Over-the-horizon radar station Duga radar in Chernobyl-2
The Duga over-the-horizon radar, also known under the code designation 5N32, is designed to calculate and detect ballistic missiles. To date, three objects are known that worked on this system:
Installation near Nikolaev (dismantled);
a station in Bolshaya Kartel near Komsomolsk-on-Amur (decommissioned in 1989, now dismantled);
Chernobyl-2, which was stopped in 1986 due to the Chernobyl accident and partially dismantled. Some parts were transported to Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
The Duga radar made it possible to monitor not only all the movements of above-ground objects in Europe, but also the launches of ICBMs throughout North America. It is thanks to the development of such technology, which have been going on for decades, and their implementation, that the station got its name - "Duga".
The Duga-1 center, which was located in Chernobyl-2, was developed by the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications. The brightest heads of the Soviet Union took part in the creation and design, namely: Kuzminsky, Vasyukov, Shamshin, Shtyren and Shustov.
The frequency of the radar was 5-28 MHz, while the antennas were created on the basis of phased array technology. There were two types of antennas in total, between which the range was and was divided. This was due to the fact that one installation would not have coped with the operating range. The low-frequency and high-frequency antennas, as well as the entire complex in the Chernobyl zone (more precisely, its remains) are still very clearly visible at any distance, since the scale of the object is really amazing.
Also at the station there was a unique system "Circle", which consisted of two rows of antenna vibrators (each 12 meters high, the number - 240 units), placed in a circle and one central, on a hill. The system sent a signal and immediately detected its own signal, which managed to bypass the entire planet during this time (!).
Unfortunately, the fate of the station turned out to be very deplorable due to the Chernobyl accident. The built radar station, which was first turned on in 1980, was upgraded just before the accident and was ready for duty, but it happened differently. Until 1987, the decision was made to mothball the station, in the hope of trying to resume its operation as much as possible after the accident. After this time, it became clear that it would not return to combat readiness due to the consequences of emissions from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
This was followed by a decision of the USSR government, according to which the most valuable and expensive equipment on the Duga-1 radar station was dismantled and transported to Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Due to the increase in looting on the territory of Chernobyl after the collapse of the USSR, as well as mass stalking, which the military patrols did not always successfully cope with, parts of the Duga-1 radar station were taken away, but it was not possible to plunder the station to the end or discreetly dismantle the remaining capacities marauders due to the colossal size of the main structures. Examination of the state of the main support metal structures has not been carried out, but traces of erosion are visible.
17 masts of 140 meters in height each and 12 of 90 meters, which, despite the lack of expertise, will still be able to cope with a certain additional load (such objects were cast from high-quality steel), gave rise to a project to create a wind farm based on remnants of the Duga-1 radar. According to the project, it was proposed to install about 20 wind turbines (6x14 meters each) on all the masts of the former radar station. Given that they could be mounted on vibrators, and the location of the station is ideal for extracting wind electricity, in addition, the transportation of electricity would also be convenient, this project has a rational grain. But, again, it all comes down to doing research, getting permits, and global government disinterest in developing the area.
WITH The state of the satellite component of the missile attack warning system (EWS) does not inspire optimism. However, a few days ago, a message flashed in the news: the early warning system is in order and the country is protected from attack from any direction. But what does the word "protected" mean if Russia does not have a global missile defense system? There is only an outdated missile defense system in Moscow, which will not be able to fend off a massive attack, although with a certain probability it will save the capital from one or two warheads (warheads). However, what mad nation would dare to strike with such forces? The United States today also does not have a reliable missile defense system, although technologically they are capable of shooting down warheads somewhere over Arctic Canada (figuratively speaking, this is more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet) .
There is only one defense against a nuclear attack on Russia: the threat of retaliation. A grim strategy of assured, mutual destruction, born in the era of the Great Confrontation. The state of our nuclear forces is described in the article. In the process of “getting up from their knees”, they suffered significantly, but, apparently, they are still capable of destroying the United States. The problem is, will we have time to respond if America decides to launch a disarming strike? During such an attack, it should be noted that millions of people will die from radioactive fallout, even if only nuclear infrastructure facilities are chosen as targets.
The missile, launched from the United States, will reach its target in Russia in 27-30 minutes. The ability to strike back before the silos are disabled and missile submarines are destroyed at piers or sunk by hunter submarines at sea depends critically on how quickly and reliably the fact of a nuclear attack on Russia can be established. It is highly desirable to detect missile launches in order to have the maximum margin of time. And this can only be done with the help of the early warning satellite constellation.
According to data from various sources, against 16 American early warning satellites, Russia today has only 2! The article below talks about three satellites, but one of them, apparently, has already stopped working.http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1827540.html. It remains to rely only on ground-based early warning radars. Consequently, for most of the day, the early warning system does not see the territory of the United States and almost the entire water area of the World Ocean. This means that in the event of a nuclear attack, Russia would have less than 15 minutes to assess the situation and make a decision. This is too little!
Question: How did we get to this point? What did the government do in the "fat 2000s", swimming in petrodollars? Preparing for the Olympics in Sochi? Now the Defense Ministry is cheerfully reporting on plans to restore the early warning satellite constellation. Let's hope they make it.
Dmitry Zotiev
The author of the following article is Fedor Chemerev, published on the websitehttp://gazeta.eot.su/article/kosmicheskiy-eshelon-sprn.
The last spacecraft of the Russian missile attack warning system (SPRN) was launched on March 30, 2012. Shortly before this, the circumstances of its creation were discussed at the forum of the Novosti Kosmonavtiki magazine. The result of the discussion was the words of one of its participants:“Regarding this car, I would ask you not to flatter yourself, and not to mock” .
Bitter as it may seem, but these words can be fully applied to the entire space industry and, undoubtedly, to the space echelon of early warning systems. And this is extremely worrisome.
By the mid-2000s, the first signs of another round of space militarization appeared. In February 2004, the US Air Force's U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan-2004". Later, the main provisions of the report were reflected in the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, known as the "Unified Perspective-2010", which received further development in the document "Unified Perspective-2020". It is stated that the main principle of the construction of the American armed forces is "all-encompassing domination." The US Army must be ready to conduct large-scale military operations, including in space, with the most decisive goals.
An important place in development plans technical means related to military space is assigned to the space echelon of the new generation early warning system.
From the early 1970s to the present, the United States has been in service with the IMEWS (Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellite) system with spacecraft (SC) in geostationary orbits (GSO). The task of the system is, together with ground-based radars, to detect launches of Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the launch site.
Currently, nine IMEWS satellites are located over the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and the European zone, the coverage areas of which cover the entire band along the equator. All of them are equipped with infrared radiation receivers, with the help of which missile launches are detected. The last satellite of this constellation was launched in December 2007.
The more modern SBIRS ("Space-Based Infrared System") is designed to replace the IMEWS system. This is an integrated system, which includes four geostationary satellites (GEO), two vehicles in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) and ground points for collecting and processing data and constellation control. As part of this system, it is planned to have up to 24 low-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. All SBIRS spacecraft are equipped with infrared radiation receivers.
STSS low-orbit satellites are designed to detect strategic, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and support military formations and individual units. Their task is to escort a rocket detected by high-orbit satellites SBIRS or IMEWS. The objects of detection and further tracking may be warheads and other missile fragments after they have been separated. In the future, STSS satellites will be equipped with laser radars to measure the range and determine the target state vector.
As of March 2013, the combined SBIRS-STSS constellation is represented by seven satellites: GEO-1 (USA-230, 2011), GEO-2 (USA-241, 2013), HEO-1 (USA-184, 2006), HEO- 2 (USA-200, 2008), STSS-ATRR (USA-205, 2009), STSS Demo 1 (USA-208, 2009) and STSS Demo 2 (USA-209, 2009).
What is the situation with the Russian SPRN space group? According to the Internet resource "Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia", as of November 2013, our early warning system included two satellites of the 74D6 type in highly elliptical orbits (VEO) - Kosmos-2422 and Kosmos-2446 (US-KS system) and one in geostationary orbit - Cosmos-2479 (type 71X6, US-KMO system). These are the last satellites manufactured at NPO. Lavochkin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, funding for work on the US-KS system has practically ceased, and by 1995, on the US-KMO system as well. The assembly of vehicles to maintain the orbital group was made from parts and assemblies left over from the Soviet era. To date, these backlogs have been exhausted.
Total - sixteen against three! Such is the quantitative ratio of the forces of the United States and Russia in the space segment of early warning systems. What about quality? What can we oppose to "all-encompassing domination"?
It is believed that the project of the United space system(EKS). The lead developer of the system is JSC “Corporation “Kometa”. This enterprise specializes in the creation of command posts, global information and control systems for various purposes, the development, production and operation of hardware and software tools for ground and aerospace complexes of control, monitoring and telecommunications.
Kometa has been the lead developer of the US-K, US-KS (Oko), US-KMO (Oko-1) systems since Soviet times. The lead developer of spacecraft for these systems was NPO im. Lavochkin. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Television (VNIIT) developed on-board television-type detection equipment, and the State Optical Institute. Vavilov (GOI) - equipment of a heat direction finding type.
In NPO them. Lavochkin always insisted on the concept laid down in the US-K system. It provided for the presence of only four satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), located so that the observation areas of individual devices in the aggregate would cover all missile hazardous regions (ROR). In addition, each satellite must observe from the upper part of the orbit for 6 hours. The movement of the satellites was synchronized in such a way that at any time any point of the ROP was under observation, and the satellites also insured each other. For this purpose, a device was created with a three-axis orientation system and with the ability to control along all three axes. Its delivery into orbit could be carried out by the light Molniya-M rocket, which is three times cheaper than launching it into the GEO using the heavy Proton-K rocket. Brilliant technical solution! Wasn't it the prototype for the HEO satellites of the new American SBIRS system?
However, due to problems with the detection equipment (they were eliminated only in 1984), the US-K had to be abandoned - in favor of the US-KS system with eight satellites on the HEO and one insurer on the GSO. The obvious shortcomings of the US-KS, in fact, a temporary system, caused distrust on the part of a number of Kometa specialists in the very idea of using highly elliptical spacecraft. Moreover, they were not used in the American IMEWS.
Perhaps these disagreements played a role in the fact that the long-time partner of "Kometa" - NPO im. Lavochkin - outside the CEN project. But there is another explanation as well. Comet needed partners with money. And those who, by the time the tender for the development of spacecraft was held, already had sources of funding other than state ones, could have them. At NPO them. Lavochkin was not there. And they were, for example, at the GKNPTs them. Khrunichev - from commercial launches - until the supply of Protons runs out. RSC Energia, a participant in international projects with the Mir and ISS orbital stations, also had good prospects.
But could it be otherwise in the conditions of very modest funding for protracted space programs? Gazprom probably proceeded from the same logic by ordering Energia satellites of the Yamal series. And, thereby, financed the development of a new direction for Energia - unmanned spacecraft modern type. And this intellectual and technological backlog is no less valuable than Gazprom's finances.
One way or another, today it is Energia that is the lead developer of the EKS spacecraft. The spacecraft, apparently, is being built on the basis of the Yamal universal non-hermetic platform that meets the requirements of modularity, in which the control, power supply, and thermal control systems are concentrated. The platform has been comprehensively worked out - the Yamals have been operating for more than 9 years.
According to experts, writes Gazeta.Ru, the EKS will be able to detect launches not only of ICBMs, ballistic missiles of submarines, but also operational-tactical and tactical missiles, as well as service the military communications system. Energia has the resources necessary to create a spacecraft. But how long will it take?
Unfortunately, media reports that mention CEN are not encouraging yet. Until recently, Energia had problems with the military. In November 2011, Kommersant.ru reported that the subject of the proceedings in arbitration court Moscow was the failure to complete the work on the CEN. And this is after their transfer from June 2008 to May 2010!
From the publication in Krasnaya Zvezda dated February 3, 2014, it follows that the construction of the assembly and test building for the EKS spacecraft (run by Spetsstroy of Russia) is unlikely to be completed before the end of the year. The report of Interfax.ru (September 3, 2013) that the head of one of the departments of Spetsstroy, Alexander Belov, was charged with embezzling a large amount of money as part of the GLONASS program is alarming. The leadership of Roskosmos is being reshuffled, and there is talk of reorganizing the rocket and space industry.
It is reported that three-quarters of the electronics in Russian spacecraft are imported. Can't there be dangerous "special bookmarks" in it? In addition, at any time, the manufacturer of a microcircuit or processor can stop producing them - and our hardware developers and programmers will find themselves in a very difficult situation.
All this contributes little to productive, rhythmic work. And time goes by. Will the creators of the CEN even have time to start the first flight design tests before the last Lavochka satellites fall down?
The situation is reminiscent of the beginning of 1999. By that time, the orbital constellation had also “melted away”. However, then the other segments of the early warning system did not inspire optimism. Now the situation is better, the hopes of the military leadership are connected with over-the-horizon radar stations - work on their construction and putting on experimental combat duty is going according to plan.
But it is important to understand that the absence of a space-based early warning system, which means the presence of "holes" in the warning system, can devalue the entire Russian nuclear missile shield - our deterrent weapon. In addition, the unreliability of Russia's early warning system is a powerful argument for the information-psychological war against us.
After the incident with the Korean Boeing-747, shot down by a Soviet fighter in September 1983, the USSR was accused of exceeding the required level of defense and almost of cannibalism. “Burned with milk”, in May 1987, the air defense forces allowed the sports plane of 18-year-old Mathias Rust to land on Red Square. And they became the subject of ridicule from the "world community" and some compatriots. As a result, the command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR underwent significant changes. And then there was August 1991...
By the beginning of 1995, the orbital constellation of the early warning system of Russia consisted of 11 satellites. And still, a mistake occurred - when on January 25, 1995, the Norwegian-American, as they later said, research four-stage Black Brant XII rocket was launched, the Russian early warning system qualified it as a nuclear missile attack. It came to the "nuclear briefcase". The world has gone through some unpleasant hours.
Three years later, on March 15 and 16, 1998, the Washington Post published two articles by D. Hoffman under the unifying title "Shattered Shield" ("Leaky Shield") - about the degradation of the Russian missile defense system.
A year later, the Rossiyskiye Vesti newspaper launched a discussion about Russian missile defense. During the discussion, T. Postol, an expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said: “There are many Russian military installations that can be hit from Alaska, and these installations will be destroyed, and the Russian military will not even know that there was a missile attack ... The situation is very risky, because it can initiate a decision by Russia to immediately retaliate, which will be based on unreliable information.”
So, step by step, the dominant opinion in Russian expert circles was the lack of confidence that Russia would be able to repulse the aggressor in time and reliably. Isn't that why the discussion about Russian missile defense was started?
Now our relations with the US have not improved at all. In this situation, gaps in the space echelon of the early warning system may become another reason for putting pressure on the Russian elites (they say that the statements of the Russian authorities about the power of the nuclear missile shield are a bluff, Russia will not be able to prevent missile attack). And if the opinion that our shield is rusted and good for nothing really prevails in the elite and society, then the situation may worsen catastrophically.
There is another year, maybe two. I would like to believe that the creators of the early warning system will have time. In these minutes, only three "Lavochkin" satellites protect the borders of the Fatherland. We wish them success in their difficult service. And to all the creators of early warning systems, especially those in whose hands the fate of spacecraft is in their hands - responsibility to the country and people they are called upon to protect.
Fedor Chemerev
In developing plans for war with the Soviet Union, American strategists were very concerned about how to protect US territory. The launch of the first Soviet artificial Earth satellite showed that the USSR is not inferior to the United States in creating powerful launch vehicles, and in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union, the aggressor will receive a retaliatory nuclear missile strike. Working hard on the creation of various anti-missile defense systems, American military specialists and scientists paid constant attention to the development of such reconnaissance means that would make it possible to detect enemy missile launches as early as possible. Separated from a potential enemy by boundless ocean expanses, the United States sought to maintain its habitual position of an "impregnable fortress", all the advantages of which they deeply felt during the First and especially the Second World Wars. The appearance of nuclear weapons in the USSR and the creation of long-range missiles in no way corresponded to the stereotypes of thinking of the overseas military, and they seriously thought about how to neutralize the possible actions of a potential enemy.
It was decided first of all to create an effective missile attack warning system. Already in the late 1950s, the construction of radar posts for the early warning system for ballistic missiles "Beamyus" began. To detect missiles and warheads of a potential enemy at the farthest possible frontiers, these posts were pushed as far as possible to the territory of the Soviet Union. In 1960, the installation of radar stations was completed ( radar) in Tula (Greenland), the following year, a radar station in Alaska was put into operation and in 1963, a station in England near Fylingdales.
All posts of the Beamyus system housed warhead detection and tracking stations. Their technical capabilities made it possible to detect targets moving towards the North American continent at a distance of up to 5000 kilometers. The processing of the information coming from the stations was carried out automatically during
10-15 seconds with the help of powerful electronic computers.
However, according to the Pentagon, this did not full guarantee timely detection of flying warheads, and even if successful, the error in determining the points of their fall was tens and hundreds of kilometers. This made it difficult to decide on the interception of warheads, and in Washington there were repeated demands for the creation of a missile attack warning system that would sound an alarm immediately at the time of the launch of Soviet missiles.
The further development of the missile attack warning system took place in two ways. Firstly, over-the-horizon radars were developed, which, unlike stations operating within line-of-sight, used a radio beam reflected from the ionosphere and propagating along the Earth-ionosphere channel. This made it possible to significantly increase the range of radar stations and receive a warning about missile launches
20-25 minutes before they reach the target. The first over-the-horizon radars "Teepee" and "Madre" were built in the 1960s.
The second direction in the improvement of the early warning system, which later became the main one, was the creation of special satellites with optical-electronic reconnaissance devices. Over-the-horizon radar stations, stations of the Beamuse system, reconnaissance satellites work in a complex, forming single system missile attack warnings. During 1960-1963, Atlas-Agena launch vehicles launched 9 Midas satellites into near-Earth orbits. They were equipped with infrared sensors designed to detect the emission of torches from the engines of launching rockets.
During the operation of these satellites, it turned out that in some positions spacecraft relative to the direction to the Sun, the solar radiation reflected from the Earth distorted the whole picture and optoelectronic equipment sometimes gave false signals about the launch of Soviet missiles.
Harold Brown, Chief of Science and Technology at the US Department of Defense, admitted in July 1963 with deep regret that of the $423 million spent under the Midas program, at least half was wasted. The program has undergone a radical redesign, as a result of which new project missile attack early warning system code 461. It provided for the launch of new (temporary) satellites into relatively low earth orbits. They were supposed to install a new optoelectronic system based on the use of infrared detectors, more accurately tuned to the radiation parameters of rocket engine torches. A television camera with a telephoto lens, working in conjunction with these detectors, made it possible to increase the reliability of the information received.
Promising results were soon obtained in the creation of multi-element infrared photodetectors, which could record the radiation of torches at much greater distances. In the middle of 1966, work began on the creation of satellites of the 266 and 249 series, designed to be launched into orbits far from the Earth. The main bet was now placed on satellites, which should be launched into geostationary (synchronous) orbits with a height of about 36 thousand kilometers. In August 1968, the first satellite was launched into geostationary orbit. The choice of orbit parameters ensured best review northern regions of the USSR. In April of the following year, the second satellite of this type was launched into space in such a way that at least one apparatus was constantly located above the northern hemisphere.
In 1972 the satellite system "Imeus"(Integrated Multi-Purpose Early Warning Satellite) was deemed serviceable and placed at the disposal of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
In recent years, as a rule, three DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites launched into geostationary orbits from Cape Canaveral have been used for early detection of Soviet missile launches in the United States. One satellite is located over the Indian Ocean and registers launches of land-based strategic missiles. The second is over the Pacific Ocean and the third is over South America. They must record the launches of ballistic missiles from submarines.
In June 1981, the US Department of Defense signed a contract with TRW for the manufacture of 4 second-generation DSP satellites, which should be distinguished by higher survivability in the event of enemy opposition. Their launch into orbit is carried out with the help of reusable space shuttles. Reserve (“sleeping”) satellites are also placed in orbits, which, at the necessary moment, upon a command from the Earth, will immediately “wake up” and start working.
The signals received by the sensors about the launch of enemy missiles are processed and transmitted to the headquarters of NORAD and the Air Force Space Command. According to the American press, in the 1980s the time from the moment the missiles were launched to the receipt of information at the NORAD headquarters was about three minutes. Further measures were taken to reduce this time.
The Pentagon rated the reliability of the missile attack early warning system quite highly: “We have developed satellites that can detect ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles almost from the moment they are launched, and also monitor them.” However, his optimism was not supported by the statements of other military experts, who pointed out the high vulnerability of the Imeyus satellites as the main drawback. In their opinion, it would be necessary to provide for the launch of false targets from them at a threatening moment, as well as the possibility of their maneuvering in order to evade enemy weapons in time, as a protection for these satellites.
A few words about the NORAD command receiving information from early warning satellites. It is housed in underground galleries in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The underground complex is serviced by three shifts of engineers, operators, communications specialists. Each shift includes 250 people. Another 650 specialists are employed in auxiliary work. The underground city is carefully guarded. All personnel are double checked at special checkpoints before entering the tunnel and at the entrance to the command post premises.
All this is designed to prevent the possibility of sabotage, which the NORAD command is very afraid of. Based on the concept of a "protracted" nuclear war, an increased autonomy of the underground complex was provided. Monthly supplies of water and food have been created, a block of six powerful diesel generators has been reserved to supply equipment and life support systems with electricity. To protect personnel and equipment from the action of seismic shock waves of a nuclear explosion, all rooms of the command post are equipped with spring shock absorbers.
The NORAD command receives information about the launch of missiles of a potential enemy not only from satellites. NORAD headquarters receives information from Pavepoz radars designed to detect submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), from radars on the island of Shemiya, tracking objects in outer space, radars of the Beamuse early warning system and a number of other sources.
At the NORAD headquarters, the received data is quickly analyzed and, if necessary, transferred to the command post of the Strategic Command and to the national command post in Fort Richie (Maryland).
Immediately upon receiving a signal from satellites about a possible missile attack, the US armed forces are gradually transferred to an increased degree of combat readiness. Distrust of the Soviet Union and suspicion during the years of the Cold War were so great that the first stage (according to American terminology, “cocked the trigger”) began with a signal from early warning satellites, even in the event of a test launch by a potential adversary, which was advance notice. If there is no signal to cancel the alarm, then the process of transferring the strategic forces to increased combat readiness automatically continues. Simultaneously global military system command and control transmits alarm signals to the US Department of Defense, to command posts (about 100) located in various regions of the globe, and to the White House operations center. There, in the so-called situational room, incoming information is analyzed and discussed. main question- Has the time come when it is necessary to inform the president so that he can make a decision on the use of strategic nuclear forces?
In addition to over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars, the Soviet early warning missile system used a space component based on artificial earth satellites (AES). This made it possible to significantly increase the reliability of information and detect ballistic missiles almost immediately after launch. In 1980, the ICBM launch early detection system (Oko system) began to function, consisting of four satellites US-K (Unified Control System) in highly elliptical orbits and the Central Ground Command Post (TsKP) in Serpukhov-15 near Moscow (garrison " Kurilovo"), also known as the "Western KP". Information from the satellites came to parabolic antennas covered with large radio-transparent domes, multi-ton antennas continuously tracked the constellation of early warning satellites in highly elliptical and geostationary orbits.
The apogees of the highly elliptical orbit of the US-K satellite were located over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This made it possible to observe the base areas of American ICBMs on both daily orbits and at the same time maintain direct communication with the command post near Moscow or in the Far East. To reduce the illumination by radiation reflected from the Earth and clouds, the satellites observed not vertically downward, but at an angle. One satellite could carry out control for 6 hours, for round-the-clock operation there had to be at least four spacecraft in orbit. To ensure reliable and reliable observation, the satellite constellation had to have nine devices - this achieved the necessary duplication in case of premature failure of the satellites, and also made it possible to observe simultaneously two or three satellites, which reduced the likelihood of false alarms. And there have been such cases: it is known that on September 26, 1983, the system gave a false alarm about a missile attack, this happened as a result of reflection sunlight from the clouds. Fortunately, the duty shift of the command post acted professionally, and the signal, after analyzing all the circumstances, was found to be false. A satellite constellation of nine satellites, which provides simultaneous observation by several satellites and, as a result, high reliability of information, began to function in 1987.
Antenna complex "Western KP"
The Oko system was officially put into service in 1982; since 1984, another satellite in geostationary orbit began to work in its composition. The US-KS (Oko-S) spacecraft was a modified US-K satellite designed to operate in geostationary orbit. The satellites of this modification were placed at a point of standing at 24° west longitude, providing observation of the central part of the United States at the edge of the visible disk of the earth's surface. Satellites in geostationary orbit have a significant advantage - they do not change their position relative to the earth's surface and are able to provide duplication of data received from a constellation of satellites in highly elliptical orbits. In addition to control over the continental United States, the Soviet space satellite control system provided surveillance of the combat patrol areas of American SSBNs in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
In addition to the "Western KP" in the Moscow region, 40 km south of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, on the shores of Lake Khummi, the "Eastern KP" ("Gaiter-1") was built. At the control center of the early warning system in the central part of the country and in the Far East, information received from spacecraft was continuously processed, with its subsequent transfer to the Main Missile Attack Warning Center (MC PRN), located near the village of Timonovo, Solnechnogorsk district, Moscow region (“Solnechnogorsk- 7").
Google earth snapshot: "Eastern KP"
Unlike the "Western KP", which is more dispersed on the ground, the object in the Far East is located much more compactly, seven parabolic antennas under radio-transparent domes white color lined up in two rows. Interestingly, nearby were the receiving antennas of the Duga over-the-horizon radar, which is also part of the early warning system. In general, in the 1980s, an unprecedented concentration of military units and formations was observed in the vicinity of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The large Far Eastern military-industrial center and the units and formations stationed in this area were protected from air strikes by the 8th Air Defense Corps.
After the Oko system was placed on combat duty, work began on the creation of its improved version. This was due to the need to detect launching missiles not only from the continental United States, but also from other regions of the globe. Deployment new system US-KMO (Unified System for Control of the Seas and Oceans) "Oko-1" with satellites in geostationary orbit began in the Soviet Union in February 1991 with the launch of a second-generation spacecraft, and it was already adopted by the Russian armed forces in 1996. Distinctive feature of the Oko-1 system was the use of vertical observation of the launch of missiles against the background of the earth's surface, this makes it possible not only to register the fact of the launch of missiles, but also to determine the direction of their flight. For this, satellites 71X6 (US-KMO) are equipped with an infrared telescope with a mirror 1 m in diameter and a solar protective screen 4.5 m in size.
The full constellation of satellites was to include seven satellites in geostationary orbits and four satellites in high elliptical orbits. All of them, regardless of the orbit, are capable of detecting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs against the background of the earth's surface and cloud cover. The launch of satellites into orbit was carried out by the Proton-K launch vehicle from the Baikonur cosmodrome.
It was not possible to implement all the plans to build the SPRN orbital constellation; in total, 8 US-KMO vehicles were launched from 1991 to 2012. By the middle of 2014, there were two 73D6 devices in the limitedly functional system, which could work only a few hours a day. But in January 2015, they also failed. The reason for this situation was the low reliability of onboard equipment, instead of the planned 5-7 years of active work, the service life of the satellites was 2-3 years. The most annoying thing is that the liquidation of the Russian satellite constellation of warning about a missile attack did not occur during the time of Gorbachev's "perestroika" or Yeltsin's "Time of Troubles", but in the well-fed years of "revival" and "rising from his knees", when huge funds were spent on "image events ". Since the beginning of 2015, our missile attack warning system has been based only on over-the-horizon radars, which, of course, reduces the time it takes to make a decision on a retaliatory strike.
Unfortunately, with the ground part of the satellite warning system, too, everything was not going smoothly. On May 10, 2001, a fire broke out at the TsKP in the Moscow region, while the building and ground communications and control equipment were seriously damaged. According to some reports, direct damage from the fire amounted to 2 billion rubles. Due to the fire, communication with Russian early warning satellites was lost for 12 hours.
In the second half of the 90s, on a top secret Soviet time object near Komsomolsk-on-Amur as a demonstration of "openness" and "gesture of good will" a group of "foreign inspectors" was admitted. Then, especially for the arrival of the "guests", at the entrance to the "Eastern KP" they hung a sign "Center for Tracking Space Objects", which still hangs.
At the moment, the future of the Russian early warning satellite constellation has not been determined. So, at the "Eastern KP" most of the equipment is decommissioned and mothballed. About half of the military and civilian specialists involved in the operation and maintenance of the Eastern KP, data processing and relaying underwent reduction, and the infrastructure of the Far Eastern control center began to deteriorate.
According to information published in the media, the Oko-1 system should be replaced by the satellite of the Unified Space System (EKS). Created in Russia satellite system CEN functionally is in many ways an analogue of the American SBIRS. In addition to the 14F142 Tundra devices that track missile launches and calculate trajectories, the EKS should also include satellites of the Liana marine space reconnaissance and target designation system, devices of the optical-electronic and radar reconnaissance complex and geodetic satellite system.
The launch of the Tundra satellite into a high elliptical orbit was originally scheduled for mid-2015, but later the launch was postponed to November 2015. The launch of the device, which received the designation "Cosmos-2510", was carried out from the Russian Plesetsk cosmodrome using a Soyuz-2.1b launch vehicle. The only satellite in orbit, of course, is not capable of providing a full-fledged early warning of a missile attack, and serves mainly to prepare and adjust ground equipment, train and train calculations.
In the early 70s, work began in the USSR on the creation effective system ABM of the city of Moscow, which was supposed to provide the defense of the city from single warheads. Among other technical innovations was the introduction of radar stations with fixed multi-element phased antenna arrays into the anti-missile system. This made it possible to view (scan) space in a wide-angle sector in the azimuthal and vertical planes. Prior to the start of construction in the Moscow region, an experimental truncated model of the Don-2NP station was built and tested at the Sary-Shagan training ground.
The central and most complex element of the A-135 missile defense system was the Don-2N all-round radar operating in the centimeter range. This radar is a truncated pyramid about 35 meters high with a side length of about 140 meters at the base and about 100 meters along the roof. In each of the four faces there are fixed large-aperture active phased antenna arrays (receiving and transmitting) that provide all-round visibility. The transmitting antenna radiates a signal in a pulse with a power of up to 250 MW.
Radar "Don-2N"
The uniqueness of this station lies in its versatility and versatility. The Don-2N radar solves the tasks of detecting ballistic targets, selecting, tracking, measuring coordinates and pointing interceptor missiles with a nuclear warhead at them. The station is controlled by a computer complex with a capacity of up to a billion operations per second, built on the basis of four Elbrus-2 supercomputers.
The construction of the station and anti-missile mines began in 1978 in the Pushkinsky district, 50 km north of Moscow. During the construction of the station, more than 30,000 tons of metal, 50,000 tons of concrete were used, 20,000 kilometers of various cables were laid. Hundreds of kilometers of water pipes were required to cool the equipment. Work on installation, installation and adjustment of equipment was carried out from 1980 to 1987. In 1989, the station was put into trial operation. The A-135 missile defense system itself was officially put into service on February 17, 1995.
Initially, the Moscow missile defense system provided for the use of two echelons of interception of targets: long-range anti-missiles 51T6 at high altitudes outside the atmosphere and shorter-range anti-missiles 53T6 in the atmosphere. According to the information released by the Russian Defense Ministry, the 51T6 interceptor missiles were removed from combat duty in 2006 due to the expiration of the warranty period. At the moment, only 53T6 near-field anti-missiles with a maximum range of 60 km and altitude of 45 km remain in the A-135 system. In order to extend the service life of 53T6 interceptor missiles, since 2011, in the course of a planned modernization, they are being equipped with new engines and guidance equipment based on a new element base with an improved software. Since 1999, tests of anti-missiles in service have been carried out regularly. The last test at the Sary-Shagan test site took place on June 21, 2016.
Despite the fact that the A-135 anti-missile system was quite advanced by the standards of the mid-80s, its capabilities made it possible to reliably repel only a limited nuclear strike with single warheads. Until the early 2000s, Moscow's missile defense system could successfully withstand monoblock Chinese ballistic missiles equipped with rather primitive means of overcoming missile defense. By the time it was put into service, the A-135 system could no longer intercept all the American thermonuclear warheads aimed at Moscow, deployed on the LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM and UGM-133A Trident II SLBM.
Google earth snapshot: Don-2N radar and 53T6 anti-missile silo
According to data published in open sources, as of January 2016, 68 53T6 interceptor missiles were deployed in silo launchers in five position areas in the vicinity of Moscow. Twelve mines are located in close proximity to the Don-2N radar.
In addition to detecting ballistic missile attacks, tracking them and targeting them with anti-missiles, the Don-2N station is involved in the missile attack warning system. With a viewing angle of 360 degrees, it is possible to detect warheads of ICBMs at a distance of up to 3,700 km. It is possible to control outer space at a distance (height) up to 40,000 km. For a number of parameters, the Don-2N radar is still unsurpassed. In February 1994, during the ODERACS program from the American Shuttle in February 1994, 6 metal balls were thrown into outer space, two each with a diameter of 5, 10 and 15 centimeters. They were in earth orbit from 6 to 13 months, after which they burned up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. The purpose of this program was to find out the possibilities for detecting small space objects, calibrating radars and optical means in order to track "space debris". Only the Russian station "Don-2N" was able to detect and plot the trajectories of the smallest objects with a diameter of 5 cm at a distance of 500-800 km with a target height of 352 km. After detection, their escort was carried out at a distance of up to 1500 km.
In the second half of the 70s, after the appearance in the United States of SSBNs armed with UGM-96 Trident I SLBMs with MIRVs, and the announcement of plans to deploy the MGM-31C Pershing II IRBM in Europe, the Soviet leadership decided to create a network of over-the-horizon medium-potential decimeter range stations in the west of the USSR. New radars, due to their high resolution, in addition to detecting missile launches, could provide accurate target designation for missile defense systems. It was supposed to build four radars with digital information processing, created using the technology of solid-state modules and having the ability to tun the frequency in two bands. The basic principles of building a new station 70M6 "Volga" were worked out at the range radar "Danube-3UP" in Sary-Shagan. The construction of a new early warning radar began in 1986 in Belarus, 8 km northeast of the city of Gantsevichi.
During the construction, for the first time in the USSR, the method of accelerated construction of a multi-storey technological building from large-sized structural modules with the necessary embedded elements for installing equipment with connecting power supply and cooling systems was applied. New technology The construction of objects of this kind from modules manufactured at Moscow factories and delivered to the construction site allowed to reduce the construction time by about half and significantly reduced the cost. This was the first experience of creating a high-factory early warning early warning radar station, which was later developed during the creation of the Voronezh radar station. The receiving and transmitting antennas are similar in design and built on the basis of AFAR. The size of the transmitting part is 36×20 meters, the receiving part is 36×36 meters. The positions of the receiving and transmitting parts are separated by 3 km from each other. The modular design of the station allows for a phased upgrade without removing it from combat duty.
The receiving part of the radar "Volga"
In connection with the conclusion of an agreement on the liquidation of the INF Treaty, the construction of the station was frozen in 1988. After Russia lost the early warning system in Latvia, the construction of the Volga radar station in Belarus resumed. In 1995, a Russian-Belarusian agreement was concluded, according to which the communication center of the Navy "Vileika" and ORTU "Gantsevichi" together with land plots were transferred to Russia for 25 years without the collection of all types of taxes and fees. As compensation, the Belarusian side was written off part of the debts for energy carriers, the Belarusian military personnel are partially servicing the nodes, and the Belarusian side is provided with information on the rocket and space situation and admission to the Ashuluk air defense range.
Due to the loss of economic ties, which was associated with the collapse of the USSR and insufficient funding, construction and installation work delayed until the end of 1999. Only in December 2001 did the station take up experimental combat duty, and on October 1, 2003, the Volga radar was put into service. This is the only station of this type built.
Google earth snapshot: receiving part of the Volga radar
The early warning radar station in Belarus primarily controls the patrol areas of American, British and French SSBNs in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. The Volga radar is capable of detecting and identifying space objects and ballistic missiles, as well as tracking their trajectories, calculating launch and fall points, the detection range of SLBMs reaches 4800 km in an azimuth sector of 120 degrees. Radar information from the Volga radar is transmitted in real time to the Main Missile Attack Warning Center. Currently, this is the only operating facility of the Russian missile attack warning system located abroad.
The most modern and promising in terms of tracking missile-hazardous areas are the Russian early warning radars of the 77Ya6 Voronezh-M / DM type in the meter and decimeter range. In terms of their capabilities in terms of detecting and tracking ballistic missile warheads, the Voronezh stations are superior to the radars of the previous generation, but the cost of their construction and operation is several times lower. Unlike the stations "Dnepr", "Don-2N", "Daryal" and "Volga", the construction and debugging of which sometimes stretched for 10 years, the early warning radars of the Voronezh series have a high degree of factory readiness, and from the moment construction began to putting on combat duty usually takes 2-3 years, the period of installation of the radar does not exceed 1.5-2 years. The station is a block-container type, includes 23 equipment elements in factory-made containers.
Early warning radar "Voronezh-M" in Lekhtusi
The station consists of a transceiver unit with AFAR, a prefabricated building for personnel and containers with electronic equipment. The modular design principle makes it possible to quickly and cost-effectively upgrade the radar during operation. As part of the radar, control and data processing equipment, modules and nodes are used that allow to form a station with the necessary performance characteristics from a unified set of structural elements, in accordance with the operational and tactical requirements at the location. Thanks to the use of a new element base, advanced design solutions and the use of an optimal operating mode, compared to old-type stations, power consumption has been significantly reduced. Software management of the potential in the sector of responsibility in terms of range, angles and time makes it possible to rationally use the power of the radar. Depending on the situation, it is possible to quickly distribute energy resources in the working area of the radar during peaceful and threatened periods. The built-in diagnostic system and highly informative control system also reduce the cost of maintaining the radar. Thanks to the use of high-performance computing tools, it is possible to simultaneously track up to 500 objects.
Elements of the antenna meter radar "Voronezh-M"
To date, three real-life modifications of the Voronezh radar are known. Stations of the Voronezh-M type (77Ya6) operate in the meter range, the target detection range is up to 6000 km. Radar "Voronezh-DM" (77Ya6-DM) operate in the decimeter range, the range is up to 4500 km horizontally and up to 8000 km vertically. UHF stations with a shorter detection range are better suited for missile defense tasks, since the accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets is higher than that of meter-range radars. In the short term, the detection range of the Voronezh-DM radar should be increased to 6,000 km. The last known modification is the Voronezh-VP (77Y6-VP) - a development of the 77Y6 Voronezh-M. This is a high-potential meter range radar with a power consumption of up to 10 MW. Due to the increase in the power of the emitted signal and the introduction of new modes of operation, the possibility of detecting subtle targets in conditions of organized interference has increased. According to the published information, Voronezh-VP of the meter range, in addition to the tasks of early warning systems, is capable of detecting aerodynamic targets at medium and high altitudes at a considerable distance. This allows you to record the massive takeoff of long-range bombers and tanker aircraft of "potential partners". But the statements of some "cheers-patriotic" site visitors " Military Review» about the possibility of using these stations to conduct effective control of the entire airspace of the continental part of the United States, of course, does not correspond to reality.
Google earth snapshot: Voronezh-M radar in Lekhtusi
Currently, eight Voronezh-M/DM stations under construction or in operation are known. The first Voronezh-M station was built in Leningrad region near the village of Lekhtusi in 2006. The radar station in Lehtusi took up combat duty on February 11, 2012, covering the northwestern missile-hazardous direction, instead of the destroyed Daryal radar station in Skrunda. Support base is located in Lehtusi educational process Military Space Academy named after A.F. Mozhaisky, where training and training of personnel for other Voronezh radars is carried out. It was reported about plans to upgrade the head station to the level of "Voronezh-VP".
Google earth snapshot: Voronezh-DM radar near Armavir
The next station was Voronezh-DM in Krasnodar Territory near Armavir, built on the site of the runway of the former airfield. It consists of two segments. One closes the gap formed after the loss of the Dnepr radar station on the Crimean peninsula, the other replaced the Gabala Darial radar station in Azerbaijan. The radar station built near Armavir controls the southern and southwestern direction.
Another UHF station was built in the Kaliningrad region at the abandoned Dunaevka airfield. This radar covers the zone of responsibility of the Volga radar in Belarus and the Dnepr radar in Ukraine. The Voronezh-DM station in the Kaliningrad region is the westernmost Russian early warning radar and is capable of controlling space over most of Europe, including the British Isles.
Google earth snapshot: Voronezh-M radar in Mishelevka
The second Voronezh-M meter-range radar was built in Mishelevka near Irkutsk on the site of the dismantled transmitting position of the Daryal radar. Its antenna field is twice the size of the Lekhtusin one - 6 sections instead of three, and controls the territory from the US west coast to India. As a result, it was possible to expand the field of view to 240 degrees in azimuth. This station replaced the decommissioned Dnepr radar, located in the same place in Mishelevka.
Google earth snapshot: Voronezh-M radar near Orsk
The Voronezh-M station was also built near Orsk, in Orenburg region. It has been in test mode since 2015. Putting on combat duty is scheduled for 2016. After that, it will be possible to control the launches of ballistic missiles from Iran and Pakistan.
Voronezh-DM decimeter radars are being prepared for commissioning in the village of Ust-Kem in the Krasnoyarsk Territory and the village of Konyuhi in the Altai Territory. These stations are planned to cover the northeast and southeast directions. Both radars should start combat duty in the near future. In addition, the Voronezh-M stations in the Komi Republic near Vorkuta, Voronezh-DM in the Amur Region and Voronezh-DM in the Murmansk Region are at various stages of construction. The last station is to replace the Dnepr/Daugava complex.
The adoption of Voronezh-type stations not only significantly expanded the capabilities of missile and space defense, but also makes it possible to place all ground-based early warning systems on the territory of Russia, which should minimize military-political risks and exclude the possibility of economic and political blackmail by CIS partners . In the future, the Russian Defense Ministry intends to completely replace all Soviet missile warning radars with them. It can be said with full confidence that the Voronezh series radars are the best in the world in terms of a set of characteristics. As of the end of 2015, the Main Missile Warning Center of the Space Command of the Aerospace Forces received information from ten ORTUs. There was no such radar coverage by over-the-horizon radars even in the days of the USSR, but Russian system missile attack warnings this moment is unbalanced due to the lack of the necessary satellite constellation in its composition.
According to materials:
http://sputniknews.com
http://englishrussia.com
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-610.html
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/01/status_of_the_russian_early-warning.shtml
I remember the talk that after the collapse of the USSR, half of our country was simply "blind" and not covered from the air. The military honestly admitted that there are holes in the control and surveillance system where they have no idea what is happening during combat duty.
The USSR had one of the best missile attack warning systems of its time. It was based on radar stations located on the territory of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia and Ukraine. The collapse of the Union destroyed its integrity. In the Baltic States, a fully functional Daryal-type station was defiantly blown up shortly after gaining independence. According to experts, under pressure from NATO, Kyiv closed its Dnepr-type anti-missile radars. Another radar station was in Azerbaijan near the village of Gabala. Considered the most powerful in the world. But she also stopped working. Only Belarus has fulfilled and is fulfilling an agreement with Russia on its Volga radar station.
By 2000, Russia had effectively lost the ability to receive timely data on a missile attack. Moreover, back in the mid-1990s, with the degradation of the radio engineering services of the Air Defense Forces, our country lost a single radar field.
If in the USSR the entire airspace over a vast country was monitored around the clock by numerous radar systems, then the Russian Federation was no longer able to do this.
This was not mentioned, but it was not a secret either - the sky above new Russia turned out to be out of control in many places. Not only light aircraft, but also large airliners could fly without any radar support. And it happened when a passenger plane, and even more so a helicopter, crashed somewhere in the taiga, they searched for it for weeks, since it was not known exactly where it disappeared.
And now...
And now, as Spetsstroy of Russia reports, in the Vorkuta region, work is underway to build a new radar complex for early warning of a missile attack warning system (SPRN) and space control "Voronezh-VP".
The Voronezh-VP radar complex under construction consists of two radar stations of the meter and centimeter range. Meter stations have a good practical experience. They have already been tested in Irkutsk and Orsk. The centimeter station will be tested for the first time in Vorkuta. The viewing range of the radar station under construction is about 6,000 kilometers. She will take up combat duty in 2018.
The first such station "Voronezh-M" (M means that the station of the meter range) began to build in May 2005 in the village of Lekhtusi, Leningrad Region. And already in December 2006, she was put on experimental combat duty. This became a world record for the speed of construction and commissioning, albeit a trial one, of such a complex radar complex.
As it turned out, the specialists of the Research Institute for Long-Range Radio Communications and other enterprises that are part of the specialized concern "Radio Engineering and Information Systems", developed not only the latest and very powerful radar, but also the first in the world to implement the technology of the so-called high factory readiness.
The radar, capable of detecting small and high-speed targets at a distance of thousands of kilometers, has a modular design, assembled from blocks built and debugged at the factory. Previously, stations with similar characteristics were built in terms of five to nine years. Now for a year and a half.
VHF stations very organically complement Voronezh-DM UHF stations.
In February 2009, near the city of Armavir in the Krasnodar Territory, the first Voronezh-DM radar was put on experimental combat duty. Two radar buildings have a height of a ten-story building. They contain, figuratively speaking, the electronic brain of the station. It is important that the most modern equipment is mainly of domestic production.
The huge screen of the command post displays a sector of view in the southwestern and southeastern strategic directions from Europe to India. The Armavir radar station is capable of detecting launches of ballistic and cruise missiles from the air, land and from submarines at a distance of up to six thousand kilometers. An ultra-high-speed computer instantly determines the trajectory of the missile and the place where the warhead is likely to fall.
Just one "Voronezh-DM" near Armavir provides the information that was previously collected from three huge radar stations located on the territory of Azerbaijan and Ukraine.
Radar "Voronezh-DM" was created under the leadership of the General Designer of the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications Sergey Saprykin.
For readers of "RG" Sergei Dmitrievich revealed some secrets. According to him, the modularity of the design of domestic radars of high factory readiness makes it possible to build and put into operation the most powerful radar systems anywhere in Russia in just one and a half to two years. No more than two hundred specialists can serve them. For comparison, thousands of highly qualified specialists should serve and work at similar facilities built according to old designs.
Everyone knows that the United States is actively creating a European missile defense system. Americans have always claimed highest efficiency missile defense that they imposed on the Europeans. However, information has recently appeared that the protection of the European missile defense system is not very effective. However, this has never been a secret for our specialists.
General Designer Sergei Saprykin believes, and there is no doubt about the competence of his opinion, that the Americans have only one single missile defense radar station, which has characteristics similar to those possessed by Voronezh-DM. This is a cyclopean in size and very expensive to maintain UEWR radar, which is located on the island of Greenland and is part of the US national missile defense system. In appearance, it is similar to the Soviet anti-missile radars of the Daryal type. Operates in the decimeter range, has two antennas. There are no other radar stations that are close in their characteristics to the capabilities of the Voronezh-DM either in the United States or in other NATO countries. And we have the assembly of such radars put on a conveyor stream.
Russian technologies make it possible, for example, in the future to assemble modular radars not only for military purposes, but also those that will be able to track space hazards on a global scale, in particular, to detect asteroids and large meteorites dangerously approaching our planet in a timely manner. It turns out that "Voronezh" can protect not only Russia, but the whole Earth.
Now construction in progress radar stations of a new generation of both meter and decimeter ranges in the Orenburg region and in the Komi Republic. Radars of the "Voronezh-DM" type near Kaliningrad and "Voronezh-M" near Irkutsk took up combat duty. And two more radar stations near Krasnoyarsk and in the Altai Territory in the south of Central Siberia will begin to operate in the mode of experimental combat duty.
In the future, it is planned to build and put into operation several more radar stations of the Voronezh-M and Voronezh-DM types in the Amur Region, not far from Orsk, Vorkuta and Murmansk. The range of these stations will be at least six thousand kilometers. Russia will acquire radar protection not only in the air, but also in outer space.
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