Tsygankov and international relations. Tsygankov P

M.: 2003 - 590 p.

The most well-established provisions and conclusions of world international political science are generalized and systematized; its basic concepts and the most famous theoretical directions are given; gives an idea of the current state of this discipline in our country and abroad. Particular attention is being paid to the globalization of world development, changes in the nature of threats to international security, and the features of a new generation of conflicts. For students of higher educational institutions students in the areas and specialties of International Relations, Regional Studies, Public Relations, Sociology, Political Science, as well as undergraduates, graduate students and university teachers.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 9
Chapter 1. Object and subject of international political science 19
1. The concept and criteria of international relations 20.
2. World politics 27
3. Relationship between internal and foreign policy 30
4. The subject of international political science 37
Literature 44
Chapter 2. The problem of method in the theory of international relations 46
1. Significance of the problem of method 46
2. Methods of situation analysis 50
Surveillance 51
Examining Documents 51
Comparison 52
3. Explicative methods 54
Content analysis 54
Event Apalise 54
Cognitive mapping 55
Experiment 57
4 Predictive methods 58
Delphi Method 59
Building Scenarios 59
System approach.60
5. Analysis of the decision-making process 70
Literature 75
Chapter 3. The problem of laws of international relations 77
1; On the nature of laws in the field of international relations 78
2. The content of the laws of international relations 82 .
3. Universal patterns of international relations 89
Literature 94
Chapter 4
1. Traditions: international relations in the history of socio-political thought 97
2. "Canonical" paradigms: the basics 105
Liberal-idealistic paradigm 106
Political realism 109
Marxist-Leninist paradigm 113
3. "Great Disputes": The Place of Political Realism 117
Literature 122
Chapter 5. Modern schools and trends in the theory of international relations 125
1. The dispute between neo-realism and neo-liberalism 126
Neorealism 126
Neoliberalism 132
The main provisions of the dispute between neorealism and neoliberalism 136
2. International political economy and neo-Marxism 140
International political economy 140
Neo-Marxism 149
3. Sociology of international relations 155.
Literature 163
Chapter 6 International System 167
1. Basic concepts of systems theory 168
2. Features and main directions systems approach in the analysis of international relations 173
3. Types and structures of international systems 178
4. Laws of functioning and transformation of international systems 184
Literature 192
Chapter 7. Environment of the system of international relations 193
1. Features of the environment of international relations 194
2. Social environment. Features of the modern stage of world civilization 196
3. Biosocial environment. The role of geopolitics in the science of international relations 201
4. Globalization international environment 212
The concept of globalization in comparison with other concepts that are close in meaning 214
The question of the historical uniqueness of globalization 217
The main components of globalization 219
Debate over the consequences of globalization 221
Literature 225
Chapter 8. Participants in international relations 228
1. The essence and role of the state as a participant in international relations 231
2. Non-state participants in international relations 238
Main features and typology of IGO 239
General characteristics and types of INGOs 242
3. Paradox of participation 248
Literature 252
Chapter 9. Goals, means and strategies of participants in international relations 254
1. On the content of the concepts of "goals" and "means" 254
2. Strategy as a unity of ends and means 267
General idea of strategy 267
Big strategy.; 270
Crisis management strategies 271
World strategies 272
Strategy and diplomacy 275
3. Force and violence as part of ends and means 277
Literature 286
Chapter 10. National interests: concept, structure, methodological and political role 288
1. Discussions about the legality of use and about the content of the concept of "national interest" 288
2. Criteria and structure of the national interest 298
On the unconscious element in the structure of the national interest 304
3. Globalization and the national interest 307
Literature 317
Chapter 11 International Security 320
1. The content of the concept of "security" and the main theoretical approaches to its study 320
2. Changing security environment and new global threats 331
3. New security concepts 338
The concept of cooperative security 339
The concept of human security 343
Democratic Peace Theory 344
Literature 347
Chapter 12. The problem of legal regulation of international relations 349
1. Historical forms and features of the regulatory role international law 350
2. Features of modern international law and its basic principles 353
Basic principles of international law 358
3. Human rights law and international humanitarian law 360
Right human disposition 360
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 364
The concept of humanitarian intervention 367
4. Interaction of law and morality in international relations 372
Literature 376
Chapter 13. The Ethical Dimension of International Relations 378
1. Morality and law in international relations: general and special 379
2. Variety of interpretations of international morality 382
Confessional-cultural performances 383
The Conflict of Theoretical Schools 385
Holism, individualism, deontology 390
3. Basic imperatives of international morality in the light of globalization 395
The main requirements of international morality 395
Globalization and new normativism 398
On the Effectiveness of Moral Norms in International Relations 401
Literature 404
Chapter 14. Conflicts in international relations 406
1. The concept of conflict. Features of international conflicts in the era of the Cold War 407
The concept, types and functions of conflict 407
Conflicts and crises 410
Features and Functions of Conflict in a Bipolar World 412
Conflict Resolution: Traditional Methods
and institutional procedures 413
2. The main directions in the study of international conflicts 417
Strategic Research 417
Conflict Studies 420
Peace Research 423
3. Features of "new generation conflicts" 426
General context 426
Reasons, participants, content 428
Settlement mechanisms 431
Literature 438
Chapter 15. International cooperation 440
1. The concept and types of international cooperation 440
2. Interstate cooperation from the standpoint of political realism 443
3. The theory of international regimes 447
4. Sociological approach to the analysis of international cooperation 450
5. Cooperation and integration processes 457
Literature 468
Chapter 16 Social Foundations international order 470
1. The concept of international order and its historical types 470
The concept of "international order" 470
Historical types of the international order 475
Post-war international order 479
2. Political and sociological approaches to the problem of international order 484
3. Foreign and domestic scientists on the prospects of a new world order 492
Literature 504
Instead of conclusion 507
Appendix 1. Some international principles, doctrines, theories. International organizations, treaties and agreements 510
Annex 2. Resources on the Internet, dedicated to research in the field of international relations (AB Tsruzhitt) | 538
Name index 581
Index 587

International relations have long occupied a significant place in the life of any state, society and individual person. The origin of nations, the formation of interstate borders, the formation and change of political regimes, the formation of various social institutions, the enrichment of cultures, the development of art, science, technical progress and an efficient economy are closely connected with trade, financial, cultural and other exchanges, interstate alliances, diplomatic contacts and military conflicts - or, in other words, with international relations. Their importance is growing even more today, when all countries are woven into a dense, ramified network of diverse interactions that affect the volume and nature of production, the types of goods created and the prices for them, consumption standards, the values and ideals of people.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the world socialist system, the entry into the international arena of the former Soviet republics as independent states, the new Russia's search for its place in the world, the definition of its foreign policy priorities, the reformulation of national interests - all these and many other circumstances of international life have a direct impact on the daily existence of people and the fate of Russians, on the present and future of our country, its immediate environment and, in a certain sense, on the fate of mankind as a whole. “In the light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that in our days there is a sharp increase in the objective need for a theoretical understanding of international relations, for an analysis of the changes taking place here and their consequences, and not least for the expansion and deepening of the relevant topics in the general humanitarian training of students.

Russian theory

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

WHAT SHOULD WE BE?*

A.P. Tsygankov

We Russians have done nothing for humanity precisely because we do not have, at least not, a Russian outlook.

K.S. Aksakov

The time has come to turn to the study of reality in all its contradictions and the creation of its own theory, which would cease to see deviations and pathology in local features that are not contained in Western schemes.

Introduction

The Russian science of international relations is entering a special period of its development. For more than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet state, a significant path has been traveled, a rich array of empirical and theoretical material has been mastered, a number of interesting concepts and approaches have been developed. discipline difficulties of an ideological and material nature. Empirical research is still sluggish, while theoretical work suffers from excessive abstraction. The general crisis of the system of social sciences in Russia, partly associated with the collapse of the Marxist paradigm, says-

* A significant part of the ideas of the article is discussed in detail in: .

1 The development of Russian international studies was analyzed in more detail in: , .

HELL. Bogaturov

and on the development of international research. The world has tangibly changed, leaving behind a period of unipolar globalization and revealing a number of new economic, political and ethno-cultural fault lines2. Are we ready to reflect on it? Do we have the necessary methodological and theoretical tools for this? Are Russian international affairs experts able to respond to the new challenges of the time?

This article proposes to comprehend the new world realities on the path of development Russian theory international relations (RTMO). At a turning point in the world development of theory, the initiative in defining the most important areas of empirical analysis and foreign policy practice could belong. Unfortunately, RTMO is still in the process of formation, often torn apart in

2 A detailed analysis of new phenomena in international relations was undertaken in Russia in recent works: , .

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contradictions and struggle of mutually exclusive approaches. Representatives of universalist and isolationist thinking have formed among Russian international theorists. If the former believe that the main thing is to integrate into the Western professional community of international affairs as soon as possible, the latter consider this path as disastrous, seeing in it a rejection of their own system of values and calling for intellectual autarky. The well-known dispute between the Westerners and the Pochvenniks finds its reflection in the discussion of the development paths of the RTMO.

Inviting the Reader to Discuss possible ways development of RTMO, I proceed from the need to overcome these extremes. In part, such overcoming would be possible as a result of narrowing the gap that has developed in Russian university practice between the teaching of international relations (IR) and Russian political thought. If political scientists and philosophers study the history of political, including domestic, thought, then international affairs most often take courses on the basics of Western theory of international relations. These areas need each other for further development, but are divided into different departments and faculties. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of its own intellectual roots, which is impossible without studying Russian thought. Without movement in this direction, the normal discussion for the development of the RTMO between the Westerners and the Pochmenniks will gravitate toward excessive ideology.

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logicization, hindering the development of the theory. If the indicated gap is overcome, then in Russia, over time, conditions could develop for the formation of a national school in the global TMT. Such a school would arise at the intersection of international relations and the history of national thought.

In the development of this idea, the article discusses the trends of Westernization and ethnocentrism in the global TMT, as well as the essence of a new theoretical dispute about the possibility of forming a universal theory of knowledge of the world. Against this global background, I propose to consider the issue of the formation of the RTMO, the points of growth of which I see in the ways of turning to the traditions of Russian thought. In criticizing universalist positions, I by no means want to be understood as an isolationist. The danger of isolationism, although weakened over the past twenty years, is still not overcome, as evidenced by the actively developing conspiracy theories and pseudoscientific research outside of academic structures. At best, the isolationist trend will delay the already protracted development of answers to questions about Russian identity and the related development of RTMO. At worst, it will return us to dogmatism that suffocates creative thought.

It is obvious to me that any TMT can fruitfully develop only in the process of active dialogue between Russian researchers and their colleagues in Western and non-Western countries. I hope that it is in the course of such a dialogue that the originality of Russian thought will come to light, because, as Vladimir Solovyov wrote, “we inevitably impose

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our national imprint on everything we do." I also hope that, reflecting on their contribution to the global intellectual community, Russian theorists will not forget about the responsibility for shaping the desired image of the future of the country and the world as a whole. After all, any social theory involves not only the analysis of facts, but also the creative building of the image of society with its characteristic system of meanings and values.

Westernization and ethnocentrism in TMO

Social cognition has long occupied the minds of social scientists. Discussions on this topic erupt and fade periodically, reflecting the ambivalence of the belief in universality and the progressive growth of knowledge. In the 20th century, discussions began with theorists of the so-called "logical positivism" formulated by the followers of the Vienna Circle in Europe. The next major step was the correction of logical positivism by Karl Popper with his "critical rationalism" and the desire to change the principles of testing scientific knowledge. The founder of critical rationalism, in particular, argued that knowledge cannot be scientific if it is formulated as non-falsifiable, i.e. if principles and conditions are not proposed under which the previous hypothesis will be considered incapacitated. Then came the time of "scientific revolutions" by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn made a sharp distinction between "normal science" and scientific revolutions and pointed out the need to understand the social and group conditions dictated by

transitions from one "paradigm" of normal science to another. Thus, the researcher came closer to the principles of the sociology of knowledge than his predecessors, a number of which had been formulated long before him in Europe by Karl Mannheim and Max Weber.

According to the latter, the interpretation of social knowledge does not exclude, but presupposes an understanding of the sociocultural characteristics of its formation. Discussions on the topics of the methodology of scientific knowledge continue, but the majority of representatives of the community of international affairs agree with the principle of the social conditionality of knowledge. Today, few people believe in the scientistic principles of “logical positivism” formulated within the framework of the Vienna Circle. Yes, and positivism itself has become more complex and interesting, going far beyond the limits of "logical positivism" and generally accepting criticism of the theory of absolute and universal truth. Social science is not free and cannot be free from ideology in the sense in which sociologists Mannheim and Weber understood it, following Karl Marx. Being a part of public consciousness, social science actively reproduces and produces national ideologies and myths. The social sciences cannot completely free themselves from these myths, although it is impossible not to strive for this.

Due to the indicated dependence of cognition on the characteristics of the cultural and ideological context, many social theories are ethnocentric in nature. In anthropology and sociology, ethnocentrism

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It is customary to define it as a belief in the "natural" superiority of one's own culture in relation to others3. Ethnocentric theory defends the values of one's culture and is based on the moral superiority of one cultural community over others. In this case, others are perceived as not civilized enough and as a potential threat. Specialists in the development of science, including social science, have come to the conclusion that such a conviction is formed in the course of historical development and is rooted in the institutional, social and civilizational structures of society. Less ethnocentric theories define "their" moral values as open to reassessment, not absolute and unchanging. At the same time, they consider alternative communities not so much as a threat, but as a source of new knowledge.

Theories of international relations are also not free from ethnocentrism and are often based on the rigid assumptions of the culture that gave rise to them. According to the just remark of the American political scientist Stanley Hoffman, international relations are "American social science", reflecting and theoretically fixing the vision of the world through the prism of Western civilization. The British internationalist Edward Carr was even more categorical when he defined the Western science of international relations as “ the best way rule the world from a position of strength. It is obvious that no science is outside of time.

3 A good review of the literature is found in: .

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nor space. The Western understanding of international relations has been formulated in relation to the realities of Western civilization and is not necessarily applicable to the rest of the world. In a world represented by a variety of cultural, ethnic, religious and regional traditions, it is generally difficult to imagine a common understanding of international relations.

It is no coincidence that many of the theories developed within the Western intellectual tradition are ill-suited to explaining events occurring outside this part of the world. Recall, for example, that the attempt to inculcate the theory of "shock therapy" as a model for the transition to market economy V Russian conditions ended with the recognition of the need for its (at least) modification. Widespread theories of democratic transition have also proved far from universal and demonstrated the need for adaptation to non-Western socio-cultural conditions. Experts remember that a similar fate befell the theory of modernization. Finally, the theory of democratic peace is also ethnocentric. According to this theory, democracies do not go to war with each other. However, the social roots of democracy may differ and are not always conducive to peace. Thus, some of the democratizing regimes in Eurasia turned out to be militaristic, including in relation to each other.

Not all theories of international relations are equally ethnocentric, but all in one way or another are a reflection of the national character and social

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cultural specifics of the country and cannot be mechanically transferred to a different cultural soil. Therefore, the prospects for creating a kind of global international theory remain vague, because national and cultural differences have not disappeared anywhere and continue to determine the behavior of participants in world politics. Therefore, the most important for international affairs specialists is not only the question of whether an international theory is possible, but also the question of its national and cultural identity and the possibility of developing such a theory outside the Western "center". If an international theory cannot formulate universally applicable laws of behavior in world politics, then such a theory may strive to solve a more modest task - to identify national and cultural characteristics and traditions in the world system, based on the understanding of such a system as globally pluralistic, and not globally. -universalist.

A New Theoretical Debate: Is Our Knowledge of the World Universal?

In the light of what has been said, the recent and ongoing controversy in the theory of international relations is of particular interest. Its meaning is connected both with the criticism of the ethnocentrism of Western theory, and with the clarification of the question of whether a universal theory of social knowledge about the world is possible. This dispute is a continuation and logical development of already held disputes in the TMO.

The earlier controversy can be summarized as a movement from polemic among Western specialists to a gradual

involvement in the theory of international relations of representatives of the critical direction and scientists working outside the Western region. In the first third of the twentieth century. actively developed a discussion between idealists who advocated the prohibition of wars through international law and realists who denied such a possibility. In the middle of the century, the discussion about the principles of the world order was supplemented by a dispute about the methodology of research. Many internationalists have come to believe in modernist or quantitative methods of collecting and analyzing information about the world. In this dispute, modernists were opposed by traditionalists, or supporters of traditional historical and legal approaches. Finally, in the last third of the century, representatives of the critical and post-structuralist trends became more active, attacking the mainstream for its conservatism and inability to rethink international relations in connection with the emergence and development of new social movements in the world. Postmodernists, feminists, Marxists and others have questioned the traditional rationalist-oriented TMT and its methods of understanding the processes taking place in the world. In the 1980s The response to the challenge of post-structuralism in Europe and the United States was the emergence of a constructivist trend that studied social norms, ideas and identities4.

At the beginning of the XX! V. backlog of representatives of the post-structuralist direction

4 On disputes in the theory of international relations, see: .

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The changes have made it possible for scholars to question the monopoly of Western knowledge of international relations. Already in the last quarter of the 20th century, through the efforts of Hayward Alker and his followers, the question of the political hegemony and intellectual provinciality of American IR theories was sharply raised. Later, these efforts led to the activation of supporters of the pluralization of the processes of knowledge of the world. Arlene Tickner, Ole Waver, and David Blaney, who teach international relations in Columbia, Continental Europe, and the United States, respectively, initiated a series of books on the development of TIR in various parts of the world. Hélène Pélerin edited a French-language book on overcoming Anglo-American centrism in international relations. John Hobson published an important book analyzing the colonial Eurocentrism of Western international relations theories. In addition, interest in the problems of civilization, civilizational identity and their influence on the formation of views about the world has increased among IR theorists.

A new controversy in theory is unfolding against the backdrop of growing changes in the social political practice international relations. Like any other discussion in the social sciences, the debate about overcoming Westernization and the Western colonial legacy is difficult to understand without understanding its social roots. The roots of this dispute should be sought in the gradual formation of a new world order, which is based on the disintegration of the unipolar

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a lot of dominance in the world of the USA and Western civilization in general. This process, initiated by the September 2001 terrorist attack by al-Qaeda Islamic radicals, was continued by the rise of China and other non-Western powers, which undermined Western economic dominance, and resulted in both the material weakening of Western civilization and the steady decline of its monopoly on the use of force in the world. First the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, and then Civil War in Syria demonstrated the inability of the United States and its allies to limit the use of force by others (including against close partners), as well as to mobilize for its use in the face of opposition from Russia, China and other major powers.

Against this socio-political background, a controversy is developing between the new supporters of universal knowledge about the world and the defenders of a pluralistic vision of the world and TMT. Universalists proceed from the ontological unity of the world, which requires the formation of uniform rational standards for its comprehension. Representatives of the liberal and realist trend in the Western TMO consider a global peace with its characteristic unified principles of behavior of states and the settlement of international disputes to be accomplished. For liberals we are talking about the formation of international institutions, while realists emphasize the military-power dimension of the world order and the leading role of the United States in maintaining an optimal international balance of power for the West. But both are convinced that

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the unity of the world implies the unity of the principles of its cognition, and ontological universalism must be supplemented by epistemological universalism. As for the attempts of China and other non-Western cultures to form their own approaches or schools of TMT, they are seen as untenable, since they call into question the principles of the universality of scientific knowledge (analysis, verification, etc.) and, therefore, gravitate towards self-isolation. For example, the American researcher Jack Snyder expressed his readiness to study Confucianism as the need to comprehend Chinese strategic culture, but denied him the right to act as the philosophical foundation of a special Chinese school in TMO.

Attempts to formulate alternative schools of theorizing are criticized not only by Western realists and liberals, but also by some representatives of the post-structuralist trend in TMT. Not being supporters of Westernization and Western-type universalism, they, nevertheless, speak out in defense of the same unified principles of scientific verification, doubting the productivity of both the formation of national schools in TMT, and the very dialogue of “Western” and “non-Western” approaches. For example, for the British researcher Kimberly Hutchins, the very opposition of “Western” to “non-Western” excludes the possibility of dialogue and, as a result, is not able to give anything but endless mutual criticism, a new opposition and strengthening of provinciality.

As for the critics of the globally universalist vision, they

accept the pluralization of TMT as a natural reflection of the pluralization of the world itself, with its diversity of power, social and cultural relations. It is easy to identify the roots of this position in the works of representatives of various areas of social and international political thought. Thus, some representatives of the realist trend, like the already quoted Carr, believe that knowledge is not free from politics, but, on the contrary, is included in the system of power relations in the world. Consequently, the objectivity of cognition is hampered by the inequality of the parties, and the claims to universalism, in fact, seek to consolidate the interests of power and the position of the strong. Proponents of Frankfurt critical theory, like Jurgen Habermas, go even further, considering progressive theory as the basis of the social and political transformation of society. As for the already mentioned representatives of the sociology of knowledge, the analysis of the socio-cultural boundaries of universalism and the social context of the functioning of ideas remains immutable for them. Finally, theorists working in the post-colonial tradition see in the pursuit of universalism an inability to understand the Other and a desire to dominate him5 * *.

Does this mean that the critics of universalism are refusing to participate in the formation of a unified TMO? Some of them will probably be ready to make statements like Friedrich Nietzsche and French postmodernists, according to which not only

5 A more detailed analysis of the literature contains

lives in:

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God, but the author has also died, which means that the texts no longer carry any semantic load. Some will speak out in favor of the impossibility of a single knowledge, pointing to the eternity of the confrontation between the great powers in world politics. However, many continue to assume the importance of maintaining the overall TMT as a fundamental scientific benchmark. For them, a globally pluralistic vision of the world not only does not exclude, but also presupposes a desire for common epistemological guidelines, but the presence of a dialogue different approaches is perceived as an indispensable condition for such a striving. It is necessary to be aware that there are many serious obstacles on the way to the formation of a unified TMT, which include, in particular, narrowed standards of rationality and epistemology. Recent studies by TMT methodologists have shown that the very understanding of science in IR should be significantly expanded6. There are also proposals to expand the epistemological boundaries, going beyond the limits of academic social science and showing openness to various philosophical researches focused on the production of knowledge about the world.

Does RTMO exist?7

The dispute about the nature of knowledge about the world finds its continuation among Russian

6 American researcher Patrick Jackson revealed the functioning of four scientific traditions of neopositivism, critical realism, reflexivism and analyticism, see: .

7 In this section, I am partly based on a survey of Russian international theorists that I conducted. The results of the survey will be discussed in more detail in a separate article.

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Russian theorists of MO. Today we can talk about the formation of two polar positions.

Firstly, in Russian discussions one can clearly hear the voices of universalists, whose position is close to the position of Western supporters of the globally universal TMT already described above. Critically evaluating the state of the Russian science of international relations, Russian universalists associate it with insufficiently active efforts to connect to global science. Some of them consider the stage of mastering the world experience in the study of IR basically completed, but at the same time they do not see in Russian research the diversity and discussions necessary for theoretical development, complaining about the dominance of realist and geopolitical approaches. The majority is convinced that mastering world experience is still ahead, because only integration into the international professional community can lead Russian science out of the dead ends of isolationist development and attempts to form “own” theories8. It is not surprising that the attitude of representatives of this group towards the idea of creating a Russian school of IR is negative. It sees unsupported ambitions, tendencies towards epistemological isolationism and attempts to exert ideological pressure on science, similar to the Soviet one.

Secondly, there is an isolationist attitude in Russian academic and political discussions.

8 A. Makarychev's response to the survey. Published with the permission of the author.

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position, which is the object of criticism from the universalists. We are talking about those representatives of Russian thought inside and outside the academic community who remain convinced that everything Russia needs for its intellectual development has already been basically created, and mainly by the Russians themselves. We have already written about the isolationist trend in Russian ML, which is rooted in the Russian superiority/inferiority complex. There are many in the Russian intellectual community who are convinced both of their possession of the truth and of the need to develop a purely Russian science in order to make it important to confront the “hostile” West. Curiously, while rejecting Western post-structuralist approaches as alien to Russia's Eurasian and Orthodox values, representatives of this group actively borrow Western traditionalist geopolitical theories. A fresh example of the creativity of representatives of this group is the recent book by the founder of the neo-Eurasian direction of Russian geopolitics, Alexander Dugin, International Relations. The author of the book demonstrates knowledge of various areas of TMT, however, in constructing his theory of a multipolar world, he relies on Samuel Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski and other traditionalist theorists of geopolitical and geocultural thought.

The identified positions are polar opposites, not fully covering the essence of the problem faced by the RTMO.

Over a twenty-year period of development, Russian international theorists have proposed and developed a number of original approaches and concepts in understanding world trends and foreign policy9. Therefore, it is legitimate to say that today RTMO has formed as a scientific direction. At the same time, the serious difficulties that this direction is experiencing in its development are also obvious. It is hard to disagree with the universalists that part of these difficulties are related to the still weak integration of Russian scientists into the global community of international affairs specialists. This topic has many intellectual, institutional and financial facets, each of which should be seriously discussed. But it must also be recognized that intellectual adaptation to the conditions of the global world is unlikely to be successful without mobilizing one's own traditions of social thinking. Russian international affairs specialists should pay attention to the fact that Russia has its own and long-standing roots of thinking about the world. This aspect of the problem deserves special mention, especially since its solution is unlikely to require the mobilization of significant financial resources.

It seems to me that over the past few centuries, Russia has developed a huge, albeit disparate, body of theoretical knowledge, which may well become the basis for the formation of a Russian school in TMO. From a historical point of view, RTMO

9 For details, see: .

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has already taken shape as a system of thinking about the world. This position falls under the definition of TMT, which was proposed at the time by Alker and his colleagues, and according to which international theory is a system of scientific and culturally rooted ideas and thoughts about the world. This definition also includes Western ideas about the world, which are based on the concept of the absence of a legitimizing center (anarchy), however, at the same time, the theory of anarchy loses the halo of universality attached to it by a significant part of Western international affairs, retaining its significance within this community of scientists. Outside the Western world, variants of an international theory of a different nature have developed and continue to develop. It seems that there are no serious grounds to deduce from the theories of international relations the ideas about the world of Muslim, Orthodox and other theologians and thinkers who put the problem of values and proper behavior at the center. Moreover, not only social scientists, but also practicing diplomats and politicians proceed from these ideas.

As for the RTMO, it has developed not one, but three traditions that deserve the attention of international theorists10. Its representatives are guided, respectively, by imitation of the West (Westernism), the preservation of independent statehood (statehood) and an original system of cultural values (third-Rimism). By tradition, I mean succession

10 See more in: .

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the diversity of ideas about the development of international relations that have been developing over several centuries of Russian history. Each of the traditions or schools of thought has developed its own images of Russia and the world system, which, despite all historical modifications, have retained their internal continuity and differences from each other.

Characteristic, for example, are the differences between the Westerners, the sovereigns and the Third Romans in their understanding of freedom, the state, and the world system. Russian Westernism is convinced of the priority value of freedom, which it understands as the liberation of the individual and which it finds in the West, but not in Russia. Convinced of the invincibility of the desire for individual liberation, Westerners consider Western civilization the most developed and viable, and the rest of the world - developing in the direction of reproducing the basic values of the West. The primary task of the state, therefore, is to create conditions of freedom, contributing to the prosperity and development of the individual. Such ideas differ significantly from those formed within the boundaries of the other two traditions of Russian international theory - sovereignty and third-rateism. The sovereigns interpret freedom as political independence, insisting on the priority of a strong and powerful state. Since the world is perceived by them as an endless struggle for power, the sovereigns are convinced that without a strong state, Russia will not be able to survive and survive. Finally, for those who see Russia as an independent culture and civilization (Third

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Rome), all other targets are secondary. Not political freedom and independence, but spiritual liberation should, in their opinion, be considered as the main domestic and international priority.

None of the presented traditions is internally homogeneous, and each develops in controversy with each other and is influenced by various representatives of Western thought. For example, earlier Westernism developed under the influence of Catholic thought, and later, depending on its varieties, under the influence of Charles Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other European philosophers. The sovereigns were also significantly influenced by Western ideas, and many of them admired the European diplomacy of Clemens Metternich and Otto Bismarck, as well as the American diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Even the original Third Roman tradition of Russian thinking has been significantly influenced by Western ideas - from German romanticism to American theorists of the pluralism of civilizations.

Today, for the further development of RTMO, it is necessary to more actively mobilize the array of theoretical knowledge accumulated by Russian thought.

Necessity

and the possibility of developing RTMO

For the further development of RTMO, new intellectual guidelines, resources and development impulses are needed. First of all, the Russian community of international relations needs a discussion about the need to form

of the national school in the global TMT. Regardless of the results, the mere fact of holding such a discussion could become an impetus for the development of RTMO. The Russian science of IR in many ways continues to live by borrowing Western theories, without asking the question about the nature and consequences of such borrowing. Meanwhile, the need to learn from the West (and not only from it) does not cancel, but suggests the need to reflect on the possibilities and limits of such borrowing in the interests of preserving the historically formed Russian identity and system of values.

The need for further development of the "Russian outlook" (Aksakov) is determined by a number of features of Russia's geographic, sociocultural, and political and economic position in the world. Firstly, the development of the RTMO cannot but be imprinted by the country's deep originality, which has become an alloy of a number of characteristics: predominantly Orthodox religion, the breadth of space and geopolitical challenges along the perimeter of long land borders, inter-civilizational cultural position, pre-Westphalian imperial roots, semi-peripheral in system of global economic ties, anti-bourgeoisness of the mass social strata and much more. Secondly, the need for the development of RTMO is dictated by the realities of global competition. If Carr was right that the Western theory of international relations teaches the West the art of ruling the world from a position of strength, then the development of international theory outside the United States and Europe is

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an indispensable condition for achieving a global political balance. It has long been said that those who do not want to feed their own army will feed someone else's. The unwillingness to invest the necessary resources in the development of TMO will inevitably result in the fact that the Russians will lose their independent system of views and values. Such a system has been formed in Russia over the centuries, helping it more than once to respond to international challenges. Today, such a challenge is the formation of a multipolar world. If the Russian leadership claims to make a significant contribution to the formation of this world, then there is no alternative to the formation of a national international theory.

In this regard, two hypotheses can be formulated regarding the development of RTMS and national social science in the context of increased global information openness. First, the more unique the culture of the country, the more active will be the efforts of the intellectual class to create and develop a national model of soft power and the development of social sciences in order to adapt to the conditions of the global world. Second, the stronger the pressure to borrow ideas from other cultures (and values with them), the more significant material resources countries spent on maintaining their own intellectual autonomy and resisting the danger of ideological colonization.

It seems that Russia can and should play an important role in the formation of a global pluralistic theory of international relations. Those who doubt the validity of such a statement may

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point out that international relations as a subject of teaching and as a scientific discipline have been developing in Russia relatively recently, only since the end of the Cold War, and, therefore, are much less developed than such disciplines as political science, sociology or economics. But the youth of the teaching discipline of international relations does not mean that thinking about the world is something fundamentally new for Russians. These reflections, developed over many centuries, should be considered a cumulative contribution to the RTMS. If they do not seem to someone to be quite coherent and systematized, then shouldn't these reflections be taken as the basis for the development of a national theory of international relations?

The RTMO, which is being formed today, will have to turn to Russian roots, which are deep and diverse. At the same time, it is important to take into account not only the socio-cultural originality of the social sciences, but also the desire, organic for any theory, to overcome contextual dependence. Any theory is strong in attempts to rise above the description and identify general trends in the development of the subject. Consequently, it should be developed not only on the basis of national disputes, but also by constantly comparing it with the development processes of other schools of international theory. Optimal for Russia is the path of dialogue with the dominant and critical trends in international theory in the West and East. It is especially important to measure Russian thinking about the world with Western concepts and theories,

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since the latter are the most systematized and analytically developed. Mastering the Western intellectual heritage is the most important condition for the development of Russian social science. Such development has been and will always be a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for the progress of Russian knowledge.

Thus, the path to the formation of Russian international theory largely lies through the reconstruction of the intellectual traditions of thinking about the world, starting from the time of the emergence of the Russian state. The presence of such traditions in a state with a thousand-year history is hardly subject to any doubt. Russians have been pondering and arguing about how to interact with the world for more than a century, asking questions about national borders, the nature of the Eurasian environment and the system of international relations, the specifics of obtaining knowledge about the world, the nature of violence and the principles of the relationship between man and nature. All these and many other questions relate to the subject of international relations, and therefore, it is quite possible to try to reconstruct the options for their understanding in Russian conditions.

RTMO: an image of the desired future

Building an international theory in Russia should be guided by an understanding of the current conditions for the development of the country and the world, and by what solutions were proposed by Russian thought in similar conditions. It is possible to single out three cash, relatively long-term conditions of world development. First, it is associated with the formation of multipolarity political and economic

nomic instability of the world. Secondly, it is the need dictated by the tasks of Russian modernization in new foreign technologies and investments in the national economy. Thirdly, the ongoing crisis of Russian identity and the weakening of the system of Russian values. Each of these conditions has been discussed in Russian international theory, with different traditions and schools offering their own ways of responding to them. The Sovereigns paid attention to the system of alliances and poles developing in the world, the Westernizers talked about modernization, and the Third Romans about the revival of values. Although a full-fledged synthesis of the recommendations of various traditions would be impossible - the conceptual and ideological differences between them are too deep - modern international theory should strive for the most integral understanding of the noted conditions. Only such integration can become a reliable compass for movement in the global world.

In conclusion, I will outline only one of the possible synthesis of various traditions of Russian thinking in order to form an image of a desired global future. In terms of the three conditions noted Russian development it would be optimal to combine moderate isolationism and pragmatic cooperation with the outside world in order to create conditions for internal modernization and overcome the crisis of values. The first two conditions indicate the need for international thought to develop opportunities for creating a low-cost security system and areas of global business.

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attraction of investments into the Russian economy. The third condition indicates the need to create sufficient material and ideological space for a broad discussion of the issue of values. The question of which of the Russian values should be mobilized and developed in modern conditions for the arrangement of Russia and the world should become central in Russian international theory. I think that in discussing this issue, it is important to understand the relative independence of one's system of values from the values of other peoples and civilizations. Russian values and cultural orientations cannot be summed up in terms of "West", "Eurasia", "Euro-East", etc. These concepts tend to belittle the cultural destiny of Russia, a country with centuries of experience, a special geopolitical identity and the mission of maintaining the cultural, civilizational and political balance in the world. It is also obvious that Russian values are deeper than the orientations determined by the elites and refer to the people as a whole, which is the main subject and goal of all reforms and foreign policy undertakings undertaken by the authorities.

At the same time, there is no reason to oppose one system of value orientations to another: in a transcontinental country like Russia, Westernism can be combined and even organically combined with fruitful cooperation with other parts of the world system. Russia can approach both the West and the East, while remaining Russia. Awareness of oneself as a civilization with an independent system of political

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economic, historical and cultural values does not mean that Russia does not have common values with other countries and regions. Civilizations not only compete, but also intersect and actively interact with each other. Russia, as a country located at the geographical intersection of the West, East and Asia, has special opportunities for dialogue with others. Value systems can be built on various levels. In some aspects, it will be easier for Russia to find a common language with some countries, and in some - with others. For example, in matters of human rights and liberal democracy, friction with Western countries will be inevitable, but Russia has a lot in common with the West in terms of a common history, culture, and desire to create a responsible state. This kind of value hierarchies should be built in relations with other countries. In general, the world of values will not resemble the Huntingtonian picture of the clash of civilizations, but a complex picture of their mutual intersection and hierarchical interaction.

In terms of content, Russian values should be formulated not as contradicting the ideals of sovereignty or Westernism, but as making their implementation possible on a broader cultural and civilizational basis. Statehood and the desire for democracy must be integrated into Russian system values as necessary, though not sufficient, conditions. Democracy should not be abandoned, but built into its own cultural context and system of

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rational priorities. By the way, outside of Western countries, democracy plays a significant role, but is rarely at the center state development. Indeed, along with democracy and the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, the state is obliged to guarantee stability, the implementation of significant social programs and security from external threats.

Over time, on the basis of a broad discussion, a new concept of Russian values will be developed. Bearing in mind what has already been done in Russian original theory, it is obvious that such a concept will take into account the ideas of spiritual freedom, social justice

and transethnic unity. Once formulated, Russian values will not only become a guide to practical action, but will also be spelled out in the Russian foreign policy doctrine as to be protected and disseminated, just as the values of liberal democracy are spelled out in the US foreign policy doctrine. Over time, it will become possible to focus not only on upholding, but also on the active dissemination of Russian values in the world. Without such an orientation, foreign policy is doomed to be ideologically defensive in nature, responding to the challenges of Western and other civilizations.

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Russian theory of international relations: what should it be?

Tsygankov Andrey Pavlovich, Professor, Department of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, Ph.D.

Annotation. In the development of Russian international studies, a number of problems arise related to the poor development of empirical research and the excessive abstractness of theoretical works. The article proposes to comprehend the development of the Russian theory of international relations (RTIR) in order to overcome new economic, political and ethnocultural faults. RTMO is still in the process of formation, often torn apart in contradictions and struggles between mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of the need to overcome extreme approaches by narrowing the gap between the teaching of international relations (IR) and Russian political thought. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of its own intellectual roots, which is impossible without studying Russian thought.

Key words: MO, RTMO, universalist approach, isolationist approach, Russian political thought.

Russia International Relations Theory: What Should It Be Like?

Andrei Tsygankov, Professor Chair of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, Ph.D.

abstract. Russian IR theory faces many difficulties including underdevelopment of empiric research and overall abstract approach of theoretical studies. The article suggests to reconsider the development of the Russian IR theory in order to face the new economic, political and ethno-cultural challenges. The formation of Russian IR theory is still underway, and it is characterized by contradictions and the presence of mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of overcoming the extreme approaches in the IR theory through reducing the gap between the teaching of IR and Russian political thought. The article concludes that the development of IR in Russia requires deep knowledge of its intellectual roots, thus the study of the Russian political thought becomes the necessity.

Key words: IR, Russian International relations theory, universalistm, solationalism, Russian political thought.

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The diversity mentioned above has greatly complicated the problem of classifying modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.

There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by various authors.

So, some of them proceed from geographical criteria, highlighting the Anglo-Saxon concepts, the Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the "third world" (8).

Others build their typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and the philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (which include the behaviorist school) (9). Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author Philippe Briar refers to general theories political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations. As for private theories, among them are: the theory of international actors (Bagat Korani); the theory of interactions within international systems (George Modelski, Samir Amin; Karl Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace studies (Lucien Poirier, David Singer, Johan Galtwig); integration theory (Amitai Etzioni; Carl Deutsch); theory of international organization (Inis Claude; Jean Siotis; Ernst Haas) (10).

Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers, and, from this point of view, they focus on the controversy between representatives of the traditional and "scientific" approaches to the analysis of international relations (11,12).

The fourth are based on the identification of the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, highlighting the main and turning points in the development of science (13).

Finally, the fifth are based on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist Bagat Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations based on the methods they use (“classical” and “modernist”) and the conceptual vision of the world (“liberal-pluralistic” and “materialist”).

chesko-structuralist"). As a result, he identifies such areas as political realism (G. Morgenthau; R. Aron; X. Ball), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx; F. Engels; V.I. Lenin ) and neo-Marxism (or the “dependence” school: I. Wallerstein; S. Amin; A. Frank; F. Cardozo) (14). Similarly, Daniel Kolyar draws attention to the classical theory of the "state of nature" (ie, political realism); the theory of "international community" (or political idealism); Marxist ideological trend and its numerous interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French school of international relations (15). Marcel Merle believes that the main trends in the modern science of international relations are represented by traditionalists - the heirs of the classical school (Hans Morgenthau; Stanley Hoffmann; Henry Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (Robert Cox; David Singer;

Morton Kaplan; David Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (Paul Baran; Paul Sweezy; Samir Amin) currents (16).

Examples of various classifications of modern theories of international relations could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant circumstances. First, any of these classifications is conditional and cannot exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations1. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their "kinship" with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, contrary to the opposite opinion still encountered today, there is every reason to talk about the emerging synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual “compromise” between previously irreconcilable directions.

Based on the foregoing, we confine ourselves to a brief consideration of such trends (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-Marxism.

"However, they do not set themselves such a goal. Their goal is different - to comprehend the state and theoretical level achieved by the science of international relations by summarizing the available conceptual approaches and comparing them with what was done earlier.

The legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Watgel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vitoria, Greece, Kant, on the other, found its direct reflection in that major scientific discussion that arose in the United States between the two world wars, discussions between realists and idealists. |Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical sources, which are utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the belief in the necessity and possibility of ending world wars and armed conflicts between states through the legal regulation and democratization of international relations, the spread of morality and justice to them.According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of resolving conflicts that arise between its members peacefully, using legal methods. regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange.One of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument international politics. In political practice, idealism found its embodiment in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Woodrow Wilson (17), in the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), which provides for the rejection of the use of force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stymson Doctrine. (1932), according to which the United States refuses diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved by force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State John F. Dulles and Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) and President George W. Bush (1988-1992). In the scientific literature, it was represented, in particular, by the book of such American authors as R. Clark and L.B. Dream "Achieving peace through world law." The book proposes a step-by-step project

"Sometimes this trend is qualified as utopianism (see, for example: Carr. N. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956.

th disarmament and creation of a system of collective security for the whole world for the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace among peoples should be a world government led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution (18). Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors (19). The idea of a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII - "Pacem in terns" or 04/16/63, Paul VI - "Populorum progressio" dated 03/26/67, and John Paul II - dated 12/2/80, who still speaks today for the creation of "a political power endowed with universal competence".

Thus, the idealistic paradigm that accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on the minds of our day. Moreover, it can be said that in recent years its influence on some aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.

At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day1) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, hopelessly lagged behind the requirements of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach underlying it turned out to be deeply undermined due to the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policy of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the unleashing of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was a revival on American soil of the European classical tradition, with its inherent prominence in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as "power" and "balance of power", "national interest" and "conflict".

Political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism - pointing out, in particular, the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time

In the majority of textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism is either not considered as an independent theoretical trend, or serves as nothing more than a "critical background" in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical trends.

They contributed to the unleashing of the Second World War to a large extent, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives - Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Walfers and others - determined the path of the science of international relations for a long time. Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron became the undisputed leaders in this direction.

1 The work of G. Morgenthau “Political relations between nations] Mi. The struggle for power, the first edition of which was published in |48, has become a kind of "bible" for many generations (D||political scientists both in the United States and in other countries "" JSffaaa. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau, international relations are an arena of sharp confrontation between states.At the core of all international activity of the latter lies their desire to increase their power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others.The term "power" is understood in the broadest sense: as a military and the economic power of the state, the guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, the possibility of spreading its ideological attitudes and spiritual values The two main ways in which the state secures its power, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy, are military strategy and diplomacy The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as a continuation of politics by violent means Diplomacy, on the contrary, is a peaceful struggle for power. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of "national interest". The result of the desire of each of the states to maximize the satisfaction of their national interests is the establishment on the world stage of a certain balance (balance) of power (strength), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of peace is the state of balance of power between states.

According to Morgenthau, there are two factors that can keep the aspirations of states to power within some limits - these are international law and morality. However, relying too much on them in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealist school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being solved by means of collective security mechanisms or

means of the UN. Projects of harmonization of national interests through the creation of a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hope to avoid a world nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.

In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from six principles of political realism, which he justifies at the very beginning of his book (20). Briefly, they look like this:

1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, it is possible to create a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws - although only relatively and partially. Such a theory makes it possible to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.

2. The main indicator of political realism is "the concept of interest expressed in terms of power." It provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be known. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. This notion thus avoids two errors. First, judgments of a politician's interest based on motives rather than behavior. And, secondly, deriving the interest of a politician from his ideological or moral preferences, and not from his "official duties".

Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. A rational policy is a correct policy, because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of politics also depends on its moral and practical goals.

3. The content of the concept of "interest expressed in terms of power" is not invariable. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the state's international policy takes place. This also applies to the concepts of "power" (power) and "political balance", as well as to such an initial concept, denoting the main character of international politics, as the "nation-state".

Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change

modern world. He is convinced that such a change can only be brought about by the skillful use of objective laws that have worked in the past and will work in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.

4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time, he is also aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. They must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: "Let the world perish, but justice must prevail!". It cannot afford suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral standards. It is one thing to know that nations are subject to the moral law in their politics, and quite another to claim to know what is good and what is bad in international relations.

6. The theory of political realism comes from a pluralistic conception of human nature. A real person is both an “economic person”, a “moral person”, and a “religious person”, etc. Only a “political person” is like an animal, because he has no “moral brakes”. Only a “moral person” is a fool, because he lacks caution. Only

*PeJEDi^^fe^yLhuman"> can only be a saint, because he has ^y^Ynv^^desires.

With this in mind, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from others and takes place in its own terms.

As we will see from the further presentation, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents - and, even more so, opponents - of this direction. At the same time, its conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on the objective laws of social development, the desire for an impartial and rigorous analysis

lysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and the fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them - all this contributed to the expansion of the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment and in circles statesmen various countries.

However, political realism did not become the undividedly dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. From the very beginning, its serious shortcomings prevented its transformation into a central link, cementing the beginning of a certain unified theory.

The fact is that, proceeding from the understanding of international relations as a “natural state” of power confrontation for the possession of power, political realism, in essence, reduces these relations to interstate ones, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state in the interpretation of political realists look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves look like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical reaction to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong and others are weak. Not without reason, one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with a collision of balls on a billiard table (21). The absolutization of the role of force and the underestimation of the importance of other factors, such as spiritual values, sociocultural realities, etc., significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations and reduces its degree of reliability. This is all the more true because the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains rather vague in it, giving rise to discussions and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its desire to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has become, in fact, a hostage of its own approach. He did not take into account very important trends and changes that have already taken place, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, another circumstance was overlooked: the fact that these changes require the use, along with traditional ones, of new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All this caused criticism in hell

than political realism on the part of adherents of other sub-hov, and, above all, on the part of representatives of the so-called modernist trend and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this controversy, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to a growing awareness of the need to supplement the political analysis of international realities with sociological ones.

Representatives of ^modernism *, or the "scientific" direction in the analysis of international relations, most often without affecting the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The controversy between "modernists" and "traditionalists" reaches a special intensity, starting from the 60s, having received the name "great new dispute" in the scientific literature (see, for example: 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (Quincy Wright, Morton Caplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Kalevi Holsti, Ernst Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from exact disciplines and opposed to traditional methods based on the researcher’s intuition, judgments by analogy, etc. . This approach, which arose in the United States, touched upon studies not only of international relations, but also of other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil as early as the 19th century.

Indeed, Sei-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply rigorous scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods that have already been tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, an appropriate technical base that provides researchers with new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with K. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by a rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of inter-

international relations, rejecting both any "metaphysical prejudices" and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as M. Merle emphasizes (see: 16, pp. 91-92), this approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposite models, between which experts in the field also hesitate. social sciences. On the one hand, this is the teaching of Charles Darwin about the ruthless struggle of species and the law natural selection and its Marxist interpretation. On the other hand, the organic philosophy of H. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the USA took the second path - the path of assimilation of society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, with a transition then to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to problems related to the adaptation of the social organism to to your surroundings. In the heritage of organicism, according to M. Merl, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on the study of the behavior of actors, the other - the articulation of various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second - to functionalism and a systematic approach in the science of international relations (see: ibid., p. 93).

Being a reaction to shortcomings traditional methods studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism has not become in any way a homogeneous trend - either in theoretical or methodological terms. What he has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, the desire to apply strict scientific methods and procedures, to more verifiable empirical evidence. Its shortcomings lie in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which leads to the actual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, in the inability to avoid subjectivism. Nevertheless, many studies of adherents of the modernist trend turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new methods, but also with very significant

my conclusions drawn from them. It is also important to note that they opened the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.

If the controversy between the adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly the methods of studying international relations, then representatives of transnationalism (Robert O. Koohane, Joseph Nye), integration theories (David Mitrany) and interdependence (Ernst Haas, David Mo-urs) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. At the center of the new "big dispute" that flared up in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and strength for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage.

Supporters of various theoretical currents, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward the general idea that political realism and the statist paradigm inherent in it do not correspond to the nature and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond the framework of interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state, as an international actor, loses its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The diversity of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and “channels” (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them, oust the state from the center of international communication , contribute to the transformation of such communication from “international” (that is, interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) to “transnational * (that is, carried out in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond interstate interactions led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scientists J. Nye and R. Koohei write in the preface to their book Transnational Relations and World Politics.

Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, the transformation of the situation in world markets, the growth in the number

and the importance of transnational corporations stimulated the emergence of new trends on the world stage. The prevailing among them are: the outstripping growth of world trade compared to world production, the penetration of the processes of modernization, urbanization and the development of means of communication in developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The generalizing consequence and expression of all these processes is the increase in the interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations (23). Proponents of transnationalism1 are often inclined to consider the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, to the analysis of which the same methods are applicable that make it possible to understand and explain the processes occurring in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.

Transnationalism contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, so many of the provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (24). At the same time, his undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism, with its inherent inclinations to overestimate the real significance of observed trends in changing the nature of international relations, left its mark on him. There is also a noticeable similarity between the provisions put forward by transnationalism and a number of provisions advocated by the neo-Marxist trend in the science of international relations.

Representatives of neo-Marxism (Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Arjiri Immanuel, Immanuel Wallerstein, etc.) - a trend as heterogeneous as transnationalism, are also united by the idea of the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in assessing its future. At the same time, the starting point and the basis of their conceptual constructions is the idea of the asymmetry of the interdependence of modern

"Among them, one can name not only many scientists from the USA, Europe, and other regions of the world, but also well-known political figures - for example, such as the former President of France V. Giscard d" Estaing, influential non-governmental political organizations and research centers- For example. Palme Commission, Brandt Commission, Club of Rome, etc.

moreover, about the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, about the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists represent the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the former colonial countries gained their political independence. This manifests itself in the inequality of economic exchanges and uneven development (25).

For example, the “center”, within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends in its development on the raw materials and resources of the “periphery”. In turn, the countries of the periphery are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside of them. Thus, they fall into the dependence of the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, in the end, "economic growth based on integration into the world market is underdeveloped development" (26).

In the 1970s, this approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the Third World countries of the idea of the need to establish a new world economic order. Under the pressure of these countries, which constitute the majority of the member countries of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly in April 1974 adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action, and in December of the same year, a Charter on the economic rights and obligations of states.

Thus, each of the considered theoretical currents has its strengths and its shortcomings, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, to the enrichment of the science of international relations as a whole. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated by the example of the concept of neorealism.

This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Greiko, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time

namely, to enrich it, taking into account the new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical trends. It is significant that one of the most long-standing supporters of transnationalism, Koohane, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism "power", "national interest", rational behavior, etc. - remain an important tool and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations (27). On the other hand, K. Walz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach due to the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of the conclusions, the need for which the supporters of the traditional view, as a rule, rejected.

The emergence of the school of neorealism in international relations is associated with the publication of the book by K. Waltz "Theory of International Politics", the first edition of which was published in 1979 (28). Defending the main provisions of political realism (“the natural state” of international relations, rationality in the actions of the main actors, national interest as their main motive, the desire to possess power), its author at the same time criticizes his predecessors for the failure of attempts to create a theory of international politics as an autonomous discipline. He criticizes Hans Morgenthau for identifying foreign policy with international politics, and Raymond Aron for his skepticism about the possibility of creating International Relations as an independent theory.

Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, taking as its starting point the existence of a global system, and not the states that are its elements, Waltz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.

At the same time, the systemic nature of international relations is due, according to K. Walz, to actors that do not interact here, that are not inherent in their main features (related to geographic location, demographic potential, socio-cultural specifics, etc.), but the properties of the structure of the international system. (In this regard, neorealism is often qualified as structural realism or simply structuralism.) Being a consequence of the interactions of international actors, the structure of the international system at the same time is not reduced to a simple sum of such interactions, but represents

is an independent phenomenon capable of imposing certain restrictions on states, or, on the contrary, offering them favorable opportunities on the world stage.

It should be emphasized that, according to neorealism, the structural properties of the international system do not actually depend on any efforts of small and medium states, being the result of interactions between great powers. This means that it is they who are characterized by the "natural state" of international relations. As for the interactions between the great powers and other states, they can no longer be characterized as anarchic, for they acquire other forms, which most often depend on the will of the great powers.

One of the followers of structuralism, Barry Bazan, developed its main provisions in relation to regional systems, which he considers as intermediate between the global international and state systems(29). The most important feature of regional systems is, from his point of view, the security complex. The point is that neighboring states turn out to be so closely connected with each other in matters of security that the national security of one of them cannot be separated from the national security of others. The structure of any regional subsystem is based on two factors, which are considered in detail by the author:

the distribution of opportunities among the existing actors and the relations of friendliness or hostility between them. At the same time, B. Bazan shows that both of them are subject to manipulation by the great powers.

Using the methodology proposed in this way, the Danish researcher M. Mozaffari made it the basis for the analysis of the structural changes that occurred in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq by allied (and in essence - American) troops (30). As a result, he came to the conclusion about the operational nature of structuralism, about its advantages in comparison with other theoretical directions. At the same time, Mozaffari also shows the weaknesses inherent in neorealism, among which he names the propositions about the eternity and immutability of such characteristics of the international system as its “natural state”, the balance of forces, as a way of stabilizing, its inherent static nature (see: ibid., p. 81).

due to its own advantages than to the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to maintain maximum continuity with the classical school means that most of its inherent shortcomings remain the lot of neorealism (see: 14, p. 300, 302). An even more severe sentence is passed by the French authors M.-K. Smooey and B. Badi, in the opinion of which the theories of international relations, remaining in captivity of the Western-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “to predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War , nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to sinful social reality” (31).

Dissatisfaction with the state and possibilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main motives for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline - the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scientists.

3. French sociological school

Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still today bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions. At the same time, it is indisputable that since the beginning of the 1980s, the influence of European theoretical thought, and in particular the French school, has become more and more noticeable in this area. One of the well-known scientists, Professor M. Merl of the Sorbonne, noted in 1983 that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline that studies international relations, three major trends have emerged. One of them is guided by the "empirical-descriptive approach" and is represented by the works of such authors as Charles Sorgbib, Serge Dreyfus, Philippe Moreau-Defargue and others. Nancy and Reims. Finally, hallmark The third direction is the sociological approach, which received its most vivid embodiment in the works of R. Aron (32).

In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of modern

of the French school in the study of international relations. The fact is that each of the theoretical currents discussed above - idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism - exist in France as well. At the same time, they are refracted here in the works of the historical and sociological trend that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left their mark on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with the problems of international relations. As domestic experts note, the formation of the basic methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of the philosophical, sociological and historical thought of France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and above all Comte's positivism. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative historical method and a certain skepticism regarding the mathematical methods of research (33).

At the same time, in the works of certain specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main currents of sociological thought that have already developed in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical legacy of E. Durkheim, the second comes from the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with the utmost clarity by such major representatives of the two lines in the French sociology of international relations as, for example, Raymond Aron and Gaston Boutoul.

“Durkheim’s sociology,” R. Aron writes in his memoirs, “did not affect in me either the metaphysics that I aspired to become, or the reader of Proust, who wants to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society” (34). "Neo-Durkheimism," he argued, is something like Marxism in reverse: if the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and belittles the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, the denial of the existence of a dominant ideology in society is just as utopian as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot separate

the same values, like a totalitarian and liberal society, cannot have the same theory (see: ibid., pp. 69-70). Weber, on the contrary, attracted Aron by the fact that while objectifying social reality, he did not "reify" it, did not ignore the rationality that people attach to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: M. Weber's assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics, and concern for epistemology, characteristic of the social sciences (see: ibid., p. 71). The oscillation, central to Weber's thought, between a multitude of plausible interpretations and the only true explanation of a particular social phenomenon became the basis for Aron's view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativism in understanding social - including international - relations.

It is therefore quite logical that R. Aron considers international relations in the spirit of political realism - as a natural or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a fundamental change in the main feature of international relations, which consists in the legitimacy and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron emphasizes, peace is impossible, but war is improbable. From this follows the specificity of the sociology of international relations: its main problems are determined not by the minimum of social consensus, which is characteristic of intra-social relations, but by the fact that they "deploy in the shadow of war." For it is conflict, not its absence, that is normal for international relations. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not the state of peace, but the state of war.

R. Aron names four groups of the main problems of the sociology of international relations applicable to the conditions of traditional (post-industrial) civilization. Firstly, it is "to clarify the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society." Second, "the study of which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Thirdly, the study “in every epoch, in every particular diplomatic system, of that set of unwritten rules, more or less respected values that characterize wars and

conduct of the communities themselves in relation to each other. Finally, fourthly, an analysis of “the unconscious functions that armed conflicts perform in history” (35). Of course, most of the current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of flawless sociological research in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, the above problems remain important today. New ones can be added to them, arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the 20th century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations will remain the same, as long as it will be determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the study of the decision-making process will remain the central problem. From here, Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who lead states - on "rulers", "who can only be advised and hope that they will not be crazy." And this means that “sociology applied to international relations reveals, so to speak, its own limits” (see: ibid., p. 158).

At the same time, Aron does not give up the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his seminal work, Peace and War Between Nations, he singles out four aspects of such a study, which he describes in the relevant sections of this book: Theory, Sociology, History, and Praxeology (36).

The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Using his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels of theory. The first is designed to answer questions about “what tricks the players have the right to use and which are not; how they are distributed on the different lines of the playing court; what they do to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the efforts of the enemy. Within the framework of rules that answer such questions, numerous situations may arise, which may be random, or may be the result of pre-planned actions by the players. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations,

which may develop on site. At this - the second - level of theory, it defines recommendations that describe the rules for the effective behavior of various participants (for example, a goalkeeper, a defender, etc.) in certain circumstances of the game. In the section, strategy and diplomacy are singled out and analyzed as typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, a set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations are considered.

On this basis, the sociology of international relations is built, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international actors. Sociology is called upon to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this way and not in some other way. Its main task is to study the determinants and patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables that determine the policy of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes such issues as the nature of the influence of the political regime and/or ideology on international relations. Their clarification allows the sociologist to derive not only certain rules for the behavior of international actors, but also to identify social types international conflicts, as well as to formulate the laws of development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or trainer. Now he is tackling issues of a different kind. How do matches unfold not on the blackboard, but on the playground? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? How much of the team's success belongs to technical virtuosity, and how much to team morale?

Answering these questions, Aron continues, is impossible without turning to historical research: one must follow the course of specific matches, changes in techniques, a variety of techniques and temperaments. The sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then he will follow the actions of the players in vain and will not be able to understand the meaning of the tactical pattern of this or that game. In the section on history, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of deterrence strategy in the nuclear age, traces the evolution of diplomacy

matter between the two poles of the bipolar world and within each of them.

Finally, in the fourth part, devoted to praxeology, another symbolic character appears - the arbiter. How should the provisions written in the rules of the game be interpreted? Was there really a violation of the rules under certain conditions? At the same time, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of the same team “judge” both their partners and rivals, etc. All of these judgments oscillate between efficiency scores ("he played well"), punishment scores ("he did the right thing"), and morality scores ("this team behaved in the spirit of the game"). Even in sports, not everything that is not forbidden is morally justified. This applies even more so to international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited only to observation and description, but requires judgments and evaluations. What strategy can be considered moral and what - reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of striving for peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?

As already noted, Aron's book "Peace and War between Nations" has played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school and, in particular, the sociology of international relations. Of course, the followers of his views (Jean-Pierre Derrienick, Robert Boeck, Jacques Unzinger and others) take into account that many of the provisions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that “he did not half achieve his goal”, and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns just the sociological section, and in particular - the specific application of patterns and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see: 34, pp. 457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and most importantly, the rationale for the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.

Explaining this understanding, J.-P. Derrenik (37) emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology:

deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and the sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is rather conditional, because. actionalism does not deny causality, but determi-

nism is also "subjective", for it is the formulation of the intention of the researcher. Its justification lies in the researcher's necessary distrust of the judgments of the people he studies. Specifically, this difference consists in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of causes of a special kind that must be taken into account. These causes are decisions, that is, a choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is a sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (which is associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with evaluation criteria). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problems of the sociology of international relations is the concept of "solution". At the same time, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue in the opinion of the sociologist (ie, from interests).

As for the second trend in the French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid down by Gaston Boutoul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as Jean-Louis Annequin, Jacques Freund, Lucien Poirier and others. The basis of polemology is a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of "collective aggressiveness" using the methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences.

The basis of polemology, writes G. Butul, is dynamic sociology. The latter is "a part of that science which studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors which condition or correspond to them, and the modes of their reproduction" (38). Based on E. Durkheim’s position that sociology is “history meaningful in a certain way”, polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave rise to history, since the latter began exclusively as the history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be a "history of wars." Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and borrowing of cultures, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, “violent imitation”: war does not allow states and peoples to

to live in autarky, in self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact between civilizations. But besides, it is also a “voluntary imitation” associated with the fact that peoples passionately borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging wars, etc. - up to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technological progress: for example, the desire to destroy Carthage became an incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding. And in our day, all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most conspicuous of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.

Polemology must avoid a political and legal approach, remembering that "politics is the enemy of sociology", which it constantly tries to subjugate, make it its servant - just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology cannot actually study current conflicts, and therefore, the historical approach is the main thing for it.

The main task of polemology is an objective and scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that can be observed in the same way as any other social phenomenon and which, at the same time, is able to explain the causes of global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles related to the pseudo-obviousness of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should talk about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with legal illusory, explaining the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (likening wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of the sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the combination of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.

What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “new chapter in sociology”, as G. Butul calls the polemological trend in his book (see: ibid., p. 8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has for its

purposes, a truly huge source base, which is rarely available to other branches of sociological science. That's why main question consists in what directions to classify the countless facts of this huge array of documentation. Butul names eight such areas: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their diminishing objectivity; 2) a description of the types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of participants in wars about their goals;

3) the first stage of explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts;

4) the second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical "views and doctrines; 5) sampling and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the periodicity of wars; 8) social typology wars - that is, the dependence of the main characteristics of war on the typical features of a particular society (see: ibid., pp. 18-25).

The most well-established provisions and conclusions of the world international political science are generalized and systematized; its basic concepts and the most famous theoretical directions are given: an idea is given of the current state of this discipline in our country and abroad. Special attention focuses on the globalization of world development, changes in the nature of threats to international security, and the features of a new generation of conflicts.
For students of higher educational institutions studying in the areas and specialties of "International Relations", "Regional Studies", "Public Relations", "Sociology". "Political Science", as well as undergraduates, graduate students and university professors.

Object and subject of international political science.
Sometimes one has to meet with the opinion according to which the distinction between the subject and object of science is not essential for understanding and understanding its features. that it is scholastic in nature and can only distract from really important theoretical problems. It seems that such a distinction is still necessary.

Objective reality, which exists outside and independently of our consciousness, differs from the scientific disciplines that study various aspects of this. The latter reflect and describe it, firstly, always with some "delay", and secondly, with a certain "distortion" of the essence of the ongoing processes and phenomena. Human knowledge gives, as is well known, only a conditional, approximate picture of the world, never reaching absolute knowledge about it. In addition, any science, one way or another, builds its own logic, which obeys the internal laws of its development and does not coincide with the logic of the development of the reality it studies. In any science, in this or that merc, a person is inevitably “present”, introducing a certain element of “subjectivity” into it. After all, if reality itself, which is the object of science, exists vis and independently of the consciousness of the subject who cognizes it, then the formation and development of this science, its subject are determined precisely by the social subject of cognition, which singles out one or another side in the cognitive object on the basis of certain needs and studies these corresponding methods and means. The object exists before the subject and can be studied by a variety of scientific disciplines.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 9
Chapter 1. Object and subject of international political science 19
1. The concept and criteria of international relations 20.
2. World politics 27
3. Relationship between domestic and foreign policy 30
4. The subject of international political science 37
Literature 44
Chapter 2. The problem of method in the theory of international relations 46
1. Significance of the problem of method 46
2. Methods of situation analysis 50
Surveillance 51
Examining Documents 51
Comparison 52
3. Explicative Methods 54
Content analysis 54
Event analysis 54
Cognitive mapping 55
Experiment 57
4 Predictive methods 58
Delphi Method 59
Building Scenarios 59
System approach.60
5. Analysis of the decision-making process 70
Literature 75
Chapter 3. The problem of laws of international relations 77
1; On the nature of laws in the field of international relations 78
2. The content of the laws of international relations 82 .
3. Universal patterns of international relations 89
Literature 94
Chapter 4
1. Traditions: international relations in the history of socio-political thought 97
2. "Canonical" paradigms: the basics 105
Liberal-idealistic paradigm 106
Political realism 109
Marxist-Leninist paradigm 113
3. "Great Disputes": The Place of Political Realism 117
Literature 122
Chapter 5. Modern schools and trends in the theory of international relations 125
1. The dispute between neo-realism and neo-liberalism 126
Neorealism 126
Neoliberalism 132
The main provisions of the dispute between neorealism and neoliberalism 136
2. International political economy and neo-Marxism 140
International political economy 140
Neo-Marxism 149
3. Sociology of international relations 155.
Literature 163
Chapter 6 International System 167
1. Basic concepts of systems theory 168
2. Features and main directions of a systematic approach in the analysis of international relations 173
3. Types and structures of international systems 178
4. Laws of functioning and transformation of international systems 184
Literature 192
Chapter 7. Environment of the system of international relations 193
1. Features of the environment of international relations 194
2. Social environment. Features of the modern stage of world civilization 196
3. Biosocial environment. The role of geopolitics in the science of international relations 201
4. Globalization of the international environment 212
The concept of globalization in comparison with other concepts that are close in meaning 214
The question of the historical uniqueness of globalization 217
The main components of globalization 219
Debate over the consequences of globalization 221
Literature 225
Chapter 8. Participants in international relations 228
1. The essence and role of the state as a participant in international relations 231
2. Non-state participants in international relations 238
Main features and typology of IGO 239
General characteristics and types of INGOs 242
3. Paradox of participation 248
Literature 252
Chapter 9. Goals, means and strategies of participants in international relations 254
1. On the content of the concepts of "goals" and "means" 254
2. Strategy as a unity of ends and means 267
General idea of strategy 267
Big strategy.; 270
Crisis management strategies 271
World strategies 272
Strategy and diplomacy 275
3. Force and violence as part of ends and means 277
Literature 286
Chapter 10. National interests: concept, structure, methodological and political role 288
1. Discussions about the legality of use and about the content of the concept of "national interest" 288
2. Criteria and structure of the national interest 298
On the unconscious element in the structure of the national interest 304
3. Globalization and the national interest 307
Literature 317
Chapter 11 International Security 320
1. The content of the concept of "security" and the main theoretical approaches to its study 320
2. Changing security environment and new global threats 331
3. New security concepts 338
The concept of cooperative security 339
The concept of human security 343
Democratic Peace Theory 344
Literature 347
Chapter 12. The problem of legal regulation of international relations 349
1. Historical forms and features of the regulatory role of international law 350
2. Features of modern international law and its basic principles 353
Basic principles of international law 358
3. Human rights law and international humanitarian law 360
Right human disposition 360
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 364
The concept of humanitarian intervention 367
4. Interaction of law and morality in international relations 372
Literature 376
Chapter 13. The Ethical Dimension of International Relations 378
1. Morality and law in international relations: general and special 379
2. Variety of interpretations of international morality 382
Confessional-cultural performances 383
The Conflict of Theoretical Schools 385
Holism, individualism, deontology 390
3. Basic imperatives of international morality in the light of globalization 395
The main requirements of international morality 395
Globalization and new normativism 398
On the Effectiveness of Moral Norms in International Relations 401
Literature 404
Chapter 14. Conflicts in international relations 406
1. The concept of conflict. Features of international conflicts in the era of the Cold War 407
The concept, types and functions of conflict 407
Conflicts and crises 410
Features and Functions of Conflict in a Bipolar World 412
Conflict Resolution: Traditional Methods
and institutional procedures 413
2. The main directions in the study of international conflicts 417
Strategic Research 417
Conflict Studies 420
Peace Research 423
3. Features of "new generation conflicts" 426
General context 426
Reasons, participants, content 428
Settlement mechanisms 431
Literature 438
Chapter 15. International cooperation 440
1. The concept and types of international cooperation 440
2. Interstate cooperation from the standpoint of political realism 443
3. The theory of international regimes 447
4. Sociological approach to the analysis of international cooperation 450
5. Cooperation and integration processes 457
Literature 468
Chapter 16. The Social Foundations of the International Order 470
1. The concept of international order and its historical types 470
The concept of "international order" 470
Historical types of the international order 475
Post-war international order 479
2. Political and sociological approaches to the problem of international order 484
3. Foreign and domestic scientists on the prospects of a new world order 492
Literature 504
Instead of conclusion 507
Appendix 1. Some international principles, doctrines, theories. International organizations, treaties and agreements 510
Annex 2. Resources on the Internet dedicated to research in the field of international relations (AB Tsruzhitt) | 538
Name index 581
Subject index 587.

The textbook deals with the international events of our days, indicating the transition of mankind to a new world order. Global transformations and upheavals taking place in all spheres of public life put forward more and more new questions of international politics. The authors of the textbook are convinced that today it is no longer enough to consider it as an interaction of states, interstate alliances and a clash of interests of great powers. The unimpeded expansion of information and migration flows covering the world, the diversification of trade, socio-cultural and other exchanges, the massive intrusion of non-state actors inevitably change our views on international relations. But do the ongoing changes mean that international relations are giving way to world politics? Changing the role of the state and the structure of national sovereignty in no way speaks of their disappearance, so world politics should be considered in unity with international relations.

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