Information system « Management and disposal of the property complex» (hereinafter referred to as the System) is intended for use in state authorities of the Russian Federation that carry out accounting and disposal of property in various legal forms. The system has the following functionality:
Cadastral registration of land plots, real estate and movable property in the context of legal, economic and technical characteristics;
Maintaining a register of counterparties - legal entities, individuals, individual entrepreneurs, as well as enterprises and institutions in the context of contracts (and other transactions) with property objects;
Implementation of all types of transactions with property objects, preparation of draft contracts, orders, resolutions, acts and other documents;
Calculation of fees for the use of property, accrual of penalties, fines in the personal accounts of payers;
Analysis of receipts from the Federal Treasury Department on personal accounts of payers, the possibility of using billing technology (payment terminals), interaction with banks, as well as interaction with the GIS GMP;
Monitoring and analysis of the state of the property complex;
An Internet portal for counterparties to access information on personal accounts, prepare receipts for payment, and more.
Implementation of the System will allow to carry out:
Full inventory of real estate, movable property and land, control over the integrity and completeness of data;
Reduce labor costs, the burden on employees and the risk of the "human factor" when calculating fees for the use of property, preparing and printing financial, accounting documents, parsing receipts by automating the maintenance of personal accounts and parsing payments;
Setting up the System in accordance with changes in legislation (regulatory and reference information, methods and calculation parameters);
Increasing income from the use of property due to the prompt identification of arrears and automation of the process of conducting claims and lawsuits;
Reflection of property potential, its dynamics and structure;
Monitoring and analysis of property and land resources, ensuring control over the use of property;
Enforcement of legislation on open data, etc.
DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTIONALITY
Subsystem "Maintaining a unified register of property objects"
The subsystem serves to implement and display the processes of formation of property objects (land plots, real estate, movable property) of their state accounting with the possibility of dividing by municipalities, the emergence and state registration ownership rights to them. It has the functionality to enter / upload data on legal, economic, technical and other characteristics, reflect the registration of property rights, take into account technical and title documentation, maintain a history of changes in objects.
The subsystem ensures the optimal management decisions on the disposal of property when it is leased, alienated, assigned to economic management and operational management, transferred for use or trust management, contributing as a share in the creation of business companies, using as collateral to secure credit obligations.
Subsystem "Maintaining the Register of Counterparties"
Maintaining a register of counterparties (legal entities, individuals and individual entrepreneurs) involves storing information on persons who enter into legal relations with the Administration. Information is displayed on all types of legal relations with the counterparty in the field of property relations (rent, acquisition (alienation) of property, etc.), the history of activity is kept.
The register also includes enterprises and institutions. Data is collected on the property transferred and acquired by them, an analysis is made of financial and economic activity.
Control is carried out at each stage of the liquidation procedure, bankruptcy of counterparties in order to timely withdraw property and collect debts.
Subsystem "Management and disposal of property objects"
This subsystem is used to implement and display the processes of disposing of objects (transactions): transfer of property for rent, registration of property, gratuitous use, management and operational management, permanent (perpetual) and gratuitous fixed-term use, trust management, storage, acquisition of property, purchase / sale apartments and rooms in communal apartments.
The subsystem provides for the preparation of draft documents (orders, resolutions, lease agreements, etc.), and the calculation of the purchase price of objects.
The integrity and completeness of documents are monitored, the timing of the execution of documents, the timing of the use of property, compliance with the regulations for the implementation of transactions is carried out.
A system of reminders to users on the main events in the System (the need to execute a document, prepare a document, etc.) is provided.
Subsystem "Management of personal accounts and administration of income from the use of property"
The subsystem serves to maintain personal accounts, calculate and accrue fees for the use of property, make preliminary calculations (for lease agreements), control over payment, analyze arrears and take measures to reduce arrears (claim work), prepare financial and accounting reports.
The subsystem carries out mass and individual preparation of settlement forms and forms of payment (PD-4) for sending to payers.
The subsystem provides the ability to collect, store and process information from municipalities, constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
Implementation of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation dated July 27, 2010 No. 210-FZ “On the organization of the provision of state and municipal services”, interaction with GIS GMP.
Subsystem "Analysis of receipts (payments) on personal accounts of payers"
The subsystem serves to interact with the Federal Treasury, download and process information on payments, as well as interact with banking structures to download payment orders. A billing technology is used to collect payments through payment terminals.
Subsystem "Conducting claims and lawsuits with debtors under lease agreements"
The subsystem combines the work of specialists in the implementation of the calculation of payment for the use of property and legal service. The subsystem identifies non-payers, prepares prescriptions, claims for payment of debts, and statements of claim.
The subsystem controls the deadlines for the execution of documents using a system of reminders and user notifications.
Litigation is ongoing until the entry into force of court decisions. The activities of the bailiff service are monitored.
Subsystem "Monitoring of the state of the property complex" and subsystem "Analysis of the effectiveness of property management"
Subsystems provide instrumental support for the formation of analytical materials on the state of use of property on this moment time and for the selected reporting period, containing both textual and graphical forms of information presentation. The formation of analytical materials is organized in an automated mode in accordance with the parameters specified by the user.
Within the framework of these subsystems, mechanisms for information and technological support of management activities and management decision-making have been created.
Subsystem "Internet portal"
The subsystem includes the creation of an electronic portal (contractor of the Office), which allows the user to receive the following information:
Print a payment order for the payment of the principal debt, penalty interest, debt for actual use without manually entering any additional data;
Possibility to leave a request for certificates, reconciliation acts, extracts from personal accounts and other documents;
Leave a preliminary request for the extension of contracts, assignment of the right to lease, or termination of the lease;
In the economic literature, everything that an enterprise has and uses in production activities, is called the property of the enterprise. In accordance with Art. 132 of the first part of the Civil Code “an enterprise as an object of rights recognizes a property complex used to carry out entrepreneurial activity. The structure of the enterprise as a property complex includes all types of property intended for its activities, including land plots, buildings, structures, equipment, inventory, raw materials, products, rights of claim, debts, as well as rights to designations that individualize the enterprise, its products, work and services (company name, trademarks, service marks), and other exclusive rights, unless otherwise provided by law or contract.”
The property of the enterprise includes all types of property that are necessary for the implementation of economic activities.
Usually, tangible and intangible elements are distinguished in the composition of property.
Material elements include land plots, buildings, structures, machinery, equipment, raw materials, semi-finished products, finished goods, cash.
Intangible elements are created in the course of the life of the enterprise. These include: the reputation of the firm and the circle regular customers, company name and trademarks used, management skills, personnel qualifications, patented production methods, know-how, copyrights, contracts, etc., which may be sold or transferred.
The relevance of the chosen topic of work lies in the fact that the property of an enterprise is the subject of study of various disciplines: law studies legal aspects existence, protection, transfer of property rights and obligations; in the analysis of economic activity, the effectiveness of the use of various kinds enterprise property; in the course of economics, the property of an enterprise is considered as an economic, economic resource, the use of which ensures the activities of the enterprise; accounting reflects the movement of property and the main sources of its formation.
The principles of enterprise property management are different depending on organizational forms enterprises. Currently, in Russia, the following main organizational and legal forms approved by law can be distinguished:
1. Individual with the use of hired laborenterprises without the use of hired labor
full 2. Limited liability partnershipsmixed
open 3. Joint-stock companies closed federal 4. State municipal5. Non-profit public organizations
The purpose of the work: to determine the basic principles and methods of enterprise property management from the point of view of management.
A prerequisite for effective management is the existence of goals. The goals for managing an enterprise as an economic entity are financial and economic indicators that can be determined as a result of forecasting the future activities of an enterprise. Targets can be determined only if the enterprise has a developed business plan, from which it follows: how, in what time frame, and why certain financial and economic indicators can be achieved.
The owner of any enterprise is able to assess how efficiently his property is used, only by comparing the planned indicators with those achieved. Unfortunately, over the past 10 years, the state has not done any practical steps in order to create a more or less workable system of planning in the real sector of the economy.
You can create any number of bodies involved in the management of state property, but it is impossible to manage without clear goals and high-quality information. No plans - there will be no constructive and consistent actions aimed at achieving certain goals.
Work tasks:
1. To study the main legal acts regulating the issues of enterprise property management in the Russian Federation at the present stage.
2. To study the system of state and municipal property management;
3. Describe the anti-crisis management of the property of an enterprise at the stage of bankruptcy.
The work was done on the basis of information obtained from educational and reference literature, as well as from other sources: legal acts, periodicals, enterprise documentation, expert opinions, open statistical information.
1. Types and forms of enterprise property management
1. 1 Legal regulation of enterprise property management
The Federal Law "On State and Municipal Unitary Enterprises" determines, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF), the legal status of the state unitary enterprise and municipal unitary enterprise (hereinafter also referred to as a unitary enterprise), the rights and obligations of the owners of their property. A variety of unitary enterprises are state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises are state-owned enterprises that are directly under the control of state bodies.
The property of a unitary enterprise is owned by the Russian Federation, a subject of the Russian Federation or a municipality.
The property of a unitary enterprise is formed by:
Property assigned to a unitary enterprise on the right of economic management or on the right of operational management by the owner of this property;
Income of a unitary enterprise from its activities;
Other sources that do not contradict the law.
The property of a unitary enterprise is indivisible and cannot be distributed among contributions (shares, shares), including between employees of a unitary enterprise.
The difference between the rights of economic management and operational management lies in the content and scope of the powers received by the subjects of these rights from the owner to the property assigned to them.
Only legal entities existing in special organizational and legal forms - "enterprises" and "institutions" can be subjects of the rights of economic management and operational management.
The subject of the right of economic management under the current legislation may be a state or municipal unitary enterprise (Articles 113 - 114 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation) as a type of commercial organization.
The subject of the right of operational management can be both unitary enterprises (Article 115 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation) belonging to the category of commercial organizations, and institutions (Article 120 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation) belonging to non-profit structures, as well as enterprises belonging to private property.
The right of economic management, owned either by the enterprise as a commercial organization; or an institution carrying out entrepreneurial activities permitted by its owner; therefore, it is broader than the right of operational management, which may belong either to non-commercial institutions by the nature of their activities, or to state-owned enterprises.
In accordance with Art. 294 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the right of economic management is the right of a state or municipal unitary enterprise to own, use and dispose of the property of the owner within the limits established by law or other legal acts.
The right of operational management in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 296 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation - this is the right of an institution or a state-owned enterprise to own, use and dispose of the property of the owner assigned to it within the limits established by law, in accordance with the goals of its activities, the tasks of the owner and the purpose of the property.
The founder-owner has the right to withdraw property from the subject of the right of operational management only in three cases provided for by law (excessive, unused or not used for its intended purpose), and dispose of it at its own discretion. No property other than finished products, a state-owned enterprise is not entitled to dispose of it without the consent of the owner.
1.2 Tasks and general principles of state property management
The tasks of state property management include two main blocks: strategic management and operational management.
Strategic management issues include:
Investment decisions;
Decisions on debt obligations of enterprises, especially to the state budget (both in taxes and on loans and guarantees issued);
Problems of choosing directions for the development of specific state-owned enterprises.
Operational management includes three main groups of tasks: planning, control and management decision making. High efficiency management of state property can be ensured through the implementation, one of the most common concepts modern management, - "goal management". Management by objectives implies the existence of clear, measurable and achievable goals, as well as a strategy and action plan that will ensure the achievement of the set goals. Business planning is not a step backwards, but a professional look into the future. Lack of goals and plans give rise to irresponsibility in the management of enterprises. If there are no goals and no ways to achieve them, then there are no clear criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of management. As a result, control procedures on the part of the owner (in this case, the state) turn from the most important management functions into an empty formality. Thus, the presence of a business plan that includes certain goals (in the form of financial and economic indicators), as well as the main provisions of the enterprise development strategy and operations, is the most important condition for creating a management system by goals.
RUSSIAN PRIORITIES
UDC: 338.121:656.2
PROVISION OF STATE INTERESTS WHEN FORMING A MECHANISM FOR MANAGING PROPERTY COMPLEXES OF LARGE CORPORATIONS*
V. O. FEDOROVICH, Doctor of Economics, Director of the Institute of Magistracy E-mail: [email protected] Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management
Formation of a rational organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property complex (property), ensuring a balance of interests of the state and other participants corporate relations, is a task of paramount importance, far beyond the scope of only the economic interests of the main groups of shareholders (owners). Underestimation of the importance of corporate governance in industrial corporations with state participation undermines the investment process, reduces the efficiency of capital use, hinders economic growth, hinders the mobilization of savings, makes it impossible to objectively analyze the profitability of various types of assets (property complex) of corporations and their capitalization. And, on the contrary, a correctly chosen corporate governance system guarantees the protection of the economic interests of the state,
* The article was prepared based on the materials of the journal National Interests: Priorities and Security. 2013. No. 26 (215).
financial transparency of the corporation's business activities and its accountability to owners and creditors.
Modern fast-growing corporate formations differ significantly from traditional joint-stock companies, primarily in terms of the composition and structure of assets. The entire property complex of modern corporate entities largely depends on the volume and quality of intangible assets focused on the human factor. These are commercial brands, own developments (know-how), strategic agreements, patents. With employees and business partners, such corporations have very flexible mutually beneficial contracts with a significant degree of economic freedom.
Highly integrated industrial corporations are attractive to a wide range of investors if they are dynamic, innovative and pay high dividends. Integration of various lines of business with the creation of an adequate mechanism for
Good governance improves the competitive position of any modern corporation. Ways to improve legislative framework in the field of corporate governance are determined by the economic interests of the business community. These interests lie in the area of establishing reliable partnerships between the main resource providers and are shared by participants (owners) and creditors. The main problems of interested participants in corporate relations are resolved during negotiations.
The variety of interests of shareholders or their main groups in terms of incentives, attitudes towards risk, preference for investment strategies and sources of financing determines the variability of methods and ways of forming the management of the property complex of large corporate entities. Thus, the organizational and economic mechanism of management in high-risk corporations that use venture capital and rely on the human factor in their economic activity can be very different from those in corporations that have been on the market for a long time.
In addition to the specifics of the capital structure (property) of a corporation, the organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property complex is largely determined by legislation, the system of state regulation and established business practice. These conditions set the institutional boundaries of corporate management of property (capital) of large integrated industrial corporations.
The institutional base for property management is:
Rules and regulations for the formation of a status right (title of ownership) and its subsequent protection;
Voluntarily adopted standards, national codes governing the system of intra-corporate management of property complexes;
culture business relations developed on the basis of social norms, religious beliefs and national specifics of specific states (territories).
In the process of formation of organizational, economic and financial mechanisms that ensure the effective management of the property complex, it is important to solve the problems of an institutional nature that arise in the process of separation at the legislative level of the right to own property.
responsibilities and corporate control rights. If the outsider model of corporate control is characterized by dispersion of the ownership structure, then the insider model implies the concentration of ownership (and hence strategic management) with one or several owners. The state can be a participant in both systems of corporate control.
The balance of economic interests of the participants in the outsider model is achieved through the interaction of disparate participants (owner-shareholders) and chief managers of the corporation, who have real economic opportunities. The problems of the insider model lie in the imbalance of the economic interests of the controlling participant (or a group of them) and minority participants (owners).
Let us dwell on the main factors influencing the formation of basic models of the property management mechanism to balance the economic interests of the state and other participants in corporate relations. This is the level of concentration of ownership, motivation, material and moral stimulation production management, institutional support for the process of mergers (acquisitions) and separation, models for the formation of equity (authorized) capital, cross-ownership of shares, etc. and small business (entrepreneurship) and its economic growth.
The organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property complex is aimed at solving problems that arise between the participants (owners) and the state (and the state can also be one of the owners), as well as between the participants and production management. When separating the functions of ownership and control, competition is traditionally considered the main motivation for finding optimal management and control mechanisms that minimize transaction costs. But even market competition with the dominance of the state form of ownership does not solve the problem of the conflict of economic interests in the system "participants (owners) - production management", as well as in the system "state (owner) - state regulation of economic activity" (state - fiscal tax authority) .
In the economic literature, the problems of corporate governance are considered from two positions. The first is the concept of shareholders (owners) and a narrow circle of participants. For shareholders, the most acceptable is the full accountability of production management (top managers) to the owners, i.e., the participants in the corporation. To do this, an organizational and economic mechanism is being formed that allows to maximize the rights of participants (owners) in managing the following tools:
Through compensation payments and options, the economic motivation of managers is linked to the economic motivation of owners;
To strengthen the institutional protection of owners and their rights, a ban (restriction) on insider transactions is introduced, and the market for mergers and divisions is regulated.
From the point of view of the shareholders, the decisive evaluation criterion is the maximum amount of income of the owners, determined by the maximum consolidated profit of the corporation. In this case, the simplest criterion is market price property complex of the corporation, calculated as the product of the price of shares (exchange quotation) and their number. This indicator makes it possible to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of the management of the economic activities of the corporation as a whole.
Another concept takes into account the economic interests of a wider range of persons - participants (owners), top managers, creditors, personnel and state power(state institutions). It's no secret that economic goals named categories of persons (subjects) may differ markedly. Thus, the goals of owners and managers in separating the functions of control and ownership most often do not coincide. Unlike participants who want to increase the value (capital) of the corporation, for production management (middle and top management) the main thing is the current material remuneration, for personnel - the growth of wages, which is achieved by increasing sales volumes (capturing a larger market share), as well as by implementing risky investment projects.
The problem of balancing the interests of participants (owners) and production management can be considered on the basis of the concept of "imperfect contracts" (residual control rights), proving the impossibility of an ideal contract, where all conditions and circumstances are provided - after all, management
sometimes take it management decisions in unforeseen circumstances and situations not specified in the contracts. In some cases, the participant reserves such “rights of residual control”, which sharply exacerbates the problem of information asymmetry. Thus, differences in the level vocational training and awareness of owners and managers often lead to serious losses.
The organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property complex in the framework of the first model also includes relationships with the institutional environment and provides opportunities to take into account the economic interests of creditors, personnel and government institutions (authorities). By integrating the economic interests of these groups, this model makes it possible to adequately evaluate the activities of the corporation's top managers and provides them with real targets. In this case, the value of economic value added (EVA) can serve as a complex integral indicator (Table 1).
The conceptual foundations of the formation of the organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property of large industrial corporations, proposed by various researchers, are based on modern concept managing the value of a corporation whose main goal is to ensure the growth of the market value of the corporation through an increase in the market value of shares. The system of indicators, which are used as estimates, is constantly being improved. Modern information Technology allow you to receive them in the mode of operational monitoring. Based on the generalization of the results of basic theoretical and applied developments of foreign and domestic authors, a phased scheme for the formation of an organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property of industrial and transport corporations is proposed, taking into account the structural relationship of its elements (Fig. 1).
When conducting valuation corporations use the economic category of business value. In its most general form, this is a balance or nominal cost, i.e. either the balance sheet total or the value of the organization's assets. However, the real value of the organization differs from the nominal value due, for example, to a certain discrepancy between the book value of non-current (including intangible) assets and their market value (for example, due to the significant time
Table 1
Corporate performance indicators for various stakeholder groups
Participants (owners) Lenders Production management (top managers)
Yield equity Absolute liquidity ratio Product profitability. Profitability of sales
Earnings per share Economic characteristic cash flows Marginal income
The ratio of the amount of dividends and the value of assets The liquidation value of the corporation Asset turnover indicators
The ratio of capitalization and book value of the corporation Strength of financial leverage (financial leverage) Level of operating leverage (operating leverage)
Dynamics of the level of capitalization of the corporation Share (structure) of debt obligations relative to capitalization Structure of receivables and payables, their ratio
Return on assets and the total amount of consolidated profit Financial stability of the corporation Payroll and wage intensity of products, efficiency of personnel use
Tax burden on property Degree of coverage of interest payments Efficiency of investment projects (payback periods)
Increment rate share capital Solvency Efficiency of production, economic and financial activities
beneficial use). Generally, when deriving the market value of corporations, two approaches are used.
The first approach assumes that the market value corresponds to the equilibrium price set by the interested parties in the course of a transaction related to the change of ownership of a corporation (purchase and sale of an organization).
The market value of a corporation is a relative value, influenced by many factors. Its property components should be assessed comprehensively as a self-developing mechanism, the actions of which are determined by the state of the assets and depend on the efficiency of the corporation's managers. Quite often, this uses a quantitative assessment of the economic value of the corporation - goodwill, determined by the difference between the real price and the book value of the corporation's assets.
The second approach is based on the main provisions described above, i.e., the market price of a corporation is adjusted for the amount of future growth in its assets due to an economic assessment of the probabilistic value of cash inflows. In practice, as a rule, this is the amount of discounted cash flows over the useful life of the active fixed assets of the corporation.
Economic value added (EVA) is the book value plus the present value of future EVA. In other words, this is the value of the rate of return minus the weighted average
value of capital multiplied by the amount of invested capital.
As part of the management of the value of the property complex of corporations, the EVA indicator is used when compiling capital budget, when evaluating the effectiveness of economic activity as separate isolated structural divisions, subsidiaries and affiliates ( legal entities), and corporate entity (group) as a whole.
The main economic idea of using EVA is that the share capital of any corporate entity should bring at least the same return as an investment with a similar level of risk in the government or corporate stock (bond) market.
To characterize the state interests in the formation of tax and non-tax payments to the budgets of all levels, let us dwell in more detail on the scenario options economic behavior large corporate formations with dominance or 100% participation in the structure of the share capital of the state form of ownership. The economic interests of the state are connected with the determination of the amounts and time periods for receiving income. It's about on tax and non-tax revenues of the state budget, the payers of which (subjects of taxation) in accordance with the current legislation are all legal entities registered in the Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations (EGRPO). The economic and legal aspect of this problem is somehow connected with
Ensuring balance
economic interests of subjects of corporate relations
Economic interests of subjects of corporate relations
Owners
Lenders
Managers
Economic Value Added (EVA) Equity Value Added (AMV)
Creation of a corporate governance model
Ownership structure as a quantitative assessment of the economic opportunities (powers) of participants in property management (private, state, municipal)
State property 100%
Concentrated ownership structure with separation of the dominant owner (presence of a group of minority shareholders)
Distribution (dispersed) ownership structure with a significant number of "equal" small shareholders (one share - one vote)
insider model outsider model
corporate governance corporate governance
Shareholder concept Participant concept
Consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, consolidated budgets of constituent entities of the Russian Federation
Corporate Income Tax
tax revenue
Property tax of legal entities
Income from the use of state or municipal property or from the activities of state and municipal organizations
Non-tax income
Rice. 1. Stages of formation of the organizational and economic mechanism of property management
large corporations with state participation
problems of corporate management of large business structures.
In this regard, the following questions need to be answered. How to determine the economic interests of the state with equal rights for all forms of ownership? How to influence the integration and disintegration processes in the national economy so that the economic benefit from the economic
tvenno activity of subjects and from the use of property was the maximum? What metrics should be used?
In accordance with the current legislation, budget revenues are considered to be funds received irrevocably and free of charge at the disposal of state authorities of the Russian Federation, a constituent entity of the Russian Federation and local authorities.
self-government. In general, budget revenues are formed from tax and non-tax payments and gratuitous transfers. The income of target budget funds is taken into account separately.
Tax revenues include federal, regional and local taxes and fees provided for by the tax legislation of the Russian Federation, as well as penalties and fines, non-tax revenues include income from the use of state or municipal property (after paying taxes and fees), from paid services rendered by budgetary institutions under the jurisdiction of federal bodies respectively executive power, executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, bodies local government etc.
According to Art. 42 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation (BC RF), income from the use of state or municipal property includes:
Funds received in the form of rent for the temporary possession and use or temporary use of property in state or municipal ownership;
Funds received in the form of interest on balances of budget funds on accounts in credit institutions;
Funds received from the transfer of state or municipal property to trust management;
Funds from the repayment of state loans, budget loans and budget loans, including funds from the sale of property and other collateral transferred to recipients of budget loans, budget loans and state and municipal guarantees to the relevant executive authorities as security for obligations on budget loans, budget loans and state and municipal guarantees;
Payment for the use of budgetary funds provided to other budgets, foreign states or legal entities on a returnable and paid basis;
Income in the form of profit attributable to shares in the authorized (share) capital of economic companies and partnerships, or dividends on shares owned by the Russian Federation, constituent entities of the Russian Federation or municipalities;
Other income provided by the legislation of the Russian Federation from the use of property located
belonging to the state and municipal property.
Income budget institution, received from entrepreneurial and other income-generating activities, are fully taken into account in the estimate of income and expenses of a budgetary institution and are reflected in the income of the corresponding budget as income from the use of state or municipal property, or as income from the provision of paid services.
The economic interests of the state, interpreted as the volume and intensity (speed) of the flow of financial resources (cash) to the budgets of the corresponding levels, characterize the state as a regulator of corporate relations. In table. 1, groups of indicators were presented that characterize the host state as an equal participant in the formation authorized capital- property complex of large corporate formations. To characterize economic relations of the state as a regulator of corporate relations through the functioning of the system of taxation of economic (entrepreneurial) activities, let's consider the dynamics of the seven-year period of total income and tax revenues to the federal budget of the Russian Federation (Fig. 2) .
The purpose of the analysis of information arrays, graphically presented in fig. 2-5 is to identify trends and dependencies between tax and non-tax revenues to the budget. The indicated amounts of receipts make it possible to give a volumetric (quantitative) economic assessment of the actual use of the property complexes of large corporate entities in the relevant periods of time.
Operational economic assessment characterizes the system of taxation of production, economic and financial activities of corporations through the collection of value added tax and income tax.
A strategic economic assessment can be obtained on the basis of an analysis of the property tax collection system, rent for the use of property (property complexes) in economic circulation and the amounts of revenues (reporting and planned) from the sale of state and municipal property, restructuring and corporatization of property complexes of state and municipal organizations.
To achieve a balance of economic interests of participants in corporate entities, it is necessary to determine the ratio of the volumes of
25 000 20 OOO
15 000 10 OOO
certain types of cash receipts. This value makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of the functioning of the property complexes of participating organizations and their structural divisions (Fig. 3).
From the analysis of Fig. 3 shows that there is a clear large-scale sum discrepancy between tax and non-tax revenues federal budget RF, which testifies to the low "economic weight" of state revenues from property (property complexes).
For quality assessment economic policy, carried out by the Government of the Russian Federation in terms of the operational and strategic use of property complexes with a 100% or other, well-defined share of state or municipal property in the capital of large corporations, it is advisable to analyze the dynamics of non-tax revenues to the budget of the Russian Federation,
16 000 14 000 12 000
6 000 4 000 2 000 0
including sum receipts from the use in economic circulation of property complexes of organizations of state and municipal forms of ownership. Explicit changes in approaches have been noticeable since 2008 (Fig. 4), which is also confirmed by a certain correspondence between operational and strategic assessments of the use of property complexes of corporate entities in economic circulation (Fig. 5).
Economic justification the legitimacy of state regulation of privatization processes as a tool for managing structural changes and capitalization of corporate entities with equity or 100% state participation in ownership is proved by the same growth rates of the corresponding revenues (see Fig. 4 and 5). This plot is considered in more detail by the author in the articles.
The model for coordinating state economic interests and the interests of these groups of participants in corporate relations with the formation of aggregated volumetric financial indicators is shown in fig. 6.
Let us consider the formation of a mechanism for state regulation of the economic interests of subjects of corporate relations in Russia. At present, the choice of sources and forms of financing (investment) is of particular importance for corporations to ensure both strategic development and current production and economic activities. Let us dwell in more detail on the distribution of economic interests of participants-shareholders (holders of property titles), creditors and functioning groups of corporations (legal entities), i.e. subsidiaries, dependent and affiliated organizations, and the state as an equal subject of these relations, on the one hand, and their regulator on the other.
Rice. Fig. 2. Dynamics of the total amount of income and tax revenues of the consolidated federal budget of the Russian Federation in 2005-2011, billion rubles: I - income of the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation; II - tax revenues
Rice. 3. Dynamics of tax (I) and non-tax (II) receipts of the revenue part of the federal budget of the Russian Federation in 2005-2011, billion rubles
Practice shows that the economic interests of shareholders, integrated into the ownership structure of specific corporate entities, cause quite significant differences in the structure of sources of their long-term (strategic) and short-term (operational) financing not only of the groups themselves, but also of individual subsidiaries and affiliates within corporations.
State regulation of the economic interests of the subjects of corporate relations in the conditions of a certain economic growth is provided with the help of the organizational and economic mechanism of property management. By analogy with the division of management functions and economic activities at the level state apparatus management at the corporate level is also divided into the functions of shareholders (holders of the title of ownership), the functions of public control (services of external audit) and the functions current management production and economic and financial activities(production management). As a rule, in practice, the interests of all these entities reveal significant differences, especially obvious between the participants (shareholders-investors) and managers of the corporation.
Representatives senior management corporations, acting in their own interests, try to get the highest possible wages and using their official powers, they can seize part of the assets through affiliated organizations for their own personal purposes. Managers can also, by means available to them, in accordance with applicable law, oppose themselves
owners (shareholders) in terms of the residual income received by the corporation (retained consolidated profit).
The institutional base of property relations arising from the reform of large industrial corporations, as well as modern corporate relations regulated by the state, are determined by three basic legislative acts. These are federal laws of April 25, 1996 No. 39-F3 “On the market valuable papers”, dated December 26, 1995 No. 208-FZ “On joint-stock companies”, dated 05.03.1999 No. 46-FZ “On the protection of rights and legal
Rice. 4. Dynamics of non-tax revenues (I) and income from the use of state and municipal property (II)
in 2005-2011, billion rubles
Rice. Fig. 5. Dynamics of income tax (I) and income from the use of state property (II) in 2005-2011, billion rubles.
Rice. 6. Balance of economic interests of the state and other key participants
corporate relations
interests of investors in the securities market”. The federal law on joint-stock companies made it possible to form in Russia a two-tier system for managing large corporate entities (JSC), generally consisting of a board of directors and a board of directors. This law creates a sufficiently solid legal basis for effective corporate management of the property of complex organizational structures.
Under this law, a minority minority on the board of directors can block transactions that are contrary to their economic interests. Thus, decisions on changes in the authorized capital, on the adoption of amendments to the charter and on major (i.e., exceeding half of the book value of the property complex of the corporation) transactions require three-quarters of the votes general meeting shareholders.
It also seems sufficient to protect the rights of shareholders from possible "dilution" of outstanding shares. A new (additional) issue of shares must be placed on the secondary market at market value. The adoption of the relevant decision on placement must be approved by two-thirds of the votes of the general meeting. The voting procedure itself is also strictly regulated, especially when the number of shareholders exceeds 1,000 people. By law, each shareholder has the right to vote, the "weight" of which corresponds to the number of shares multiplied by the number of board members to be elected. Sufficient attention is also paid to external control over
activities of production management is, first of all, a mandatory external audit, and for corporations with more than 500 employees. - an external independent registrar of securities (shares of a corporate entity).
The federal law on the protection of investors' rights regulates the rules of conduct for securities registrars, custodial institutions and traders. This greatly facilitates the very procedure for the free sale (purchase and sale) of securities in the secondary market. In addition, the current legislation establishes rather strict standards regarding the amount of financial information to be published in the open press. This is an annual financial statements(1st and 2nd forms), information on significant events for the corporation (changes in the authorized capital, composition of the board of directors, chief managers, share capital structure).
The main vectors of economic interests of the participants, regulated by the current legislation (legislative and regulations RF) are shown in Fig. 7.
Let us comment on the indicated in Fig. 7 directions and levels of interaction of economic interests of groups of subjects.
1-2 - the relationship between the participants and production management, due for the most part to the type of ownership (concentrated or dispersed), on the basis of which the authorized capital of a corporate entity is formed. There are potential opportunities here
Rice. 7. The main directions of interaction between the economic interests of the state and other subjects of corporate relations, regulated by the current legislation of the Russian Federation: 1 - participants (owners, i.e. shareholders);
2 - production management (secondary and higher
managers); 3- creditors; 4 - staff (employees); 5- state regulatory bodies
mergers or acquisitions of a legal entity and the associated risks of job loss.
2-3 - relations between production management and credit organizations, which often determine not only the relationship of the lender and the lender, regulated by the financial stability of the organization and the liquidity of the business. Relations between top managers and the lending institution often develop into a relationship between the participants (owners) and the lender as a possible potential institutional owner of the corporate entity (link 3-1 in Figure 7).
2-4 - relations between the top managers and the staff of the corporation, regulated by the system of contracts and the terms of the collective agreement concluded annually between the administration (top managers) and the hired staff of the corporation.
3-5 - relations between state institutions (banking) and commercial banks or between the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and commercial organizations in the field of regulation of credit relations and taxation of credit organizations, including currency regulation.
4-5 - relations between employers and employees, regulated by the state through civil and labor legislation.
5-1 - relations between public institutions (authorities) and participants
(owners), regulated by the three legislative acts mentioned above.
5-3 - relations between state institutions (authorities) and production management, regulated by civil law and the Corporate Governance Code.
If we consider the directions of the impact of economic interests for each of the five subjects of corporate relations presented in Fig. 7, taking into account the incoming directions of influence with a minus sign, and the outgoing ones with a plus sign, it is possible to draw up a balance equation for the economic interests of the partners in corporate relations, which should be taken into account in management and adjusted using the organizational and economic mechanism of property management.
The contradictions between the economic interests of the participants (owners) and production management (top managers) are considered in the conceptual theory of agents or the concept of delegation of authority - agency theory. At the same time, the economic interests of owners and managers are studied, and groups of their main contradictions are classified.
Slightly different conceptual approaches form the basis of the theory of interested persons (stake-holder theory), which proposes ways to harmonize the economic interests of all entities directly or indirectly related to the functioning of the corporation. According to this concept, the goal of the economic activity of any corporation is not to maximize the value of the corporation (growth of capitalization), but to improve its image by improving the social and economic situation personnel and reduce environmental risks. Managers, in the absence of information asymmetry, make managerial decisions, taking into account all interested parties (owners, creditors, personnel, etc.).
Let's try to realistically assess the possibilities of production management to balance the economic interests of the subjects of corporate relations. To do this, we classify into groups economic disagreements that are potentially possible in the process of exercising the rights and obligations of subjects, in accordance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation (Table 2).
Summarizing the data in Table. 2, we can distinguish the following main contradictions in the economic interests of the considered groups of subjects.
table 2
Economic interests of the main groups of subjects taken into account in the formation of the organizational and economic mechanism of property management
Subjects of corporate relations Characteristics of economic interests Degree of influence on the achievement of the goal Responsibility
Owners (participants): majority shareholders (board of directors), minority shareholders (board of directors) Strategic, long-term Tactical, operational, short-term High Low Limited participation Limited participation
Production management: Executive Director(chief manager), top managers (board, administration), personnel, employees (collective council, trade union) Tactical and short-term (amplitude), individual Operative, short-term, collective (group) Tactical group and operational individual High (partially limited) Medium (limited) Low, minimal High individual Medium individual Low
State - participant (shareholder) Strategic, socio-economic focus High, limited by ownership structure High, limited by participation
The state is a regulatory and fiscal authority Strategic, focused on macroeconomic benchmarks High High
Interested people(including affiliated) Tactical and medium-term Limited or low Low, depending on control conditions
1. Disagreements in economic interests between participants (owners) and production management (top managers) can be quite significant. Thus, owners are interested in maximum capitalization and dividend payments, and top managers are interested in high material remuneration (wages, bonuses, managerial status). Dominants depend on the degree of concentration of ownership.
2. The conflict of interests of the dominant groups of shareholders (majority shareholders) and other shareholders (minority shareholders) of the corporation, as a rule, manifests itself in connection with the dynamics of the market value of shares: the majority shareholders have long-term interests, the minority shareholders have short-term interests. As for investments, for some, strategic innovations are decisive, for others, operational ones. For example, according to the International Finance Corporation, the share of retained (net) profits allocated to national companies RF on dividend payments increased to 21%, while such payments were made in less than 30% of regional corporations with sales of less than $10 million and more than 50% of companies with sales over $10 million.
3. Disagreements between top managers and staff (employees), as well as between owners and employees are mainly resolved on a contract basis
when hiring (hiring) for work, in the future - with the help of trade unions, civil and labor legislation.
4. Differences in the interests of owners and other stakeholders (affiliates, government agencies).
Practice has shown that a rational organizational and economic mechanism for managing the property complex contributes to the streamlining of corporate relations at all levels of the hierarchy of management of entities, which ultimately streamlines business processes and contributes to the growth of investment in the national economy. At the same time, a quantitative economic assessment, which comprehensively and fairly objectively takes into account the economic interests of the state and other subjects of corporate relations and reflects the effectiveness of the mechanism for managing the property complex, is provided by two identical and widely used indicators - the value added of equity capital (market added value, MAV) and economic value added. (economic value added, EVA) .
The problem of resolving economic contradictions between the subjects of corporate relations is being actively studied in developed capitalist countries. Traditionally, there are Anglo-American and German-Japanese models of corporate governance. In the first, the emphasis is on state regulation of capital markets for legal
howling protection of owners (participants), as well as legal entities as equal participants in economic turnover. At the same time, the rights of minority groups of shareholders are equally protected (in the case of a dispersed ownership structure). There are also special schemes for participation in the board of directors of representatives employees(personnel of the corporation), through this mechanism, the economic interests of the personnel are taken into account.
In the German-Japanese model of corporate governance (Germany, Japan, Austria, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, etc.) there are two-level management systems - the board and the supervisory board, which includes independent directors - representatives of all subjects of economic relations. The Russian, the youngest, model of corporate governance in practice enshrines quite significant rights expressing the interests of all subjects of corporate relations of executive directors (president of an OJSC, chairman of the board of directors, general (executive director). Currently, it is necessary to turn Special attention on the experience of Germany, where the degree of participation of an employee in ownership, management and production processes determines his motivation, interest in the final results of the corporation's activities (which not only contributes to the balance of economic interests of these groups of subjects, but also meets the principles of economic and social justice).
Let us consider several situational models that are typical for the practice of modern corporate relations and allow us to talk about the possibility of integrating economic interests in the management of the property complex of large corporate entities.
The owners have at their disposal an effective toolkit with which it is possible to correct the managerial decisions of managers. These are mechanisms of internal and external control, the use of independent persons in the boards of directors, a change in the ownership structure - in case of mergers (acquisitions) or division of a corporation. In some cases, relative harmonization of the interests of owners and managers is possible through the mechanism of monetary compensation. Relativity is due to the measure of responsibility, measured by a specific amount of costs incurred by owners and managers as a result of their management decisions.
Complicating the situation under consideration, the appearance of a third subject - the spokesman is quite op-
divided economic interests - the creditor (in the case of long-term borrowings, the creditor is considered the investor) as the holder of the debt obligations of the corporation. In the event of a conflict situation (a discrepancy between the economic interests of owners and creditors), the threat of bankruptcy of the corporation becomes real. However, if there is little or no risk on a corporation's debt obligations, creditors have little interest in either the rate of return or the market value (capitalization) of the corporation itself. If such a risk is still present, then the owners always have certain advantages over creditors. Such advantages lie in the legal sphere, since claims on shares are, by their economic and legal nature, residual claims, and in the event of a decrease in the value of debt obligations, the value of obligations on shares remains unchanged for some time.
It is also possible that the production management makes managerial decisions that allow (within the framework of the current legislation) to transfer the corporation's assets into the sphere of its own powers, strengthening its economic position. If managers act in the interests of the owners, then in the event of a default risk, they may be interested in transferring credit resources towards the owners of the corporation, for example, in the following ways:
Direct investment resources (loans) to the most risky high-yield assets. When making a profit, the owners remain the winners, otherwise the creditors assume the risk of loss;
Reducing the capitalization of costs financed by attracted financial resources (additional issue of shares). Typically, attraction is carried out until the profit received due to this (net present value) is equal to the amount attracted for this financial resources(investments). If at the same time as additional funds loans are used, then the growth in the market value of debt obligations becomes a kind of “capital” for this part of the investment. When paying off debt obligations, in this case, there is a reduction in investment;
Having carried out a fairly active credit policy for partial payment of funds borrowed by the owners of the corporation. This helps to reduce the market value of debt obligations and save
a decrease (although often a decrease) in the level of capitalization of a corporation. At the same time, the amount of dividends received by the owners largely compensates for the decrease in the value of their shares;
Hiding information from creditors regarding financial stability corporations. By dragging out the restructuring procedure or exploiting gaps in legislation, managers make the procedure of bankruptcy and reorganization of a corporation as difficult as possible. The economic gain (very relative) due to the conservation of the age structure of debt obligations and the increase in risk is received by owners to the detriment of creditors. Solving the problem of coordinating the interests of owners and managers requires a search for approaches and methods for quantitatively measuring the quality of managerial decisions. Owners are potentially ready and able to adequately pay for management decisions of managers if there are indicators that allow them to effectively, with a given degree of objectivity, measure and evaluate their management contribution. Such indicators can be the amount of earnings per ordinary share, the capitalization of the corporation, the positive dynamics of profitability, the level of economic value added or the value added of equity capital.
Correctly chosen criteria for operational strategic economic assessment will enhance professional motivation corporate management to generate financial revenues that increase the capitalization of the corporation, rather than organizational pseudo-reorganizations and risky investments with low returns. The Russian economy is currently characterized by the strengthening of the position of the state. This is manifested in the regulation of economic and financial relations at the macro level in increasing the share of state ownership in especially significant sectors of the economy. State regulation of financial markets, the processes of restructuring of large industrial and transport corporations affects the structure of the authorized capital, the balance of economic interests of participants and the sources of strategic and current financing of economic activities. In practice, this happens through the implementation of targeted state programs (lending to specific sectors of the economy), regulation of stock market prices, through state participation in large industrial corporations.
active formations (holdings), through the policy of credit rates (participation of the state in credit institutions, adjustment of the refinancing rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, etc.).
As mentioned above, the coordination of the economic interests of participants (owners) can also have a direct impact on the structure of sources of financing for large corporate entities. V. B. Kondratiev considers three basic approaches that explain the differences in the structure of financing. Within the framework of the first approach, the capital structure of the corporation seems to be moving towards a well-defined optimal model, which is possible under the current bankruptcy legislation and the level of taxation, which harmonize the composition and structure of assets, the level of investment risk and the amount of profitability.
The second approach characterizes the impact of the conflict of economic interests of insiders and outsiders on the optimality of the structure of sources corporate finance. In this case, it is believed that the agency costs associated with the exercise of managerial powers of the corporation's managers predominate.
Within the framework of the third approach, the emphasis is on the problems associated with the imperfection of the Russian financial market. A certain asymmetry of information and the presence of transaction costs limit the ability of production management to manage the investment process. The conflict of economic interests of owners, creditors and management can have a direct impact on the efficiency of the corporation and its development strategy, making it difficult to form a rational structure of funding sources. Thus, the analysis of debt financing, on the one hand, provides control over the actions of production management, but, on the other hand, leads to an increase in agency costs. This is explained by the fact that the growth of credit risks contributes to an increase in the share of remuneration of creditors and other holders of debt obligations, which they receive in the distribution of net consolidated profit from all profitable investments of the corporation. Such a prospect of redistribution of income in reality contributes to the refusal of owners from strategically beneficial capital investments.
As a first approximation, the financial structure of large corporate entities, in the capital of which there is (or prevails) the state
gift property can be represented by the following basic indicators:
Indicators of financial stability (ratio of own and borrowed money);
Specific gravity debt obligations in the total amount of financing of capital investments;
The share of short-term liabilities in the total liabilities of the corporation;
The level of coverage of debt obligations by cash, i.e. the ratio of gross current cash, before taxes and depreciation, to the average interest rates for the period on debt obligations (credits).
Achieving a balance of interests of all participants in large corporate entities (including the state) and an incentive to build a rational structure of the property complex, ensuring the mobilization and optimal flow of financial resources, should be:
Legalization of equality of all forms of ownership, development of methods for registering relevant rights and their subsequent protection;
Clear distribution of the rights and obligations of the parties, consistency of decisions and adopted provisions on the basis of legislative and regulatory acts;
Consistent reform of the corporate sector through the system federal laws, prescribing the procedure for the creation, accession (merger) and separation of large corporate entities, as well as laws on the functioning of the stock market (securities market), bankruptcy of organizations, etc.;
Transparency in the management of the property complex (accompanying the distribution of financial resources with reliable and transparent reporting on the production and economic activities of the corporation and its financial condition);
Regular control over the intra-corporate distribution of managerial powers, analysis of decision-making procedures, compliance with the rules of statistical and financial reporting.
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Among the features characteristic of enterprises and organizations with the participation of state capital, which impede their effective functioning in the current market relations, most often include:
inefficiency of the enterprise management system;
low level of responsibility of enterprise managers to the founders for the consequences of decisions made,
Poor preservation and inefficient use of the property of the enterprise,
· weak financial and economic results of its activity;
· insecurity of the unity of the enterprise as a property complex;
· the practice of cross-subsidization and deformed structure of production costs.
Methodological developments in the field of public administration property complexes and their reforms largely copy those for commercial organizations. But one should not expect similar results for state-owned enterprises, since the state property complex has significant differences:
High inertia of reproductive processes, usually caused by complex structure production and commercial relations and determining the effectiveness of the restructuring process by the initial state of the enterprise;
A significant share of non-production expenses, often including expenses for the maintenance of non-core assets;
Disunity of the goals of functioning industrial enterprise as an independent commercial unit and the tasks facing the owner (represented by state and territorial authorities);
Inefficient methods of management, which, as a rule, include traditional and outdated forms: budgeting, support for the system of sanctions, normalization of economic indicators.
For systematic support of the innovative development of state organizations and state-owned enterprises, the main thing is the inflow of investments. Government authorities can ensure the provision, including under state guarantees, banks or special funds for long-term low-interest loans to state innovative companies. At the same time, preferential taxation can be used as an additional support measure at the local level.
The use of strategic management elements in property management at the regional level involves the use of decision support systems, both at the level of an individual organization, and at the municipal and regional levels. This is how the tasks of monitoring the state of the region's property resources, testing hypotheses, analyzing and forecasting market conditions, and analytically substantiating the strategic choice are solved.
