Russian Navy. The topic of today's article is cruisers.
I must say that in the USSR the closest attention was paid to this class of ships: in the post-war period and until 1991, 45 ships of this class (including artillery, of course) entered service, and by December 1, 2015, 8 cruisers remained. We will devote a separate article to the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov", since, regardless of the peculiarities of the domestic classification, this ship is an aircraft carrier. Today we will limit ourselves to missile cruisers.
Missile cruisers (RKR) of project 1164 - 3 units.
Displacement (standard / full) - 9,300/11,300 tons, speed - 32 knots, weapons: 16 Bazalt anti-ship missiles, 8 * 8 S-300F Fort air defense systems (64 air defense systems), 2 * 2 Osa air defense systems -MA" (48 missiles), 1 * 2-130-mm AK-130, 6 * 6-30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533-m torpedo tubes, 2, hangar for the Ka-27 helicopter.
All three ships of this type: "Moskva", "Marshal Ustinov", "Varyag" are in the ranks of the Russian Navy, and the first of them is the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, and the last of the Pacific.
Heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) of project 1144.2 - 3 units.
Displacement (standard / full) - 23 750-24 300 / 25 860 - 26 190 tons (data in various sources differ greatly, sometimes the total displacement of 28 000 tons is indicated), speed - 31 knots, armament - 20 anti-ship missiles "Granite ", 6 * 8 SAM "Fort" (48 SAM), "Fort-M" (46 SAM), 16 * 8 SAM "Dagger" (128 SAM), 6 SAM "Kortik" (144 SAM), 1 * 2- 130-mm AK-130, 2 * 5 533-mm torpedo tubes with the ability to use the Vodopad-NK PLUR, 2, 1 RBU-6000, a hangar for 3 helicopters.
It was assumed that all three ships of this type, Peter the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Lazarev, would be built according to the same project, but in fact they were not identical and had some difference in the range of weapons.
The Fort-M air defense system is installed only on the Peter the Great, the rest of the ships have two Fort air defense systems, their total ammunition load is 96 missiles, and not 94, as on the Peter the Great. Instead, the Osa-M air defense systems (2 per ship) and eight 30-mm AK-630s were installed on the Kinzhal air defense system and the Kortik air defense system on the Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Lazarev. "Peter the Great" and "Admiral Nakhimov" have 2 RBU-12000 and one RBU-6000, but on the "Admiral Lazarev" - on the contrary, one RBU-12000 and two RBU-6000.
"Peter the Great" is currently serving in the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation, "Admiral Nakhimov" is undergoing modernization. "Admiral Lazarev" withdrawn from the fleet.
Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) of project 1144.1 - 1 unit.
Displacement (standard / full) 24 100 / 26 190 tons, speed - 31 knots, armament - 20 Granit anti-ship missiles, 12 * 8 Fort air defense systems (96 SAMs), 2 * 2 Osa-M air defense systems ( 48 missiles), 1 * 2 launchers PLUR "Metel", 2 * 1 100-mm AK-100, 8 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533-mm torpedo tubes, 1 RBU-12000, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for 3 helicopters.
The first-born of the TARKR class in the domestic fleet, in the USSR he received the name "Kirov", in the Russian Navy - "Admiral Ushakov". Withdrawn from the Russian Navy in 2002, but not yet disposed of.
Needless to say, all the missile cruisers that we have were inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR. Only "Peter the Great" was completed in the Russian Federation, but it was launched in 1989 and by the time the Union collapsed it was in a fairly high degree of readiness.
Soviet missile cruisers are a unique weapon of their kind, created within the framework of the concepts of combat use of the Soviet Navy. Today we will not analyze in detail the history of their creation, because both the RKR of project 1164 and the TARKR of project 1144 are worthy of not even a separate article, but a series of articles each, but we will limit ourselves to only the most general milestones.
For some time (after World War II), NATO aircraft carrier groups were considered the main adversary of our fleet, and during this period the concept of the USSR fleet involved fighting them in our near sea zone, where surface ships would act together with missile-carrying aircraft. Although it is worth noting that even then we were building completely ocean-going ships, such as artillery cruisers of the Sverdlov type (project 68-bis) - apparently, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin understood well that the ocean fleet is an instrument not only of war, but also peace.
However, after the appearance of nuclear submarines (carriers of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, SSBNs) in the enemy fleets, they became a priority target for our Navy. And here the USSR had, let's not be afraid of this word, insoluble conceptual difficulties.
The fact is that the range of even the very first SSBN ballistic missiles was several times greater than the combat radius of carrier-based aircraft, respectively, enemy SSBNs could operate at a greater distance from our shores. In order to counteract them, they had to go to the ocean and / or remote sea areas. This required fairly large surface ships, with powerful sonar equipment, and they were created in the USSR (BOD). However, the BOD, of course, could not successfully operate in the conditions of the overwhelming dominance of the United States and NATO in the ocean. In order for the PLO groups of the USSR to be able to successfully fulfill their functions, it was necessary to somehow neutralize the American aircraft carrier and ship strike groups. Off our coasts, the MPA (Naval Missile-Carrying Aviation) could do this, but its limited radius did not allow it to operate in the ocean.
Accordingly, the USSR needed a means of neutralizing the NATO AUG far from its native shores. Initially, this task was assigned to submarines, but it soon became clear that they would not solve this problem on their own. The most realistic way - the creation of its own aircraft carrier fleet - for a number of reasons turned out to be unacceptable for the USSR, although domestic sailors really wanted aircraft carriers and, in the end, the USSR began to build them. Nevertheless, in the late 60s and early 70s, one could only dream of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines could not independently defeat NATO fleets in the ocean, and the country's leadership set the task of destroying SSBNs.
Then it was decided to shift the focus to the creation of new weapons - long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as a space target designation system for them. The carrier of such missiles was to be a new, specialized class of ocean-going surface attack ship - a missile cruiser.
What exactly it should be, there was no clarity. Initially, they thought about unification on the basis of the BOD of projects 1134 and 1134B, in order to use one hull to create ships for anti-aircraft defense (that is, BOD), air defense (with the placement of the Fort air defense system on them) and strike carriers of anti-ship missiles. Then they abandoned this in favor of the Project 1165 Fugas missile cruiser, which carried both anti-ship missiles and the Fort air defense system, but it was then closed due to too high a cost - the ship was supposed to be made nuclear. As a result, they returned to the project 1134B BOD, but decided not to unify it in a single hull, but to make a much larger missile cruiser based on it.
The idea was to create a flagship of the PLO group, equipped with powerful strike and anti-aircraft weapons, and the latter was supposed to provide not objective, but zonal air defense (i.e. cover the entire group of ships). This is how the project 1164 missile cruiser appeared.
At the same time, and in parallel with the development of a new missile cruiser, domestic design bureaus designed a BOD with a nuclear power plant. They started with a displacement of 8,000 tons, but later the appetites of the sailors grew and the result was a ship with a standard displacement of the order (or even more) of 24,000 tons, equipped with almost the entire range of weapons that existed at that time. Of course, we are talking about the Project 1144 heavy nuclear missile cruiser.
The fact that project 1164 was originally created as a missile cruiser, and project 1144 as a BOD, to some extent explains how in the USSR at the same time, in parallel, two completely different ships were created to perform the same tasks. Of course, such an approach cannot be called sound in any way, but it must be admitted that as a result of this Russian Navy received two types of extremely beautiful ships instead of one (forgive me, dear reader, such a lyrical digression).
If we compare the Atlantes (ships of project 1164) and the Orlans (project 1144), then, of course, the Atlantes are smaller and cheaper, and therefore more suitable for large-scale construction. But, of course, the Orlans are much more powerful. According to the views of those years, in order to “penetrate” the AUG air defense and cause unacceptable damage to an aircraft carrier (completely disable or destroy), 20 heavy anti-ship missiles were needed in one salvo. "Orlan" had 20 "Granites", 24 such missiles were put on nuclear submarine missile carriers of project 949A "Antey" (to, so to speak, with a guarantee), but "Atlantes" carried only 16 "Basalts".
On the Orlans there were two Fort air defense systems, which means there were 2 posts of the Volna tracking and target illumination radar. Each such post could direct 6 missiles at 3 targets, respectively, the Orlan's ability to repel massive raids was much higher, especially since the Atlant's radar located in the stern "does not see" the bow sectors - they are closed by the superstructure of the cruiser. The short-range air defense of Orlan and Atlant was comparable, but on Peter the Great, instead of the obsolete Osa-M air defense systems, the Dagger air defense system was installed, and instead of the AK-630 metal cutters, the Kortik air defense system was installed. On the Atlants, due to their smaller size, such an upgrade is hardly possible.
In addition, the Atlantov PLO was deliberately sacrificed: the fact is that the deployment of the most powerful SJSC Polynom at that time increased the displacement of the ship by about one and a half thousand tons (the SJSC itself weighs about 800 tons) and this was considered unacceptable. As a result, "Atlant" received a very modest "Platinum", suitable only for self-defense (and even then - not too much). At the same time, the underwater search capabilities of the Orlans are not inferior to those of specialized BODs. The presence of an entire air group of three helicopters, without a doubt, provides Orlan with much better anti-aircraft defense capabilities, as well as search and tracking of surface targets, than one Atlanta helicopter. In addition, the presence of a nuclear power plant provides Orlan with much better opportunities for escorting enemy aircraft carrier groups than Atlanta with its conventional power plant. "Atlant", unlike "Orlan", has no constructive protection.
An interesting aspect. For a long time it was argued that the weak point of our heavy ships was the CIUS, unable to combine the use of the entire variety of weapons installed on the cruisers. Perhaps this is so, but the author of this article came across descriptions of exercises in which a heavy nuclear missile cruiser, having received air target data from an A-50 AWACS aircraft (the target was not observed from the cruiser), issued target designation to an anti-aircraft missile system of a large anti-submarine ship and that , without observing the air target himself, and using exclusively the control center received from the TARKR, he hit it with an anti-aircraft missile. The data, of course, is completely unofficial, but ...
Of course, nothing is given for free. The dimensions of the Orlan are amazing: a total displacement of 26,000 - 28,000 tons makes it the largest non-aircraft carrier in the world (even the cyclopean SSBN of Project 941 Akula is still smaller). Many foreign reference books call it a "battlecruiser", that is, a battlecruiser. Without a doubt, it would be correct to adhere to the Russian classification, but ... looking at the swift and formidable silhouette of the Orlan and remembering the fusion of speed and firepower that the battlecruisers showed to the world, you involuntarily think: there is something in it.
But such a large and heavily armed ship turned out to be very expensive. According to some reports, the cost of the TARKR in the USSR was 450-500 million rubles, which brought it closer to heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers - the TAVKR of project 1143.5 (hereinafter Kuznetsov) cost 550 million rubles, and the atomic TAVKR 1143.7 - 800 million. rub.
By and large, the Soviet missile cruisers had two fundamental drawbacks. Firstly, they were not self-sufficient, because their main weapon, anti-ship missiles, could only be used at over-the-horizon ranges for external target designation. For this, the Legend reconnaissance and target designation system was created in the USSR, and it really made it possible to use anti-ship missiles at full range, but with significant limitations. Passive radar reconnaissance satellites could not always reveal the location of the enemy, and there were never many satellites with active radar in orbit, they did not provide 100% coverage of the sea and ocean surfaces.
These satellites were very expensive, they carried a powerful radar that made it possible to control NATO warships from an altitude of 270-290 km, a nuclear reactor as an energy source for the radar, and also a special booster stage, which, after the satellite has exhausted its resource , was supposed to put its spent reactor into orbit 500-1000 km from the Earth. In principle, even from there, in the end, gravity will pull the reactors back, but this should have happened no earlier than in 250 years. Apparently, in the USSR they believed that by that time spaceships would already be plowing the expanses of the Galaxy and we would somehow deal with the numerous reactors falling into the atmosphere.
But the important thing is that even the USSR could not provide absolute coverage of the earth's surface with active satellites of the Legend system, which meant that they had to wait until the satellite passed over the desired area of the sea or ocean. In addition, satellites in relatively low orbits, and even unmasking themselves with strong radiation, could be destroyed by anti-satellite missiles. There were other difficulties, and in general the system did not guarantee the destruction of enemy AUGs in the event of a global conflict. Nevertheless, Soviet missile cruisers remained a formidable weapon, and no American admiral could feel safe being within range of Kirov or Slava missiles.
The second big drawback of domestic RKR and TARKR is their high specialization. By and large, they could destroy enemy ships, lead and control the actions of a detachment of ships, covering them with their powerful air defense systems, but that's all. Such cruisers did not pose any threat to coastal targets - despite the presence of a 130-mm artillery system, bringing such large and expensive ships to hostile shores for artillery shelling was fraught with excessive risk. Theoretically, heavy anti-ship missiles could be used to destroy ground targets, but in practice this made little sense. According to some reports, the Granit anti-ship missiles cost about the same, or even more expensive than a modern fighter, and few coastal targets were “worthy” of such an expensive ammunition.
In other words, the Soviet concept of combating enemy AUGs: the creation of long-range anti-ship missiles and their carriers (RKR, TARKR, Antey submarine missile carriers), reconnaissance and target designation systems for these missiles (Legend) and at the same time - also the strongest naval land-based missile-carrying aviation was comparable in cost to the construction of a powerful aircraft carrier fleet, but did not provide the same wide opportunities for destroying surface, underwater, air and ground targets as those possessed by aircraft carrier groups.
Today, the capabilities of the missile cruisers of the Russian fleet have significantly decreased. No, they themselves have remained the same, and despite the emergence of the latest defensive weapon systems, such as ESSM or SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, the author of this article would absolutely not want to be in the place of the American admiral, on whose flagship aircraft carrier Peter the Great fired two dozen "Granites". But the ability of the Russian Federation to give target designation to heavy anti-ship missiles has greatly decreased: in the USSR there was a “Legend”, but it self-destructed when the satellites exhausted their resource, and no new ones appeared, they could not deploy Liana.
No matter how praised the NATO data exchange systems, their analogue existed in the Soviet Navy (interchange stations or VZOI) and the missile cruiser could use the data received by another ship or aircraft. This possibility exists even now, but the number of ships and aircraft has decreased by several times compared to the times of the USSR. The only progress is the construction of over-the-horizon radar stations (OGRLS) in the Russian Federation, but whether they can give target designation for missiles is not clear, as far as the author knows, in the USSR they could not issue TsU ZGRLS. In addition, ZGRLS are stationary large-scale objects, which, probably, in the event of a serious conflict, it will not be so difficult to damage or destroy them.
Nevertheless, today it is the missile cruisers that represent the "foothold" of the domestic surface fleets. What are their prospects?
All three "Atlantas" of project 1164 currently remain in service - one can only regret that at one time it was not possible to agree with Ukraine on the purchase of the fourth cruiser of this project, which is rotting near the completion wall in a high degree of readiness. Today, this step is impossible, but it would already be meaningless - the ship is too old to be completed. At the same time, the 1164 project is literally "stuffed" with weapons and equipment, which made it a very formidable ship, but greatly reduced its modernization capabilities.
"Moskva", "Marshal Ustinov" and "Varyag" became part of the domestic fleet in 1983, 1986 and 1989, respectively, today they are 35, 32 and 29 years old. The age is serious, but with timely repairs, these RRCs are quite capable of serving up to forty-five years, so that in the next decade not one of them will retire. Most likely, during this time the ships will not undergo any radical upgrades, although to exclude the installation of new anti-ship missiles in old launchers and the improvement of the Fort air defense system - however, all this is guesswork.
But with TARKR, the situation is far from being so rosy. As we said above, today work is underway on the Admiral Nakhimov, and its modernization is quite global. It is more or less reliably known about the replacement of the Granit anti-ship missiles with UVP for 80 modern missiles, such as Caliber, Onyx and, in the future, Zircon. As for the air defense system, initially there were a lot of rumors in the press about the installation of the Polyment-Redut system on the TARKR. It is possible that initially such plans existed, but then, apparently, they were abandoned, or maybe these were originally speculations of journalists. The fact is that the Redoubt is still nothing more than a medium-range air defense system, and the complexes based on the S-300 have a much longer arm. Therefore, the information that the Admiral Nakhimov will receive a Fort-M, similar to the one installed on the Peter the Great, looks most realistic. It can also be assumed that the complex will be adapted to use the latest missiles used in the S-400, although this is not a fact. "Metal cutters" AK-630 will be replaced, according to available data, by ZRAK "Dagger-M". In addition, it was planned to install the anti-torpedo complex "Packet-NK".
On the terms of repair and modernization. Generally speaking, the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR has been at Sevmash since 1999, and in 2008 it was unloaded from it nuclear fuel. In fact, the ship was more in the sludge than under repair. The contract for modernization was concluded only in 2013, but the preparatory repair work began earlier - from the moment it became clear that the contract would be awarded. It was assumed that the cruiser would be handed over to the fleet in 2018, then in 2019, then the date 2018 was again called, then 2020, and now, according to the latest data, it will be 2021. In other words, even if we assume that the deadlines will once again not “leave” to the right, and count the start of repairs from the moment the contract was signed (and not from the actual date of the start of repairs), it turns out that the repair of Admiral Nakhimov will take 8 years.
A little about the cost. In 2012, head of the State Defense Order Department of the Joint shipbuilding corporation(USC) Anatoly Shlemov said that the repair and modernization of the cruiser will cost 30 billion rubles, and the acquisition of new weapons systems - 20 billion rubles, that is, the total cost of work on the Admiral Nakhimov will be 50 billion rubles. But you need to understand that these were only preliminary figures.
We have long become accustomed to the situation when the terms of repairs of ships and the cost of their repair significantly increase from the initial ones. Shipbuilders are usually reproached for this, they say they have forgotten how to work, and appetites are growing, but such a reproach is not entirely true, and anyone who worked in production will understand me.
The thing is that a full assessment of the cost of repairs can be made only when the unit being repaired is disassembled and it is clear what exactly needs to be repaired and what needs to be replaced. But in advance, without disassembling the unit, determining the cost of its repair is akin to guessing on coffee grounds. The so-called preventive maintenance schedules help a lot in this "fortune-telling", but on one condition - when they are executed in a timely manner. But there was a problem with the repair of the ships of the fleet back in the USSR, and after 1991 it, one might say, disappeared - due to the lack of any repair.
And now, when a decision is made to modernize a particular ship, a kind of “pig in a poke” arrives at the shipyard and it’s almost impossible to guess right away what needs repair and what doesn’t. The real volumes of repair are already revealed during its implementation, and, of course, these “discoveries” increase both the repair time and its cost. The author of this article does not, of course, try to portray shipbuilders as “white and fluffy”, there are enough problems of their own, but the shift in terms and costs has not only subjective, but also quite objective reasons.
Therefore, it should be understood that 50 billion rubles, announced by Anatoly Shlemov in 2012, is only a preliminary estimate of the cost of repair and modernization of Admiral Nakhimov, which will increase significantly in the process of work. But even the indicated 50 billion rubles. in today's prices, if recalculated through official inflation data (and not through real inflation), they amount to 77.46 billion rubles, and taking into account the "natural" increase in the cost of repairs - perhaps at least 85 billion rubles, and maybe and more.
In other words, the repair and modernization of the TARKR project 1144 "Atlant" is an extremely long and costly thing. If we try to express its cost in comparable terms, then the return of the Admiral Nakhimov to service will cost us more than three frigates of the Admiral series or, for example, more expensive than the construction of a submarine of the Yasen-M type.
The next "candidate" for modernization is the Peter the Great TARKR. The cruiser, which entered service in 1998 and has not undergone major repairs since then, is time to make a “capital”, and if so, then at the same time it is also worth upgrading it. But the Admiral Lazarev, obviously, will not be modernized, and there are several reasons for this:
- Firstly, as mentioned above, the cost of modernization is extremely high.
- secondly, today in the Russian Federation only Sevmash can carry out repairs and modernization of this level of complexity, and in the next 8-10 years it will be occupied by Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great.
- thirdly, "Admiral Lazarev" went into operation in 1984, today he "knocked" for 34 years. Even if we put it at the shipyard right now, and taking into account that it will stay there for at least 7-8 years, after modernization it will hardly be able to serve more than 10-12 years. At the same time, "Ash", built with about the same money and in the same timeframe, will last at least 40 years.
Thus, even the immediate staging of the Admiral Lazarev for repair is a rather dubious undertaking, and even taking on its repair in a few more years will not make any sense at all. Unfortunately, all of the above also applies to the lead TARKR "Admiral Ushakov" ("Kirov").
In general, we can say the following: for some time, the situation with missile cruisers in the Russian Federation has stabilized. In recent years, we had three ships of this class ready "for a campaign and battle": "Peter the Great", "Moskva" and "Varyag" were on the move, "Marshal Ustinov" was undergoing repairs and modernization. Now the Ustinov has returned to service, but it is high time for the Moscow to be repaired, then the Varyag will probably be repaired. At the same time, "Peter the Great" will be replaced by "Admiral Nakhimov", so we can expect that in the next 10 years we will have two permanently operating cruisers of project 1164 and one of project 1144. But in the future, the time will come for the Atlantes to gradually retire - after a decade, their service life will be 39-45 years., But the Admiral Nakhimov, perhaps, will remain in the fleet until 2035-2040.
Will they be replaced?
This may sound seditious, but it is completely unclear whether we need missile cruisers as a class of warships. It is clear that today the Russian Navy needs ANY warship, because their numbers have long since hit the bottom and in their current state the fleet cannot even ensure the fulfillment of such a key task as covering SSBN deployment areas. In addition, it should be understood that in the future, with the economic policy, which is being carried out today by the leadership of the country, we do not foresee any rivers of abundance in our budget, and if we want to ever get a capable Navy that somehow meets its tasks, then we must choose the types of ships taking into account the criterion "cost-effectiveness" .
At the same time, it is extremely doubtful that the missile cruiser class satisfies this criterion. For ten years now, there have been talks about the creation of a promising destroyer, and after the start of the implementation of SAP 2011-2020, some details about the future project appeared. From them it became quite clear that, in fact, it was not a destroyer that was being designed, but a universal missile and artillery surface combat ship equipped with powerful strike weapons (various types of cruise missiles), zonal air defense, the basis of which was to be the S-400 air defense system, if not S -500, anti-submarine weapons, etc.
However, such universalism obviously does not fit into the dimensions of the destroyer (7-8 thousand tons of standard displacement), respectively, at the very beginning it was said that the displacement of the ship of the new project would be 10-14 thousand tons. In the future, this trend continued - according to the latest data, the displacement of the Leader-class destroyer is 17.5-18.5 thousand tons, while its armament (again, according to unverified rumors) will be 60 anti-ship winged, 128 anti-aircraft and 16 anti-submarine missiles. In other words, this ship, in terms of size and combat power, which occupies an intermediate position between the modernized Orlan and Atlant and has a nuclear power plant, is a full-fledged missile cruiser. According to the plans voiced in the open press, it was planned to build 10-12 such ships, but more modest figures of 6-8 units in the series also "slipped".
But what is the cost of implementing such a program? We have already seen that the repair and modernization of TARKR, according to preliminary (and clearly underestimated) forecasts in 2012, cost 50 billion rubles. but it is obvious that the construction of a new ship would be much more expensive. It would be completely unsurprising if the cost of the destroyer "Leader" in 2014 prices would be 90-120 billion rubles, or even more. At the same time, the cost of a prospective Russian aircraft carrier in 2014 was estimated at 100-250 billion rubles. In fact, of course, there were many assessments, but the words of Sergei Vlasov, the general director of the Nevsky Design Bureau, in this case are the most significant:
« I have already said that an American aircraft carrier cost $11 billion in the recent past, that is, 330 billion rubles. Today it is already worth 14 billion dollars. Our aircraft carrier will, of course, be cheaper - from 100 to 250 billion rubles. If you equip it with various weapons, then the price will increase dramatically, if you put only anti-aircraft systems, the cost will be less" (RIA News).
At the same time, Sergei Vlasov clarified:
“If the future aircraft carrier has a nuclear power plant, then its displacement will be 80-85 thousand tons, and if it is non-nuclear, then 55-65 thousand tons.”
The author of this article does not at all call for another "holy war" in the comments between opponents and supporters of aircraft carriers, but only asks to take into account the fact that the implementation of the program for the serial construction of destroyers (and in fact - heavy nuclear cruisers) "Leader" in terms of its costs is quite comparable to the program to create an aircraft carrier fleet.
Let's summarize. Of the seven missile cruisers that did not go under the gas cutter until December 1, 2015, all seven have been preserved to date, but the two TARKRs, Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Lazarev, have no chance of returning to the fleet. In total, the Russian Navy still has five missile cruisers, of which three non-nuclear (project 1164) will leave service around 2028-2035, and two nuclear-powered ones may well survive even until 2040-2045.
But the problem is that today we have 28 large non-aircraft carrier ships of the oceanic zone: 7 cruisers, 19 destroyers and BODs and 2 frigates (including project 11540 TFRs). Most of them were commissioned back in the days of the USSR, and only a small number of them were laid down in the USSR and completed in the Russian Federation. They are becoming obsolete physically and morally and require replacement, but there is no replacement: to date, not a single large surface ship of the ocean zone has been built in the Russian Federation (from laying to delivery to the fleet). The only replenishment that the fleet can count on with some certainty in the next 6-7 years is four Project 22350 frigates, but you need to understand that these are frigates, that is, ships that are inferior in class to a destroyer, not to mention a missile cruiser.
Yes, we can say that the armament of frigates of the type "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" significantly exceeds what, for example, our Project 956 destroyers had. But you need to understand that for their time, the "nine hundred and fifty-sixths" were quite competitive with American destroyers type "Spruance", in response to which they were created. But the Gorshkov frigate, for all its undoubted merits, is absolutely no match for the modern version with its 96 UVP cells, LRASM anti-ship missiles and zonal air defense based on the SM-6 missile defense system.
Project Leader destroyers were positioned as replacements for Project 1164 missile cruisers, Project 956 destroyers and Project 1155 BODs, but where are these Leaders? There were speculations that the first ship of the series would be laid down before 2020, but this remained good intentions. As for the new SAP 2018-2025, at first there were rumors that the “Leaders” were completely removed from there, then there was a denial that work on them would be carried out, but funding (and the pace of work) for this program was reduced. Will at least the first Leader be laid down before 2025? Mystery.
A reasonable alternative to the Leader could be the construction of Project 22350M frigates (in fact, Gorshkov, enlarged to the size of a Project 21956 destroyer, or Arleigh Burke, if you like). But so far we do not have not only a project, but even a technical task for its development.
There is only one conclusion from the above. The surface ocean fleet, inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR, is dying, and, alas, nothing is replacing it. We still have a little time to somehow correct the situation, but it is rapidly ending.
In the second half of the twentieth century, 180 independent states appeared on the world map, but out of this wild variety of countries and peoples, only two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, had a powerful ocean fleet. For example, no one, except us and the Americans, massively built missile cruisers. Four more European countries, in order to maintain the former status of "sea powers", made efforts to create their own missile cruisers, but all their attempts ended with the construction of a single ship with predominantly American weapons and systems. "Ships of prestige", nothing more.
The pioneers in the creation of missile cruisers were the Americans - by the end of the 40s, their military industry had created the first combat-ready air defense systems suitable for installation on a ship. In the future, the fate of US Navy missile cruisers was determined exclusively by escort functions as part of aircraft carrier groups; American cruisers were never designed for a serious sea battle with surface ships.
But missile cruisers were especially respected in our country: during the existence of the USSR, dozens of very different designs appeared on the expanses of the World Ocean: heavy and light, surface and underwater, with a conventional or nuclear power plant, there were even anti-submarine cruisers and aircraft carrier cruisers! It is no coincidence that missile cruisers have become the main strike force of the Soviet Navy.
In a general sense, the concept of "Soviet missile cruiser" meant a large multi-purpose surface ship with a powerful anti-ship missile system.
About the seven best missile cruisers - just a brief digression into the maritime history associated with the development of this unique class of warships. The author does not consider himself entitled to place any specific ratings and create a rating of "best of the best". No, this will be just a story about the most outstanding designs of the Cold War era, indicating their known advantages, disadvantages and interesting facts associated with these death machines. However, the nature of the presentation of the material will help the reader to independently determine which of this "magnificent seven" is still worthy of the highest pedestal.
Albany-class missile cruisers
1944/1962 Full displacement 17,500 tons. Crew 1200 people.
Full speed - 32 knots. Cruising range - 9000 miles (at 15 knots).
Armament:
- Talos long-range air defense systems (2 launchers, ammunition 104 missiles);
- Tartar short-range air defense systems (2 launchers, ammunition 84 anti-aircraft missiles);
- anti-submarine missile system ASROC (ammunition 24 rocket torpedoes);
- 8 Polaris intercontinental ballistic missiles (never installed);
- two universal guns of 127 mm caliber.
Three American monsters rebuilt from World War II heavy cruisers. After the first successful experiments with the missile, the US Navy decided on a global modernization of the Baltimore-class artillery cruisers - they dismantled all the weapons from the ships, cut off the superstructure and turned their insides around. And now, after 4 years, an incredible “thug” with a tall superstructure and mast-pipes studded with secret radio-electronic equipment entered the sea. The fact that this ship was once a Baltimore-class heavy artillery cruiser was only reminiscent of the shape of the bow.
Despite its ugly appearance, the Albany series of cruisers were cool warships capable of providing high-quality air defense for aircraft carrier formations in the near zone (by the standards of those years) - the Talos air defense missile range was more than 100 km, and two hundred missiles on board allowed fight off enemy aircraft for a long time.
Advantages:
15 cm armor belt, inherited from the heavy cruiser Baltimore,
- 8 fire control radars,
- high installation height of radars,
Flaws:
- lack of strike weapons,
- superstructures made of aluminum alloys,
- an archaic, in general, design.
Baltimore-class heavy artillery cruiser - this is what the Alban cruisers looked like before modernization
Belknap-class missile cruisers
1964 Gross displacement 8,000 tons. Crew 380 people.
Full speed - 32 knots. Cruising range - 7000 miles (at 20 knots).
Armament:
- universal launcher Mk.10 (80 anti-aircraft and anti-submarine missiles);
- automated artillery installation Mk.42 caliber 127 mm;
- 3 DASH unmanned anti-submarine helicopters (subsequently replaced by a conventional SH-2 Sea Sprite helicopter);
- two auxiliary guns of 76 mm caliber (subsequently replaced by anti-aircraft guns "Phalanx");
- 8 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (added after modernization in the early 1980s).
A series of 9 light escort cruisers, on which great hopes were pinned - already at the birth of the Belknap-class cruiser, they received a universal set of naval weapons, including the original computerized CICS, unmanned helicopters and a new AN / SQS-26 under-wing sonar, supposedly capable of hear the propellers of Soviet boats tens of miles from the side of the ship.
In some ways, the ship justified itself, in some ways it didn’t, for example, the daring project of an unmanned helicopter DASH turned out to be of little use for real use on the high seas - the control systems were too imperfect. I had to expand the hangar and the helipad for the deployment of a full-fledged anti-submarine helicopter.
It is noteworthy that after a short disappearance, 127 mm caliber guns returned to the ship again - the American sailors did not dare to completely abandon artillery.
In the 1960s and 1970s, cruisers of this type regularly patrolled off the coast of Vietnam, firing anti-aircraft missiles at North Vietnamese MiGs that inadvertently flew into the zone of destruction of the cruisers. But Belknap became famous not for its feats of arms - in 1975, the lead ship of this type was crushed in the Mediterranean Sea by the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy.
The cruiser was costly by its navigational error - the flight deck of the aircraft carrier literally “cut off” all the superstructures, and from above, a kerosene shower from the torn fuel lines of the aircraft carrier fell on the mangled remains of the ship. The ensuing eight-hour fire completely destroyed the cruiser. The restoration of Belknap was clean political decision, otherwise such a stupid death of the ship could undermine the prestige of the US Navy.
Advantages of "Belknap":
- computerized combat information and control system NTDS;
- the presence of a helicopter on board;
- small size and cost.
Flaws:
- the only launcher, the failure of which left the ship essentially unarmed;
- fire-dangerous aluminum superstructures;
- the absence of strike weapons (which, however, is dictated by the purpose of the cruiser).
Burnt "Belknap"
Missile cruisers of project 58 (code "Grozny")
1962 Gross displacement 5,500 tons. Crew 340 people.
Full speed - 34 knots. Cruising range - 3500 miles (at 18 knots).
Armament:
- anti-ship complex P-35 (2 launchers, ammunition 16 anti-ship missiles);
- short-range air defense system M-1 "Volna" (16 anti-aircraft missiles);
- two automatic twin guns of 76 mm caliber;
- 6 torpedoes caliber 533 mm;
- 2 x 12 rocket launchers RBU-6000;
- Helipad
Favorite ship of Nikita Khrushchev. A small Soviet cruiser with colossal strike power for its size. The world's first warship equipped with anti-ship missiles.
Even with the naked eye, it is noticeable how much the baby was overloaded with weapons - according to the plans of those years, the Terrible had to carry watch almost alone in the far latitudes of the oceans. You never know what tasks may arise before the Soviet cruiser - the Terrible must be ready for anything!
As a result, a universal weapon system appeared on board the ship, capable of fighting any air, surface and underwater targets. Very high speed - 34 knots (more than 60 km / h), universal artillery, equipment for receiving a helicopter ...
But the P-35 anti-ship complex was especially impressive - eight four-ton blanks capable of breaking off the rails at any moment and rushing over the horizon at supersonic speed (firing range - up to 250 km).
Despite doubts about the P-35's long-range target designation capabilities, powerful electronic countermeasures and anti-aircraft fire from the American AUGs, the cruiser posed a deadly threat to any enemy squadron - one of the four missiles of each launcher was with a megaton "surprise".
Advantages:
- exceptionally high saturation with fire weapons;
- great design.
Flaws:
Most of the shortcomings of the Terrible were one way or another connected with the desire of the designers to place the maximum number of weapons and systems in the limited destroyer hull.
- short cruising range;
- weak air defense;
- imperfect weapon control systems;
- fire hazard design: aluminum superstructure and synthetic interior trim.
Sea power of the USSR
Missile cruiser "Long Beach"
1961 Gross displacement 17,000 tons. Crew 1160 people.
Full speed - 30 knots. Cruising range - 360,000 miles.
Armament:
- Terrier medium-range air defense systems (2 launchers, ammunition 102 missiles)
- Talos long-range air defense systems (1 launcher, ammunition 52 missiles)
- ASRO anti-submarine missile system (ammunition 24 rocket torpedoes)
- two universal guns of 127 mm caliber;
- two Phalanx anti-aircraft guns, 8 Harpoon anti-aircraft missiles, 8 Tomahawk missiles (modernization in the early 1980s).
The world's first nuclear cruiser is undoubtedly worthy of mention in the list of the best ships of the twentieth century. In combination, Long Beach became the world's first purpose-built missile cruiser - all previous designs (Boston-class missile cruisers, etc.) were just improvisations based on World War II artillery cruisers.
The ship turned out great. Three missile systems for various purposes. The unusual "box" shape of the main superstructure, dictated by the installation of SCANFAR phased radars, also unique radio systems of its time. Finally, the nuclear heart of the cruiser, which made it possible to accompany the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise everywhere, for interaction with which this miracle was created.
However, an incredible price was paid for all this - $ 330 million (about 5 billion at the current exchange rate!), In addition, the imperfection of nuclear technologies did not allow the creation of a compact nuclear control system of the required power in the 50s - the cruiser rapidly "grew" in size, reaching, finally, 17 thousand tons. Too much for an escort ship!
In addition, it turned out that Long Beach did not have the opportunity to put their advantage into practice. Firstly, the autonomy of the ship is limited not only by fuel reserves. Secondly, in the retinue of an aircraft carrier there were many ships with conventional power plants, which made it difficult for the nuclear cruiser to move quickly.
"Long Beach" honestly served 33 years. During this time, he left a million nautical miles behind the stern, while managing to fight in Vietnam and Iraq. Due to its exceptional complexity and cost, it remained the lone "white elephant" of the fleet, however, it had a significant impact on the development of world shipbuilding (including the birth of our next "hero").
Advantages of "Long Beach":
- unlimited autonomy in terms of fuel reserves;
- radars with headlamps;
- versatility.
Flaws:
- monstrous cost;
- less survivability compared to conventional cruisers.
Heavy nuclear missile cruiser pr. 1144.2 (code "Orlan")
1998 Gross displacement 26,000 tons. Crew 635 people.
Full speed - 32 knots. Cruising range - not limited by fuel reserves.
Armament:
- anti-ship complex "Granit" (20 launchers, ammunition 20 missiles);
- S-300F "Fort" long-range air defense system (6 launchers, 48 missiles ammunition);
- long-range air defense system S-300FM "Fort-M" (6 launchers, ammunition 46 missiles);
- short-range air defense system "Dagger" (12 launchers, ammunition 128 missiles);
- anti-submarine complex "Waterfall" (ammunition 20 rocket torpedoes);
- 6 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems "Kortik";
- three jet bombers;
- three helicopters.
For comparison, TAVKR "Peter the Great" was chosen - the last and most advanced of the heavy nuclear missile cruisers of the "Orlan" type. A real Imperial cruiser with an amazing set of weapons - it has on board the entire range of systems that are in service with the Russian Navy.
Theoretically, in a one-on-one battle, the Orlan has no equal among all the ships of the world - a huge ocean killer will be able to deal with any enemy. In practice, the situation looks much more interesting - the enemy against whom the Orlans were created does not go alone. What awaits "Orlan" in a real battle with an aircraft carrier and its escort of five missile cruisers? Glorious Gangut, Chesma or the terrible Tsushima pogrom? Nobody knows the answer to this question.
The appearance of the first Orlan in 1980 excited the whole world a lot - in addition to its cyclopean size and heroic stature, the Soviet heavy cruiser became the world's first warship with under-deck vertical launch systems. Caused many fears anti-aircraft complex S-300F - nothing like that at that time simply did not exist in any country in the world.
In fact, the first ship with the S-300F experimental complex installed was the Azov BOD. In addition, the S-300F guides are not installed quite vertically, but at an angle of 5 ° to the normal to prevent the missile from falling to the deck in the event of a failure of the starting engine.
As in the case of the American "Long Beach", when discussing the "Orlan" one often hears an opinion about the adequacy of creating such a Miracle. Firstly, for the destruction of the AUG, nuclear submarine missile carriers, pr. 949A, look more attractive. The stealth and security of the submarine is an order of magnitude greater, the cost is less, while the 949A salvo is 24 Granit missiles.
Secondly, 26 thousand tons of displacement is a direct consequence of the presence of nuclear reactors, which do not provide any real advantages, only taking up space in vain, complicating maintenance and worsening the ship's survivability in battle. It can be assumed that without the YaSU, the Orlan's displacement would have been halved.
By the way, a paradoxical coincidence, the bald eagle is the national emblem of the United States!
Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser
1986 Gross displacement 10,000 tons. Crew 390 people.
Full speed - 32 knots. Cruising range - 6000 (at 20 knots).
Armament:
- 122 Mk.41 vertical launchers (launching almost all types of missiles in service with the US Navy, with the exception of submarine-launched ballistic missiles);
- 8 anti-ship missiles "Harpoon";
- two lightweight universal artillery systems Mk.45 caliber 127 mm;
— six anti-submarine torpedoes caliber 324 mm;
- two anti-aircraft guns "Phalanx";
- two automatic guns "Bushmaster" caliber 25 mm.
"Stand by admiral Gorshkov: "Aegis" - at sea!" - “Beware Admiral Gorshkov: Aegis is at sea!” - it was with such a message that the first Ticonderoga went to sea - an unsightly ship from the outside, with the most modern electronic filling.
For comparison, the cruiser CG-52 "Bunker Hill" was chosen - the lead ship of the second series of "Ticonderogues", equipped with UVP Mk.41.
Thought out to the smallest detail, a modern ship with unique fire control systems. The cruiser is still focused on providing air defense and anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier formations, however, it can independently deliver massive strikes along the coast with the help of Tomahawk cruise missiles, the number of which on board can reach hundreds of units.
The highlight of the cruiser is the Aegis combat information and control system. Together with the fixed phased panels of the AN / SPY-1 radar and 4 fire control radars, the ship's computers are capable of simultaneously tracking up to 1000 air, surface, and underwater targets, while automatically selecting them and, if necessary, attacking the 18 most dangerous objects. At the same time, the energy capabilities of the AN / SPY-1 are such that the cruiser is able to detect and attack even pinpoint fast-moving targets in low Earth orbit.
Advantages of Ticonderoga:
- unprecedented versatility at minimal cost;
- huge striking power;
- the possibility of solving missile defense problems and destroying satellites in low orbits;
Disadvantages of Ticonderoga:
- limited dimensions, and, as a result, dangerous congestion of the ship;
- Widespread use of aluminum in the design of the cruiser.
Missile cruiser project 1164 (code "Atlant")
1983 Gross displacement 11,500 tons. Crew 510 people.
Full speed - 32 knots. Cruising range - 6000 (at 18 knots).
Armament:
- anti-ship missile system P-1000 "Volcano" (8 twin launchers, ammunition 16 missiles);
- anti-aircraft missile system S-300F "Fort" (8 drum launchers, ammunition 64 missiles);
- two short-range anti-aircraft missile systems "Osa-MA" (2 beam launchers, ammunition 40 missiles);
- anti-submarine complex "Waterfall" (ammunition 10 rocket torpedoes);
- one twin automated artillery installation of 130 mm caliber;
- three batteries of automatic anti-aircraft guns AK-630 (total 6 guns + 3 fire control radars);
- two jet bombers;
- an anti-submarine helicopter and a hangar for its long-term storage.
With a displacement 2.25 times less than the huge nuclear-powered Orlan, the Atlant cruiser retains 80% of its strike power and up to 65% of its anti-aircraft weapons. In other words, instead of building one Orlan super cruiser, you can build two Atlants!
Two Atlant missile cruisers, by the way, are 32 Vulkan supersonic anti-ship missiles and 128 S-300F anti-aircraft missiles. As well as 2 helipads, 2 AK-130 artillery mounts, two Frigate radars and two hydroacoustic stations. And all this instead of one "Orlan"! Those. the obvious conclusion suggests itself - the missile cruiser pr. 1164 is the very “golden mean” between the size, cost and combat capabilities of the ship.
Even despite the general moral and physical obsolescence of these cruisers, the potential inherent in them is so high that it allows the Atlantes to still act on an equal footing with the most modern foreign missile cruisers and URO destroyers.
For example, the S-300F complex, which has no analogues - even modern US Navy anti-aircraft missiles, due to the limited size of standard Mk.41 UVP cells, are inferior in terms of energy characteristics to Fort missiles (in other words, they are twice as light and twice as slow).
Well, it remains to be wished that the legendary "grin of socialism" be modernized as often as possible and remain in combat service as long as possible.
Advantages of Atlanta:
- balanced design;
- excellent seaworthiness;
- S-300F and P-1000 missile systems.
Flaws:
- the only fire control radar of the S-300F complex;
- lack of modern self-defense air defense systems;
- an overly complex design of the gas turbine.
Maltese sunset, November 1989. The stern of the cruiser "Slava" is visible, in the foreground - the bow of the cruiser "Belknap"
An additional award is a commemorative flag.
The emblem of the collection is a key containing the following elements:
- bald eagle;
- US heraldic shield.
Sub-collection "Cruisers of the 1900÷1930s"
Fully assembled "Cruisers 1900÷1930s" opens the possibility of installing a second flag on American cruisers.
The cruiser St. Louis, named after the city in Missouri, was laid down in 1902. At the initial design stage, it was planned to build a series of ships, which was an improved cruiser Olympia (the flagship of the American squadron at the Battle of Manila in 1898) with a displacement of 6000 tons with a mixed armament of heavy and rapid-fire guns and a speed of 20 knots. However, the laying for the Russian fleet at one of the American shipyards of the Varyag cruiser, which is larger in size, with a single armament of 152-mm guns and a design speed of 23 knots, forced us to reconsider the project.
Entered into the US Navy in August 1906, the St.Louis was a nearly 10,000 ton ship with fourteen 152mm guns and a speed of 22 knots. The armor belt that protected the cruiser's power plant gave it a noticeable advantage over the other classmates armed with rapid-fire artillery, the vast majority of which were armored. Having completed the tests, the brand new four-pipe handsome man, sparkling with snow-white sides, set off on a voyage from New York to San Diego in May 1907. On the way, the cruiser, making a proper impression, visited a number of ports in Latin America, passing from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Magellan.
The cruiser Salt Lake City, named after the capital of Utah, was laid down in 1927. It was built extremely quickly and after two and a half years it entered service, overtaking even the lead Pensacola, which was laid down a few months earlier. The design phase that preceded construction lasted much longer. The idea of creating a 10,000-ton high-speed cruiser with 203-mm artillery was expressed as early as 1918, and until 1926 several dozen variants of the design of such a ship were considered, with different armament, armor and speed. Entered into service in 1929-1930, Salt Lake City and Pensacola had an impressive firepower of ten 203 mm guns. At the same time, due to poor armor, they were initially classified as light cruisers. Only in 1931, their classification was brought into line with the international one, and Pensacola and Salt Lake City “became heavier”.
The service of the USS Salt Lake City during the Second World War was very tense. Twice he had a chance to test his armor and firepower in artillery battles with Japanese heavy cruisers. The first time this happened was in October 1942 at Cape Esperance off the Solomon Islands, when American ships, catching the Japanese formation by surprise, managed to inflict severe losses on it and put it to flight. In March 1943, a small squadron, the core of which was Salt Lake City, intercepted Japanese cover forces off the Commander Islands, which were escorting transports with landing forces. The enemy formation included two heavy cruisers, each of which individually surpassed its overseas classmate, and yet the Americans entered the battle. For several hours, Salt Lake City, boldly maneuvering, exchanged fire with an enemy that was twice its firepower. The weak armor of the ship was not designed to withstand 203-mm shells, which almost led to a tragic ending. However, both Japanese cruisers were also damaged by fire from Salt Lake City, almost depleting their ammunition. The Japanese admiral, having met such stubborn resistance, considered it good to stop the operation and retire.
In 1929, when eight cruisers with 203-mm artillery were already at various stages of construction, the command of the US Navy came to the conclusion that the ships of the “Washington” generation were insufficiently protected. In this regard, by the beginning of next year, a draft of a new cruiser was created, which, with a displacement and armament limited by international agreements (10,000 tons, 203-mm guns), had significantly improved armor. The vital parts of the ship were protected from artillery fire, equal in caliber to his own, in this the new project surpassed all previous ones. USS New Orleans, commissioned in 1934, named after the city in Louisiana, became the lead in a series of seven units.
During World War II, New Orleans-class cruisers took part in many combat operations. The geography of their campaigns and battles stretches from Svalbard and the coast of North Africa to Australia and the Japanese islands. Three ships of the series were killed in an extremely unsuccessful battle for the Allies off Savo Island in the Solomon Islands in August 1942, however, the remaining ships were able to "recoup" over the next three years - in total, New Orleans-class cruisers were awarded 64 battle stars, becoming one of the most honored fighting units of the US Navy. The head, New Orleans, in October 1944 was able to avenge the death of his comrades by taking part in the battle at Cape Engano, where four Japanese aircraft carriers went to the bottom.
In September 1939, World War II began, and international agreements that limited the development of naval weapons ceased to operate. The command of the US Navy was able to replenish the growing fleet with light cruisers without regard to their displacement. However, the global conflict was gaining momentum and it was necessary to hurry. In order not to waste time creating the project from scratch, the last “big” light cruisers, St.Louis and Helena, were taken as the basis. The need to strengthen the ship's air defense and the desire to install the latest fire control systems and radar on it forced the abandonment of one of the 152-mm towers. The resulting light cruiser, having twelve 152-mm guns, was not inferior to the vast majority of her classmates in terms of the power of main battery artillery, far surpassing them in terms of air defense strength and saturation with modern equipment.
The second ship of the series, USS Columbia, named after the capital of the state of South Carolina, was built almost simultaneously with the lead ship, USS Cleveland, and entered service in July 1942. The most impressive episode of his combat career was his participation in operations near the island of Bougainville (Solomon Islands) in November 1943. On November 1, four Cleveland-class cruisers, including USS Columbia, unleashed the power of their rapid-fire guns on enemy positions on the island. A few hours later, in a night battle, which became known as the battle in the Empress Augusta Bay, they repulsed an attempt by a strong Japanese squadron to strike at the American landing site on about. Bougainville. Immediately after this, on the morning of November 2, USS Columbia and three of her sisterships repelled a massive enemy air raid, shooting down over 20 aircraft, again without loss on their part.
Seven Baltimore-class cruisers managed to take part in the hostilities during World War II. In addition to covering aircraft carrier formations with their powerful air defense, these ships were also quite effectively used to shell enemy coastal positions, moreover, as in pacific ocean, and during the landing of the allies in France. Unlike the Cleveland-class cruisers, which were overstocked with weapons, which excluded their modernization and predetermined a short service life, many Baltimore-class cruisers were re-equipped and remained in service until the 1960-1970s, having managed to take part in hostilities in Korea and Vietnam .
The cruiser Worcester, named after a city in Massachusetts, was laid down in January 1945. The idea to create a ship armed with 152 mm universal guns arose from the command of the US Navy back in 1941, when the increased threat from the air in the war at sea became absolutely obvious. The difficulties of developing a universal 152-mm turret and the controversy surrounding the very concept of such a cruiser led to the fact that the design of a new ship was delayed for several years. Changes were made during construction. The familiarity of the US Navy with the Japanese tactics of kamikaze pilots forced them to abandon the installation of 40-mm Bofors assault rifles on new cruisers and replace them with much more powerful 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. The new two-gun 152-mm turrets, saturated with complex mechanisms, turned out to be very heavy and bulky. As a result, the “light” cruiser, on which six such towers were installed, turned out to be comparable in size to her heavy classmates of the Baltimore class.
USS Worcester and her only sister ship USS Roanoke entered service only in 1948-1949, when World War II had long since ended. In total, four units were ordered under the project, but the order for two ships, one of which was laid down, was canceled in August 1945, when the US victory in the war with Japan became a fait accompli. Having joined the US Navy, USS Worcester spent a significant part of her active service outside her native waters, "showing the flag" in the Mediterranean, Latin America, Northern Europe and the Pacific region. The ship's participation in the Korean War of 1950-1953 was marked with two battle stars. In 1970, USS Worcester, obsolete due to the development of anti-aircraft missile weapons, was excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Short-lived, rapidly changing night battles against the ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, put the command of the US Navy in front of the need to create rapid-fire 203-mm guns capable of bringing down a maximum of metal and explosives on the enemy in a short time. A three-gun 203 mm turret with an automatic loading mechanism was created by the end of 1945. Since its weight and dimensions noticeably exceeded the similar characteristics of the towers, both those that were already part of the fleet and heavy cruisers that were still under construction, it was necessary to design and design for the new tower in parallel. new ship. The lead heavy cruiser, named Des Moines after the city in Iowa, was laid down in May 1945. It was to be followed by eleven more units, however, in connection with the end of the Second World War, it was decided to complete only three. Another laid down ship was dismantled on the slipway.
Commissioned in 1948-1949, the same-type Des Moines, Salem and Newport News were unparalleled in the maritime expanses of the post-war world. Their appearance had a noticeable impact on the design of heavy artillery ships in the USSR in the early 1950s. In particular, with an eye on Des Moines, the Soviet heavy cruiser Project 66 was being developed. Having no chance to use their main battery against surface targets, Des Moines-class cruisers during their years of active service, as a rule, performed the honorary functions of flagships. The firepower of the USS Newport News proved to be in demand when shelling coastal targets during the Vietnam War. Two of the three ships in the series were dismantled for metal in 1990-2000, USS Salem is preserved as a museum ship in Quincy, Massachusetts.
Sub-collection "Main caliber"
The fully assembled "Main Caliber" opens up the possibility of installing a second flag on American aircraft carriers.
Five-inch (127 mm) caliber guns were very popular in the American Navy. For the first time in service with US Navy cruisers, 127-mm guns (Mark 1) appeared in the 1880s. By 1901, a new, long-barreled, five-inch Mark 5 gun was developed, and a few years later, its slightly modified version, the Mark 6. Even with the fact that all loading operations were carried out manually, the Mark 5/6 gun could fire from 6 to 8 armor-piercing shells, the weight of which ranged from 22 to 27 kg.
The 127 mm Mark 5/6 guns were installed as the main guns on Chester-class light cruisers, and as mine countermeasure artillery on Delaware-class battleships. In addition, a number of older ships were re-equipped with them. In particular, instead of their 152-mm and 120-mm guns of English production, ten 127-mm guns were received in 1904-1907 by the cruiser Albany. In the 1910s, the Mark 5/6 was replaced by the faster-firing and more penetrating 127 mm Mark 7/8 gun. However, even during the Second World War, individual Mark 5/6 installations were still found in service with auxiliary ships and coastal batteries.
The development of a new rapid-fire 152 mm Mark 6 gun was completed by 1900. Over the next decade, this artillery system, as well as its modified version, the Mark 8, became widespread in the US Navy. The gun had a rate of fire of about 6 rounds per minute with a projectile weight of about 48 kg. The elevation angle, limited to 15 degrees, provided a firing range of over 13.5 km.
The 152 mm Mark 6/8 guns became standard in the auxiliary artillery of US Navy battleships and armored cruisers built in the 1900s. Only on cruisers of the St. Louis type were they installed as the main caliber. After the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, most ships of the pre-dreadnought era were sent for scrapping, while 152-mm guns were transferred en masse to the US coastal artillery.
152 mm Mark 16 twin turret
Especially for light cruisers of the Omaha class, a new 152 mm gun, the Mark 12, was developed with an increased barrel length and a high muzzle velocity. According to the original design, the armament of these ships consisted of ten single deck and casemate installations. However, then, in 1920, in order to surpass the British C-class cruisers in broadside power, the two-gun Mark 16 turret was developed. 30 degrees, which provided a theoretical firing range of over 23 km.
The introduction of the Mark 16 turret marked a significant milestone in the history of the cruiser class. The technological level of the previous, pre-dreadnought era did not allow the creation of sufficiently reliable turret installations with a high speed of aiming guns at a target. In this regard, at the beginning of the 20th century, fast-firing guns on cruisers were usually placed directly on the deck or in casemates, which limited their firing range and did not ensure confident operation in difficult weather conditions. The entry into service in 1923-1925 of the Omaha-class cruisers marked a gradual transition to placing all main-caliber artillery on cruisers in turret mounts.
152 mm triple turret
The relatively low muzzle velocity of the heavy projectile and the close location of the barrels in the turret had a negative effect on the accuracy of firing at long distances. However, the turret's ability to fire up to 30 rounds per minute made it an extremely formidable weapon at short and medium combat distances. This advantage was especially useful in the fleeting night battles between American and Japanese ships in the Pacific campaign.
152mm universal mount
The idea of creating a universal gun with a caliber of more than 127 mm arose in the US Navy as early as 1937, but it was only possible to translate it into metal by 1948, when the cruiser Worcester was completed. For the turrets of the main caliber of ships of this type, the same 152-mm Mark 16 guns were used as on the Brooklyn and Cleveland-class cruisers, which had the same theoretical firing range, about 23.8 km, and the same shell weight, about 59 kg. The fundamental difference between the new installations was the greater automation of the loading mechanisms and the power of the guidance drives increased by an order of magnitude in the horizontal and vertical planes.
The universal 152-mm turrets of the Worcester-class cruisers were the first installations in the world of such a large caliber that were capable of truly effective fire on air targets. The speed of their rotation was up to 25 degrees per second with the ability to fire about 12 rounds per minute per barrel. The payoff for these impressive performances was the relatively large size and enormous weight of the machine-laden turrets. The two-gun 152-mm universal mount weighed about 20% more than the three-gun 152-mm turret of the cruiser Cleveland or Helena, which predetermined the displacement of the USS Worcester, which was solid for a ship of this class.
127mm Mark 29 Universal Mount
One of the first U.S. Navy anti-aircraft guns, the 76mm Mark 10, was developed from 1913-1915 from an earlier system, the Mark 6, which was widely used as anti-mine artillery on American ships built in the 1900s. The Mark 10 gun could fire at elevation angles up to 85 degrees. Formally, it had a dual purpose, since theoretically it could fire at both air and surface targets. However, the Mark 10 was not very effective in either role. In the first case - due to exclusively manual guidance, in the second - because of a too light projectile.
Until the end of the 1920s, the 76-mm Mark 10 guns were almost the only anti-aircraft artillery systems installed on large warships of the American fleet. One of the first to receive them during rearmament in 1916 was the battleships of the New York class. For the light cruisers of the Omaha class, which began to enter service in 1923, the installation of Mark 10, two per ship, was already included in the project.
The Browning M2 machine gun was developed in the United States in 1932 and was widely used in all branches of the country's armed forces. Its anti-aircraft version appeared with the Navy the following year. The rate of fire of the machine gun was quite high and amounted to about 500 rounds per minute. However, the rapid development of military aviation during the 1930s very quickly led to the fact that 12.7-mm machine guns could no longer effectively hit high-speed air targets.
As a short-range air defense system, there was no alternative to the Browning M2 in the US Navy until the appearance of 28-mm anti-aircraft guns in the late 1930s, and therefore 12.7-mm machine guns until 1941 could be found on almost all American cruisers . Only when mass production of Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns was launched in 1942 did obsolete Brownings disappear from large US warships.
Development of the first American anti-aircraft automatic system began in 1929 and was completed by 1934, when the resulting four-gun 28-mm installation could be put into production. However, the tests carried out on the system revealed a lot of shortcomings in it. It took several years to eliminate them, as a result, the supply of new guns to the fleet began only by 1940. The automatic 28-mm installation had a rate of fire up to 150 rounds per minute and was the first US Navy anti-aircraft system with a power guidance drive.
Possessing low reliability, the 28-mm installation very quickly received the not-too-respectful nickname "Chicago Piano" in the Navy. Since the pace of production of these systems could not meet the ever-increasing needs of the Navy, they were not widely used on large warships. After the mass production of 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns began in 1942, which significantly exceeded the Chicago Piano in terms of effective range, reliability and power, 28-mm guns were removed from the assembly line.
The Oerlikon, the most numerous anti-aircraft gun of the Second World War, was based on the design of a 20 mm German gun developed by Reinhold Becker in 1913-1915. The Becker gun, which had a high rate of fire for that time and low weight, was intended for installation on airplanes and the legendary Zeppelins. From Germany, demilitarized after the First World War, the production of the 20-mm gun migrated to Switzerland to the SEMAG company, and then, after its ruin, to the Oerlikon company.
Initially, the Swiss version of the 20 mm gun did not have impressive performance. In 1935, the United States, having purchased cannon samples for testing, refused to use Oerlikons, which put the Swiss company on the verge of bankruptcy. Ironically, Oerlikon was able to continue work on improving the design of the gun thanks to Japan, who bought a license to manufacture 20 mm guns. The Japanese "Oerlikons" under the designation "Type 99" became the basis of the armament of the famous Zero fighters. In 1940, in the conditions of the outbreak of war, the United States began to look for a replacement for the outdated and too weak Browning anti-aircraft machine guns. The 20-mm automatic "Oerlikon", significantly improved by that time, turned out to be most welcome. In 1941, their production was launched in the United States, and soon the Oerlikons were installed on almost every warship, from boats to battleships.
Reliability, high rate of fire (up to 120 rounds per minute), significant reach in height (over 6 km), destructive power of the projectile (ammunition weight - 900 g) - all this was made by the 40-mm automatic gun developed in 1930-1933 by the Swedish company Bofors the most common anti-aircraft artillery system. In the 1940-1950s, it was in service with dozens of countries around the world.
The production of the 40-mm Bofors in the United States began in 1941, but the Swedish gun did not satisfy the fleet in many respects, and the Americans made many improvements to the design of the installation, including using the British version of the Bofors. Mass production 40-mm guns were deployed only at the end of 1942, and it was only possible to fully satisfy the requests of the Navy by 1944, when the Bofors were able to finally oust the insufficiently effective 28-mm "Chicago pianos" from the ships. Bofors were produced in a variety of versions - air-cooled and water-cooled, in twin, quad and single installations, with manual guidance and with a power drive. A little more than 10 thousand Bofors installations were manufactured for the fleet and coast guard, over 20 thousand for the land army, about 9 thousand were delivered to the allied countries.
76 mm Mark 33 anti-aircraft gun
At the final stage of the war in the Pacific, the US Navy encountered Japanese tactics of kamikaze pilots. In such a situation, it was not enough just to hit the aircraft rushing at high speed, it had to be destroyed in the air before it approached the ship. Small-caliber anti-aircraft guns "Bofors" and "Oerlikon" could not cope with this task, and the American fleet had to urgently look for a way out of the situation. The solution was to return to the ships as anti-aircraft artillery 76-mm guns in more advanced installations with a power drive.
Already after the end of the war, the most effective 76-mm anti-aircraft gun was developed - the twin Mark 33. Very high pointing speed (24 degrees per second in the horizontal plane, 30 degrees per second in the vertical plane), the ability to fire up to 50 rounds per minute per barrel, the exhaustive destructive power of ammunition with a maximum reach in height of over 9 km made this weapon a kind of result of the development of American air defense artillery systems in the 1940s. One of the first installations of the Mark 33 was the light cruiser Worcester, which entered service in 1948. These guns were in service with the US Navy until the 1980s.
Sub-collection "Highest awards"
A fully assembled "Highest Awards" opens up the possibility of using an additional color scheme for the standard camouflages of American cruisers.
The Medal of Honor is the highest and most honorable award a soldier can receive. For the land army, aviation and navy, there are their own versions of the award badge. The Navy Medal of Honor was established in 1861, at the start of the American Civil War, and is the oldest variant of the award. In the entire history of the existence of the Medal of Honor, all its types have been awarded only a little more than 3,500 people. In the Navy, both a simple sailor and an admiral could get it.
One of those who was awarded the Navy Medal of Honor posthumously was Rear Admiral Norman Scott, who commanded a squadron in October 1942 at the Battle of Cape Esperance, which became the first victory of the American fleet in the battle of surface ships during the Pacific campaign. A month later, the admiral died on the bridge of his flagship, the cruiser Atlanta, in the First Naval Battle off Guadalcanal.
The Navy Cross is the second most important award that can be received by any member of the Navy, Corps marines or the US Coast Guard. The cross is given special significance by the fact that it is awarded for outstanding heroism, shown exclusively in a combat situation. The Navy Cross was established in 1919 to reward those servicemen whose exploits could not be awarded the Medal of Honor, the highest and at that time the only military award in the United States. In total, since its establishment, over 6,000 people have been awarded the cross.
During the Pacific campaign, three Navy Crosses were received by Robert Hayler, who became vice admiral of the US Navy after the war. He was twice decorated for his exploits as commander of the USS Honolulu, a Brooklyn-class light cruiser, with which he fought in a number of vicious naval battles off the Solomon Islands. For his contribution to the defeat of the Japanese in the Surigao Strait in October 1944, Hayler, who at that time commanded the 12th Cruiser Squadron with the rank of Rear Admiral, received the third Navy Cross.
The Distinguished Service Medal was established in 1919 to reward senior officers of the Navy and Marine Corps for exceptional service in the performance of their duties. Initially, the medal had a more honorary status than the Navy Cross, however, in 1943, at the height of World War II, these awards were reversed in the hierarchy of US insignia.
Among the American naval commanders there were many who were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal several times. So, admirals Chester Nimitz and William Halsey were awarded it four times, Ernest King, Raymond Spruance and Mark Mitscher - three times.
In 1932, the Silver Star Medal was established, which became the fourth most important military award in the US award system. In accordance with the statute approved in 1942, the medal could be awarded to a member of any rank and branch of the US armed forces for courage and bravery shown in battle. The total number of Silver Star recipients exceeds 100,000.
Among the US Navy officers awarded the Silver Star was the Hollywood actor Douglas Fairbanks. In 1941, already a celebrity, he was drafted into the Navy. In 1943, Fairbanks initiated the creation of a special sabotage unit specializing in amphibious operations, which later became known as the Beach Jumpers. For his participation in the preparation and conduct of landing operations in Sicily and in Southern France, as well as military merit shown during his service on torpedo boats, Fairbanks was awarded a number of awards, including the Silver Star Medal.
The Distinguished Flying Cross was established in 1926. It was awarded for heroism and outstanding achievements in air flight. Not only US military personnel could receive the cross, but also military and civil aviators of other countries.
The most successful ace of the US Navy, David McCampbell, who won 34 air victories during the years of World War II, had three Flying Merit Crosses among his many awards. Under his command, the 15th Air Group, based on the aircraft carrier Essex, destroyed more enemy aircraft and ships during the Pacific campaign than any other US carrier-based aviation unit.
The Bronze Star Medal is the next most important US military award after the Silver Star. It was established in 1944 and was awarded for heroism shown in the war zone. If the feat was accomplished directly during the battle, the letter “V” (from the English valor - valor) was attached to the ribbon of the medal.
The medal could be awarded to both military personnel of any branch of the US armed forces, including the Navy, as well as civilians and even, as an exception, foreign citizens. Quite deservedly, his "Bronze Star" was worn by the legend of world cinema, Henry Fonda, who in 1942 volunteered for the US Navy and served on the destroyer, air transport and aerial reconnaissance in the Pacific Ocean.
Sub-collection "Orders and medals"
A fully assembled "Orders and Medals" opens up the possibility of using additional colors of the standard camouflages of American battleships.
The US Navy and Marine Corps Medal was established in 1942 and is awarded for heroism shown by members of the US Navy in a non-combat environment. Most often, this medal is awarded for actions to save people, carried out at the risk of their own life. Often the award is given posthumously.
During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the chaplain of the battleship Oklahoma, Rev. Alois Schmit, when the ship had already received fatal damage from nine torpedoes, was locked in one of the internal compartments along with other crew members. Before the ship capsized, Father Schmit helped twelve sailors out of the trap, refusing to save himself. For his feat, the chaplain was posthumously awarded the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Medal.
Japanese
The Air Medal was established in 1942. It is awarded to members of the US military for heroism and special achievements during air flights. The same person could receive the medal more than once, in which case oak leaves were attached to the ribbon of the award.
The legendary astronaut, John Glenn, the first American to make an orbital flight, during the Pacific War, as a Marine Corps aviation lieutenant, took part in dozens of sorties at the controls of the F4U Corsair. For his services during World War II, he was awarded two Distinguished Flying Crosses and ten Air Medals.
The Commendation Badge for Service in the Navy was established in 1943 and was originally only a badge of distinction in the form of a ribbon, worn only in a common order bar. In 1950, the award acquired modern look hexagonal metal token on a white-green ribbon. It differed from the army version only in the location and width of the white stripes on the ribbon. It was not until 1960 that the status of the badge was upgraded to a full-fledged award, and it was renamed the Commendation Medal for Service in the Navy.
The Navy badge appeared before similar distinctions were introduced in other branches of the US armed forces, and stricter criteria were applied for awarding it. As a rule, only an officer or a senior petty officer in command of a unit could receive it. In the case of awarding a badge for merits shown in combat conditions, a metal letter “V” (from the English valor - valor) was attached to the ribbon.
The Navy Distinguished Service Medal was established in 1869 and is one of the oldest American military awards. For comparison: a similar insignia for the US Army was introduced only in 1941. The design of the Navy medal has changed several times. In 1885, the third version of it was already approved. appearance, which remained unchanged until 1961.
The medal is intended for members of the Navy below the officer rank. Initially, it was awarded in case of successful completion of the service life. Later, the medal began to be issued for every three years of impeccable service in peacetime or one year in wartime.
The flagship of the Northern Fleet, the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky, will begin modernization at least two years earlier than expected. During the repair with re-equipment, which will take 4-5 years, the ship will receive a new missile weapon. About the history and prospects of the largest non-aircraft-carrying warships in the modern fleets of the world - read the material on the site.
The Pyotr Veliky will be repaired with modernization no later than 2020, without waiting for the return to service of the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which should be ready by 2022. According to a source cited by the TASS agency, the modernization will take 4-5 years.
Previously, it was assumed that "Peter the Great" will begin to re-equip after the completion of work on the "Nakhimov". However, they were delayed until 2022, and the ship, according to the source, has developed an operational resource.
White elephants of the fleet
The Project 1144 Orlan heavy nuclear missile cruisers are one of the visible symbols of the USSR Navy and at the same time a good example of what comes out of a long red tape in the development and refinement of technical projects. The first approaches to the projectile began at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, the lead ship was laid down in 1973, and handed over to the fleet only in December 1980.
From the idea to create a big anti-submarine ship With nuclear reactor and with a displacement of 8 thousand tons, two branches first grew (a nuclear anti-submarine cruiser and a nuclear cruiser with anti-ship weapons), then they were merged. The resulting multi-purpose monster with a displacement of over 25 thousand tons, still characterized in the West as a battlecruiser, with all the undeniable combat capabilities, has turned into a warehouse of new weapons systems and electronic weapons of the fleet - with a concomitant increase in the complexity and cost of construction.
The USSR managed to introduce only three ships of this type: the lead "Kirov" (1980), "Frunze" (1984) and "Kalinin" (1988). The unfinished "Yuri Andropov" was inherited by the Russian Federation, which handed it over to the fleet in 1998 under the name "Peter the Great".
The remaining ships by this time were renamed, respectively, to Admiral Ushakov (in 2004, the name was taken away and a formally nameless ship with tail number 090 and the letters Kirov remained), Admiral Lazarev and Admiral Nakhimov.
The basis of the armament of the cruiser was 20 inclined anti-ship launchers missile system"Granite" (range up to 600 km). Anti-aircraft weapons included the long-range S-300F Fort air defense system and the Osa-M self-defense air defense system (on the first three ships). On the "Peter", instead of the S-300F, they put the S-300FM "Fort-M", instead of the "Wasp" - a more modern "Dagger". At Kalinin and Petra, 30-mm AK-630 assault rifles were replaced with six Kortik near-range anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems. From ship to ship, the composition of anti-submarine weapons and electronic weapons changed.
Nakhimov goes first
The idea of re-equipping Project 1144 cruisers has been discussed for a long time, but the money was allocated for it only under the 2011-2020 State Armaments Program. The first ship was "Admiral Nakhimov" (formerly "Kalinin"), which back in 1999 was put against the wall of the Severodvinsk "Sevmash" with the wording "for repair and modernization".
Only in 2013, the Ministry of Defense paid Sevmash for a long project to inspect, repair and modernize the cruiser. In the fall of the following year, the ship was transferred to the bulk pool in Severodvinsk and began to be examined. Initially, they wanted to return the cruiser to the fleet in 2018, but then the work was extended until the end of 2021.
The project, in addition to the actual restoration of readiness, includes a complete change in the composition of strike weapons: "Granite" is being dismantled. In September 2013, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, who then held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, announced that the cruiser would receive up to 80 missiles of various types, which allows us to conclude that 10 modules of the 3S14 universal ship firing system (UKKS, 8 cells each) will be installed on the Nakhimov .
The 3S14 ammunition load includes 3M14 long-range cruise missiles, 3M55 Onyx and 3M54 anti-ship missiles, and anti-submarine missiles. Also, judging by press reports, the new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, which are currently being tested, will be put on the ship. In terms of anti-aircraft weapons, the ship will receive a modernized S-300FM Fort-M complex (a similar one is installed on Peter the Great). Also, instead of "Daggers", it is possible that new air defense systems "Pantsir-M" will be installed. It will appear on the cruiser and the Polyment-Redut air defense system, although its development on the head frigate of project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov has not yet been completed.
According to the same project, with minor changes related to differences in the composition of weapons and electronic weapons, "Petra" will also be modernized. The fate of the "Admiral Lazarev" ("Frunze"), which has been in the Pacific Fleet's sludge since the late 1990s, is still in limbo. The ship was tried several times to be disposed of, but at the last moment the decision was postponed. In 2014, the ship underwent dock repairs "in order to ensure unsinkability at the quay wall." We can accurately conclude that following the completion of work on the Nakhimov and the initial analysis of the state of the Lazarev, it will be clear whether it is worth contacting the third building. Most likely, the answer will be “no”, but officially it has not yet been given.
But everything is already clear with the fourth ship, which is also the lead "Kirov". The cruiser has not been at sea since 1991 (apart from being towed to Severodvinsk in 1999) and is in very poor condition. In 2015, a tender was held for a disposal project, after which the ship was supposed to begin unloading spent nuclear fuel.
The real total cost of modernization of "Nakhimov" is unknown, but very solid. So, in 2012, Anatoly Shlemov, then head of the state defense order department of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, estimated the restoration of the cruiser's readiness at 30 billion rubles, and taking into account the installation of new weapons, up to 50 billion rubles. At that time, the planned cost of the project 20380 corvette was 10 billion rubles, the project 11356 frigate - 13 billion, and the project 22350 frigate - 18 billion.
Note that these are estimated figures given before the conclusion of the contract and before the inspection, which determined the actual state of the hull, general ship systems and cable routes. In addition, after 2014–2015, shipbuilding prices began to rise sharply, as a result of which prices rose by 60–70% for a number of ongoing projects. Thus, a rough estimate of the cost of re-equipping Nakhimov at 80–90 billion rubles no longer looks overstated.
This is a rather expensive pleasure, so the whole idea often draws criticism from experts. With the money that will be spent on Nakhimov and Peter, at current prices, 5-6 new frigates or a dozen corvettes can be built. In addition, in a similar weight category, the fleet has a newer project, which so far cannot be approached in any way.
Leader of the new fleet
For several years now, the Russian Navy has been offered to build a destroyer of the Leader project, which is essentially a new missile cruiser. Several options were considered with a displacement of 10-15 thousand tons. At first, they intended to develop two versions: nuclear and gas turbine, but then they settled on only nuclear. However, it is not yet a fact that this is the last item in the design.
The ship should receive the same UKKS with strike weapons, but, among other things, it is also considered as a carrier of the naval version of the advanced S-500 anti-aircraft missile system. There were clear comments about the appearance of ships with anti-missile capabilities in the fleet.
The plans involved the construction of 12 "Leaders": equally for the Northern Fleet and the Pacific. The lead ship was going to be laid either in 2015 or 2017, but after the rebalancing of the State Armaments Program for 2011-2020, the topic died out.
The 4.7-5 (according to various sources) trillion rubles assigned to the fleet according to the initial version of SAP-2020 did not reach it for various reasons. You can start with the unpreparedness of the industry to ensure the serial construction of new ships, and end with an increase in attention to forces general purpose following the military-political crisis of 2014. As a result, more money was spent on land and paratroopers, as well as on serial purchases of finished equipment. The fleet, however, remained to complete the already almost completely overwhelmed program for the construction of frigates and corvettes, without dispersing resources into new directions.
Now the deadlines for laying the head "Leader" have been pushed back already for 2025, which means that this topic will not receive significant funding under the new State Program for 2018-2027. At one time, there were even rumors that “Leader” would simply be deleted from the list of SAP-2027, but then it was decided to allocate “some money to support the project.”
Therefore, in the 2020s, the heavy surface forces of the fleet will have to make do with Nakhimov and Peter the Great at best.
Five or six aircraft carrier groups will be created in the future in the Northern and Pacific Fleets
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev instructed the Ministry of Defense to develop a program for the construction of aircraft-carrying cruisers in order to begin the creation of such ships in the next two years. Medvedev spoke about this during a meeting with the personnel of the only heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser in Russia, the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, from which the Supreme Commander-in-Chief observed the training of the Northern Fleet forces.
In the next two years, Russia will start building aircraft-carrying cruisers. "I think that in the near future we will prepare a program - consider this an instruction to the Ministry of Defense - to revive the aircraft carrier component (Navy) and determine the places where new aircraft carrier cruisers will be built," Medvedev said during a meeting on Saturday with the personnel of the aircraft carrier cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov", from which the Supreme Commander-in-Chief observed the progress of the training of the forces of the Northern Fleet.
"We will need to build new aircraft-carrying cruisers, this is a very important direction in the development of the naval forces," Medvedev stressed. He added that "this is how all large states with a powerful navy develop." Recalling that an aircraft-carrying cruiser is built on average for about five years, the head of state expressed the opinion that "by 2013-2015 we will be able to get the first results, if we count five years from the decision."
At the same time, he noted that "if you do, then do a lot in a different way." “Power plants must be nuclear. This creates other possibilities. The electronic filling and weapons must also change,” the Supreme Commander believes. At the same time, he stressed that "this cannot be done in one year, since not everyone is ready for this." “We lost a lot in the 90s, we didn’t build anything. It is necessary to restore the very base for the creation of aircraft-carrying cruisers and, in fact, the entire Navy,” he said.
The President recalled that new submarines are already being created. In the near future, two new submarines, Yuri Dolgoruky and Alexander Nevsky, will be put into operation.
"Yuri Dolgoruky" will be introduced next year. Sea trials are already underway,” the president said.
The aircraft carrier component needs to be restored in parallel, because without it "the submarine fleet cannot perform the tasks that it must perform, given that we have a huge country and we must protect all its borders."
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief emphasized that "the sooner we decide on the place of production (of new aircraft-carrying cruisers), the sooner we will begin to create them." “It is not so much the question of money that is important for us now, despite certain crisis phenomena in the world financial market how much is the question where to do. The country became smaller after the collapse of the USSR, and there were fewer places to build,” the head of state explained.
commander in chief Navy Russian Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky previously reported that five or six aircraft carrier groups would be created in the future in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. According to him, the command of the Navy decided to build not just aircraft carriers for these fleets, but naval aircraft carrier systems. “Everything should work in the system, including aircraft carriers. We called it the Naval Aircraft Carrier System (MAS), which will be based on the Northern and Pacific Fleets,” Vysotsky said. According to him, the construction of such systems will begin after 2012.
He emphasized that the new naval aircraft carrier systems will be very different from today's aircraft carriers and aircraft carrier groups. They will operate in close cooperation with the space group. In addition, aircraft carrier systems will operate in close contact with the air force and air defense systems. Research work is already underway.
In addition, at a meeting with the personnel of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that he did not intend to change the term of military service on conscription, reduced from 2008 to one year. “The service life can only change in one situation. You yourself understand in which case - in the case of real hostilities, ”Medvedev concluded.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the state will spare no money both for the creation of new types of weapons and for the social security of military personnel.
Medvedev stressed that "work on the modernization of the armed forces of the Russian Federation pursues two main tasks." “Task number one is the creation of a fundamentally new image of the armed forces and the creation of new types of weapons, putting them on combat duty and using them in practical activities. We will spare no expense for this. This is extremely important for maintaining the combat capability of our armed forces,” the Supreme Commander emphasized.
Task number two, in his words, is “the creation of normal social conditions for the military." Medvedev recalled that units of constant combat readiness will be transferred from January 1 to a new amount of salaries. “It will be a worthy amount, comparable to that paid in developed countries,” the President assured.
In addition, Dmitry Medvedev promised that the cost of a housing certificate for military personnel will soon be equal to the market value of housing.
“The topic of housing certificates is well known, we talked a lot about this,” Medvedev said during a conversation with the personnel of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft-carrying cruiser on board the ship. “We have a simple idea: we will bring the cost of the certificate to the market value of housing,” RIA Novosti reports.
